Abstract
In a nutshell, the present chapter claims this: First, the classical problem of knowledge has recently shifted from, How do I know? to, How do we know? — from psychology to sociology. As a phenomenological matter this is a great improvement, as a solution to the problem of rationality it is erroneous and immoral. The problem, (Why) should I act, believe, etc., this or that way? is answered: You should do so on the authority of your reason. But change the problem of rationality in accord with the change in the problem of knowledge, and ask, (Why) should we — rather than I — act or believe as we do? and the answer is clear: We should act and believe as we do, because our society is as it is, and should be as it is. This is clearly the same as, we should because we should. Not very enlightening.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1981 D. Reidel Publishing Company
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Agassi, J. (1981). Sociologism in Philosophy of Science. In: Science and Society. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 65. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-6456-6_8
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-6456-6_8
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-94-011-6458-0
Online ISBN: 978-94-011-6456-6
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive