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Moral Principles: Authoritative Norms or Flexible Guidelines?

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Reflective Equilibrium

Part of the book series: Library of Ethics and Applied Philosophy ((LOET,volume 2))

Abstract

A man of principle is a man who acts according to his principles even if he has strong inclinations not to do so. Apparently, principles — at least moral principles — involve requirements that must be satisfied and that cannot be simply set aside. A man of principle will be convinced that he must do what his moral principles prescribe. To him, principles determine what is morally right, and they should therefore be obeyed.

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References

  1. I think most authors assume this feature. An exception is Hare, who contends that principles at a critical level of moral thinking can be of unlimited specificity (Hare 1981, 41).

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  2. Although Hare’s method is certainly not a method of reflective equilibrium, he considers his approach to be a coherentist one, or rather a reconciliation of coherentism and foundationalism (Hare 1996).

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  3. Richardson emphasises that the initial norms should not be absolute with respect to the domain of acts, but rather have the form ‘Generally, one ought to…’. This is necessary to avoid that specifications either are simply implied by the initial norm or that they are logically inconsistent with the initial norm (Richardson 1990, 292). According to DeGrazia, Richardson’s assumption is more or less compatible with seeing moral norms as prima-facie binding.

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  4. The idea that casuistry can operate within a method of application of principles is elaborated by DeGrazia (1992).

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© 1998 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht

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Verweij, M. (1998). Moral Principles: Authoritative Norms or Flexible Guidelines?. In: van der Burg, W., van Willigenburg, T. (eds) Reflective Equilibrium. Library of Ethics and Applied Philosophy, vol 2. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-4972-3_2

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-4972-3_2

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-94-010-6087-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-011-4972-3

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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