Epistemology as an Aid to Science

Abstract

Gerd Buchdahl’s main point has become somewhat dearer to me after long discussions with its author, with Ernest Gellner, and with J. W. N. Watkins. I have ultimately assumed that Buchdahl’s thesis is that epistemological discussion is entirely useless for scientific research, a thesis very much in tune with the philosophy now in vogue. I shall try to criticise this thesis of Buchdahl’s, and to argue that in the historical case which he chose to discuss as an illustration of his point — Dumas’s views of atomism — epistemological criticism might have been of great use as a tool for solving scientific problems. The point of view from which my criticism is launched is that of Popper, as I shall explain in the body of my discussion.

. . .that duty to science, which consists in the enunciation of problems to be solved. . . .

Faraday