Abstract
The downfall of Cartesianism in the late 17th century has now been traced to the inability of Cartesians to solve two major problems deriving from conflicts among their metaphysical principles: They could give philosophically satisfactory explanations neither of how minds can know material objects, nor of how mind and matter can causally interact.
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© 1966 Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, Netherlands
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Watson, R.A. (1966). Conclusion. In: The Downfall of Cartesianism 1673–1712. Archives Internationales D’Histoire Des Idees / International Archives of the History of Ideas, vol 11. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-2962-9_9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-2962-9_9
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-90-247-0187-2
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