Abstract
The relations between the Netherlands and Belgium after the separation in 1839 were much better than might have been expected. Both peoples realized that a separate existence and development was the best for each, consequently the separation left no brooding hostility on either side. But neither did the relations between the two peoples develop any warmth, at least not until after 1936 when Belgium moved out of the French orbit in foreign politics and adopted the Dutch policy of neutrality and independent action. For a decade after World War I relations between the two countries were strained, for reasons that will appear later.
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Japikse, N., op. cit, p. 312.
Gosses en Japikse, op. cit, p. 808.
See Ruysch, F. A. C, Een verbond met België
Professor de Louter’s Nationale plicht en een verbond tusschen Nederland en België
Japikse, op. cit, p. 272. See also Hampe, Karl, Belgien und Holland vor den Weltkriege on the general subject of Dutch-Belgian relations of this period. Hampe, professor of history at Heidelberg, was invited by the German General-Government in Belgium to go through the Belgian Foreign Office archives. The book contains little that is new and much of doubtful value.
Japikse, op. cit, who relies on Hampe, op. cit p. 33.
The Dutch parliamentary members were Tydeman, Treub and Heemskerk. Baie, himself, was secretary of the Commission.
The lowering of postal rates, protection of patents, authors’ rights, the recognition of school diplomas, university titles, etc., were the subjects studied.
Op. cit.
The German military successes against France in the Franco-German War were the cause of the fall of the weak Van Bosse-Fock cabinet and its replacement on January 4, 1871 by a stronger cabinet under Thorbecke.
Handelingen, Tweede Kamer, 1905-06, p. 537.
Considérations politiques sur la défense de la Meuse, 1886, p. 82. “The destiny of Belgium is intimately connected with the possession and the free use of the rivers which traverse it. The Scheldt is a commercial river; our future from the point of view of economics can be fully safeguarded only by co-sovereignty over this river to the sea, that is to say, by the possession of Dutch Flanders. The Meuse is a political and military line of which the control from Dinant to below Maastricht is the veritable condition of our independence.” Banning’s views made little impression on Belgian public opinion at the time, but became popular during World War I.
Colenbrander, H. T., Nederland en Belgi’è: Proeve tot betere waardeering Foreign Minister Loudon declared in the Second Chamber in January, 1917, that there was no reason to distrust the statement by the Belgian Foreign Minister that he strongly disapproved of all drives aimed at the integrity of Netherlands territory. Handelingen, Tweede Kamer, 1916-17, pp. 1237-38.
L’Indépendance Belge January 17, 1919.
The Flemish activists published the Vlaamsche Stem at The Hague. The poet, René de Clercq, was one of the editors. In World War II he became the leader of the Flemish Nazis.
An organization called the Comité de Politique Nationale took the leadership in the campaign.
See Chapter V of the present writer’s Neutrality of the Netherlands during the World War
Mgr. Nolens, leader of the Catholic Party and a resident of Limburg, accused van Groenendael, a member of the Second Chamber from Limburg, of having advocated a plebiscite and even of having spoken favorably about it to Belgians in Brussels. Van Groenendael was unable to clear himself to the satisfaction of all of his fellow members. The Government did not take action against him, though it investigated the charges. See Handelingen, Tweede Kamer, 1918-19, pp. 679, 685-86, 696, 705, 832, Aanhangsel p. 397, Ibid, 1919-20, pp. 657ff. Bijlagen, pp. 565ff.
March 4, 1919.
Ibid, March 8, 1919.
On this whole subject see De Schelde-beslommeringen by J. A. van Hamel.
Maeterlink, M. A., Transactions, Grotius Society, IV, p. 258.
See Chapter IX, “The Fortification of Flushing.”
See article by “Y” in Fortnightly Review, Vol, 89, pp. 314ff, for a typical example, and den Beer Portugael, La Neutralité sur L’Escaut, for the Dutch view.
Documents Nos. 50, 54, 55, 56, American Journal of International Law, IX, Supp. pp. 85-86. The Belgian Government did not protest when notified by the Dutch Government that it was instituting war buoying on the Scheldt, but expressed “sincere thanks” for the measures being taken to secure navigation.
