Discussion

Abstract

These last two papers I believe present very challenging and constructive points to what we are after. Dr. Eng was presenting first an illustration of how the life-world of a patient is constituted at two different stages of constitution as if the patient had two different life-worlds. But his main effort, it seems to me, has been to show that in both of these stages there is a permanent reference to a fundamental constituted world. Furthermore, it seems that this fundamental constituted world is a constant point of reference for the specific life-worlds. (Here Professor Mohanty’s thoughts and comments are very much in focus.) Secondly, Dr. Eng’s most provocative thesis is that this distorted life-world is not the distortion of the fundamental world, but the possibility of this distortion has been foreseen in the fundamental constituted world understood as Urphänomenon. This thesis is in radical opposition to the analysis made by Henri Ey of how the world of the psychotic patient, not only his life-world, but the fundamental world, is in psychosis distorted to the point that, as I see it, it reveals the limitations of the constitutive factor at large. According to Dr Ey he has no more foothold in his fundamental world.