Being and Time

Abstract

When the young philosopher started his advanced studies at Freiburg after a brilliant Abitur in Constance, Neo-Kantianism was in full command of the German universities. This meant that only two problems were philosophically acceptable: the critical problem of knowledge and the critical problem of values. The Being-problem — and with it all ontology (metaphysics) — had long since been dissolved, indeed by Kant himself. Of course there were reactions against the trend, two in particular, both strongly influenced by Brentano. One of these reactions was Husserl’s phenomenology, which, despite its “transcendental idealism,” gave nevertheless to “ontology” a place of honor. The second reaction was the movement of Neo-Scholasticism, which could claim Brentano as its own, and with him, after the example of St. Thomas, essayed a return to Aristotle. Both these tendencies found in Heidegger a sympathetic audience: Neo-Scholasticism helped him find his way in mediaeval and ancient thought; phenomenology opened up for him what was contemporary. Traces of the latter are discernible in the habilitation thesis of 1915; traces of the former in the emphasis, during the early teaching years, on ancient philosophy as far as Augustine.