“We should be prepared at the proper moment to put extreme pressure on the Dutch to keep the Scheldt open for all purposes. If the Dutch close the Scheldt, we should retaliate by a blockade of the Rhine. It is very important to us to be able to blockade the Rhine, and it gets more important to us as the war goes on. On the other hand, if the Germans do not use the ‘Maastricht Appendix’ in the first day of war, they will not want it at all.” Winston Churchill, The World Crisis, 1911-1914, pp. 63-64.
Ibid, pp. 355-62.
Ibid, pp. 360-62. Churchill concludes: “I still think that strong presentations to the Dutch Government might have induced them to grant relief to Antwerp and the Belgian nation in their agony… a neutral Holland was of far more use to Germany than a hostile, a conquered, or even an allied Holland. Once Holland was attacked by or allied to Germany we could close the Rhine, and if we were in alliance with Holland, the Texel and other Dutch islands of enormous strategic importance would become available for the forward action of the British Navy. We should, in fact, have that overseas route without which a British Naval offensive was impossible. I do not therefore, believe that if Holland had agreed to open the Scheldt for the succor of Antwerp, Germany would have declared war on her. There would have been a long argument about interpretations of neutrality in which the Germans, after their behavior, would have started at a great disadvantage. I still think that if Holland would have said to Germany ‘The English are threatening us with a blockade of the Rhine if we do not open the Scheldt,’ Germany would have accepted the lesser of two evils.”
American Journal of International Law, IX, Supp., 80.
See Foreign relations of the United States, Paris Peace Conference, 1919, III, pp. 958ff., for Hyman’s statement. See also My Diary at the Conference of Paris with documents, David Hunter Miller. Only 40 copies were printed for the author.
It should be noted that by no means everybody in Belgium supported this extreme position. The Socialists and the Flemings were lukewarm towards the demands.
Foreign relations of the United States, Paris Peace Conference, 1919, III, p. 962.
Hymans also mentioned compensations in “colonial territory or financial indemnities, or in the guarantee of peaceful possession by Holland of her colonies …”, but no further reference was made to these amazing suggestions.
Ibid, III, p. 795.
Ibid, IV, p. 142.
See The Truth about the treaty by André Tardieu. Tardieu was president of the Committee for Belgian affairs.
See Holland, Belgium and the powers by A. A. H. Struyeken. Struycken was an adviser to Foreign Minister van Karnebeek at the Paris Peace Conference.
The Belgian Department of Foreign Affairs on May 20, 1919 sent a confidential note to General Headquarters to engage in this kind of propaganda in Limburg. Dutch newspapers obtained a copy of the note and promptly published it. When the Dutch Government protested to the Belgian Government the only justification Foreign Minister Hymans offered was that the note was sent before June 4 when the Peace Conference decided that there would be no demands on Holland for territorial cessions. See Handelingen, Tweede Kamer, 1918-19, Aanhangsel, pp. 426-27.
Foreign relations of the United States, Paris Peace Conference, 1919, IV, p. 735.
Ibid, IV, p. 801.
The Commission appointed by the Conference to consider the Belgian-Dutch questions.
A member of the First Chamber, Briet, a specialist on Dutch foreign policy, declared that the position of minister to Belgium was a difficult post to fill; among other things he should make “a very special study—and that is truly not easy-of the negotiations with Belgium over the treaties of 1839, which would take at least a year.” Handelingen, Eerste Kamer, 1937-38, p. 370.
See H. Brugmans, The Wielingen; also De Wielingen: rechten en belangen by the same author.
The literature on Dutch-Belgian relations in general is voluminous, and on this particular episode alone incredibly large. For a good analytical account of Belgo-Dutch relations between the two wars see Politieke betrekkingen tussen Nederland en België, 1919-1939 by C. A. van der Klaauw.
The Belgian Government on October 27 sent the Dutch Government a note that the treaty in no way changed the status of the Western Scheldt either militarily or politically. Ibid, p. 94.
