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The Declaration on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear and Thermo-Nuclear Weapons

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The Legal Significance of the Declarations of the General Assembly of the United Nations

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Abstract

In the face of the failure of disarmament efforts under the auspices of the United Nations so far to yield any results, Ethiopia, together with seven other Members of the United Nations, proposed at the fifteenth session that the Assembly adopt a declaration prohibiting the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons.1 As explained by the Ethiopian representative, the draft declaration was not designed as a substitute for the guiding principles which the Assembly should furnish the disarmament negotiating committee. Its adoption would be a modest step towards the ultimate goal of disarmament.2 No action was taken on the proposal by the Assembly. At the sixteenth session, the proposal was resubmitted by twelve Member states.3 It was approved by the First Committee and adopted by the Assembly4 not without some serious objections. With the exception of the USSR, the big powers voted against its adoption.

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References

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  5. The relevant paragraphs read: Recalling that the use of weapons of mass destruction, causing unnecessary human suffering, was in the past prohibited, as being contrary to the laws of humanity and to the principles of international law, by international declarations and binding agreements, such as the Declaration of St. Petersburg of 1868, the Declaration of the Brussels Conference of 1874 the Conventions of the Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907, and the Geneva Protocol of 1925, to which the majority of nations are still parties, Considering that the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons would bring about indiscriminate suffering and destruction to mankind and civilization to an even greater extent than the use of those weapons declared by the aforementioned international declarations and agreements to be contrary to the laws of humanity and a crime under international law, Believing that the use of weapons of mass destruction, such as nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons, is a direct negation of the high ideals and objectives which the United Nations has been established to achieve through the protection of succeeding generations from the scourge of war and through the preservation of succeeding generations and promotion of their cultures, 1. Declares that: (a) The use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons is contrary to the spirit, letter and aims of the United Nations, and as such, a direct violation of the Charter of the United Nations; (b) The use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons would exceed even the scope of war and cause indiscriminate suffering and destruction to mankind and civilization, and, as such, is contrary to the rules of international law and to the laws of humanity; (c) The use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons is a war directed not against an enemy or enemies alone but also against mankind in general, since the peoples of the world not involved in such a war will be subjected to all the evils generated by the use of such weapons; (d) Any State using nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons is to be considered as violating the Charter of the United Nations, as acting contrary to the laws of humanity and as commiting a crime against mankind and civilization;”

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Authors
  1. Obed Y. Asamoah LL.B.Hons. (Lond.), LL.M. (Columbia)
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© 1966 Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, Netherlands

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Asamoah, O.Y. (1966). The Declaration on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear and Thermo-Nuclear Weapons. In: The Legal Significance of the Declarations of the General Assembly of the United Nations. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-9495-2_10

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-9495-2_10

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-94-011-8685-8

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-011-9495-2

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