Abstract
Faith in the legitimacy of big government and its ability to solve the problems that concern ordinary people has declined precipitously, and ideological individualism is on the rise. Privatization is all the rage but leaves us in isolation paradoxes of various kinds. The answer lies in institutional innovations based on the lessons of game theory: seek problem-scale solutions and replace existing conflict with win-win incentives for sustainable cooperation. People are inventing such institutions and making them work while mainstream economists, bogged down in their market failure paradigm, have barely noticed what is going on.
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Randall, A. (1999). Providing for the Common Good in An Era if Resurgent Individualism. In: Casey, F., Schmitz, A., Swinton, S., Zilberman, D. (eds) Flexible Incentives for the Adoption of Environmental Technologies in Agriculture. Natural Resource Management and Policy, vol 17. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-4395-0_20
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-4395-0_20
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