For an interesting account of the debates by a leading member of parliament see Het jongste verleden by P. J. Oud, III, Chap. 5. For the debates see Handelingen, Tweede Kamer, 1926-27, pp. 253-508; Handelingen., Eerste Kamer, 1926-27, pp. 248-499.
The London Times vaguely hinted at this possibility in an editorial of March 5, 1927, before the First Chamber had voted on the bill for ratification of the treaty. But the Dutch journalist M. van Blankenstein has revealed that Harold Williams, editor in chief of the Times at the time, told him that the British Government had nothing whatsoever to do with the editorial; “The Netherlands minister [in London] called on me.” De Stem van Nederland, December, 1946.
The political parties were divided on the issue of the treaty. The retired leader of the Socialist Party, Troelstra, favored ratification but the new and current leader, Polak, was opposed. Only the Christian Historicals and the Liberal Democrats were solidly opposed.
How strong was the Dutch distrust of France is evident from an incident in 1929. The Utrechtsch Dagblad on February 23 published two documents which purported to be the text of a secret Franco-Belgian military agreement and an official interpretation of it made in 1927. According to these documents Belgium and France had military plans involving passage across Dutch Limburg. It was alleged that England was also involved in these plans. See statement by Foreign Minister Beelearts van Blokland, Handelingen, Tweede Kamer, 1928-29, Aanhangsel, p. 103. The Belgian, British and French Governments emphatically denied the authenticity of the documents and the man, a certain Frank Heine who had sold the documents to the Utrecht newspaper, confessed to falsification. Their deep distrust of France easily led the Dutch to accept the authenticity of the forged documents and for a few days there was great national indignation. See van der Klaauw, op. cit, pp. 133-35.
See Chapter XI, “Great Netherlands Idea.”
Pan-Netherlanders were convinced that Belgium would fall apart. They were opposed to the treaty because it would increase the political power of the pro-French Belgians, chiefly the Walloons, while it should be the Dutch policy to weaken this power and support the Flemings in their struggle for independence. They also feared that the treaty would in the long run bring the Netherlands under French influence. See van der Klaauw, op. cit, p. 105.
Professor H. T. Colenbrander thought that the main obstacles to good relations between the two countries would be removed if Belgium would give up completely any ideas of an alliance, if the Flemings and Walloons could make peace and if the Belgians would cease asking for concessions which would give Antwerp advantages at the expense of Rotterdam. He warned against ideas of an independent Flanders or a Flanders united with the Netherlands. Economically Belgium had become one. Flanders history was too great and in its nature too different and too rich for it ever to become assimilated with Holland. “In a common household we would fight like cats and dogs.” Nederland en België: proeve tot betere waardering
See Over Mussert by P. H. Ritter, Jr.
See Belgium, Vol. I, No. 10, 1941 and van der Klaauw, op. cit pp. 122ff.
October 14, 1931. For the documentation on the negotiations following the rejection of the treaty see Dutch Orange Book, Bescheiden in zake de tusschen Nederland en België hangende vraagstukken door de weder zijdsche regeeringen gewisseld sedert de verwerping van het verdrag van 3 April 1925; Belgian Grey Book, Documents Diplomatiques relatifs a la revision des traites de 183g
With Beelearts van Blokland, who succeeded van Karnebeek as foreign minister, a new treaty with Belgium became a cabinet rather than a purely Ministry of Foreign Affairs policy as under his predecessor. The ministry would stand or fall on any new treaty submitted to partiament.
The Juliana Canal was opened in 1935 and the Albert Canal in 1939.
Both countries had accepted obligatory or automatic jurisdiction on the basis of reciprocity.
Series A/B, No. 70, pp. 4-89. Also found in Manley Hudson, World Court Reports, IV, pp. 172ff.
The Ouchy Agreement never went into effect. The United States and Great Britain protested on the ground that it constituted a violation of the most-favored-nation clause of the commercial treaties with these countries.
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© 1959 Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, Netherlands
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Vandenbosch, A. (1959). Relations with Belgium. In: Dutch Foreign Policy Since 1815. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-6809-0_16
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