Abstract
The successful German campaigns of spring 1940 — the Blitz victories over Denmark, Norway, Holland, Belgium, France, and the defeat of a large part of the British army — had a tremendous psychological effect on the populations of the defeated countries. It is probably not unfair to state that in June 1940 a considerable part of the public in the occupied areas believed that Germany had won ultimate victory, and that the only possible policy was to adapt oneself to the fait accompli of a Pax Hitleriana on the continent. As Mr. Paul Struye, a post-war Belgian Minister of Justice observed:
The first contacts between Germans and Belgians, in May–June 1940, in the days following the disastrous Eighteen Day Campaign and the Fall of France, were characterized by a general desire to normalize the fait accompli: The tide of the German motorized armies had swept on so overwhelmingly, so irresistibly, the confusion in the minds of the people was so general and the feeling of powerlessness so crushing, that for the great majority of the Belgian population, the Third Reich had irretrievably won an ultimate and total victory. . . It was commonly thought that the war was finished for Belgium1.
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References
Paul Struye in J. A. Goris (ed.), Belgium under Occupation (New York, 1947), p. 15.
Ibid., p. 16.
James H. Huizinga in B. Landheer (ed.), The Netherlands (Berkely, 1947), p. 419. Cf. also Het Verzet van de Nederlandsche Bisschoppen tegen het Nationaal-Socialisme en Duitsche Tyrannie (Utrecht, 1945), pp. 24, 26.
Onderdrukking en Verzet, Nederland in Oorlogstijd (Arnhem-Amsterdam, 1948), I, 13. Cf. also: A. Seyss-Inquart, Vier Jahre in den Niederlanden, Gesammelte Reden (Amsterdam, 1944).
Paul Struye, L’evolution du sentiment public en Belgique sous l’occupation allemande (Brussels, 1945), p. 20. All quotations which were originally in Dutch, French, or German are translated by the author.
J. van der Tempel, Nederland in Londen. Ervaringen en Beschouwingen (Haarlem, 1946), p. 27.
James H. Huizinga, op. cit., p. 420. Cf. also L. G. Kortenhorst, Economische Samenwerking, Collaboratie en Sabotage (The Hague, 1946), p. 17 (mimeographed).
H. Colijn, Op de Grens van Twee Werelden (Amsterdam, 1940), pp. 43, 44, 50.
There is a violent attack on Colijn’s 1940 writings, and on his character in general in a pamphlet written by Visser van Nieuwpoort (pseudonym): De Anti-Revolutionnaire Partij en Dr. H. Colijn (Amsterdam, 1946).
Cf. P. S. Gerbrandy, Enige hoofdpunten van het regeeringsbeleid in London (The Hague, 1946), pp. 7–8, 38.
D. J. de Geer, De Synthese in den Oorlog (The Netherlands, 1942).
Mr. Linthorst Homan made these points in a private statement which subsequently became public. The two other leaders of the Unie, Professor J. E. de Quay and Mr. L. Einthoven, intensely disagreed with it, and as a result the Unie was almost broken up in autumn 1940. The Unie went clearly into the anti-German camp when it refused to support the “crusade” against Russia. In July 1941 the Germans forced Mr. Linthorst Homan to resign as “Com-missioner of the Queen”. Soon thereafter the Unie was forbidden. Cf. De Nederlandsche Unie en haar Driemanschap (Schiedam, 1946). Mr. Linthorst Homan’s statement is discussed on p. 43 and p. 64 of this booklet. Note also the interesting articles in Onderdrukking en Verzet (II, 76-108) by Prime Minister W. Drees and Mr. J. G. Suurhoff. Also: Kortenhorst, op. cit., pp. 17-21.
Ibid., p. 14. On the other hand, public demonstrations on June 29, 1940, Prince Bernhard’s birthday, attest that the House of Orange was still very popular. The Germans were furious about these incidents. Professor L. G. J. Verberne believes that German “correctness” in May and June 1940 accomplished nothing but “a sharpening of national vigilance. … The nation appeared uninclined to assume even a wait-and-see attitude. It had chosen, firmly and unyieldingly”. (J. Valkhoff [ed.], Grondwet en Maatschappij in Nederland 1848–1948 [The Hague, 1948], p. 148).
German mistakes in the handling of the occupied countries were accentuated by internal dissension. All the cliques around Hitler that fought for power in Germany had their representatives in the occupied Netherlands, where they tried to enlist the aid of different groups of collaborators for their own purposes. Among Seyss-Inquart’s three chief lieutenants, Rauter was Himmler’s man; Fischböck represented Göring and his policy of total spoliation; Schmidt was the N.S.D.A.P. (Borman) agent, but especially obedient to Goebbels. Ribben-trop had planted his special emissaries before the invasion, where they checked on the pro-Junker German ambassador Zech von Burkersroda. The Junkers were generally influential among the occupation troops of the Wehrmacht, and especially in its intelligence agency, the Abwehr. However, the S.D., the SS’s intelligence outfit, became more and more powerful, particularly after the July 1944 Putsch. During the last year of the occupation Seyss-Inquart became more or less the tool of Himmler, whose SS had successfully infiltrated the N.S.B., the Dutch Nazi party. Schmidt, the N.S.D.A.P. man, is said to have been assassinated by the SS when he was on his way to Hitler to complain about its policies. One more German clique in Holland is interesting: the “Russian Front Shirkers”. They created numerous quite superfluous bureaucratic empires and played German cliques against one another, which often served to continue their obviously unnecessary assignment in The Hague. Cf. Onderdrukking en Verzet, I, 352. Documentatie, status en werkzaamheid van Organisaties en Instellingen uit de Tijd der Duitse Bezetting van Nederland (Amsterdam, 1947), p. 337. Het Proces Mussert (The Hague, 1948), pp. 115, 142.
H. Bekaert, Maatschappelijke Problemen van het Incivisme (Leuven, 1946), p. 7.
Cf. Nieuw Nederland (The Hague), Feb. 8, 1946.
It is beyond the scope of this study to discuss the various economic, political, and social factors which favored the growth of Fascism in the interwar period. The spirit of June 1940, and collaboration in general can only be fully understood in their relationship with this period.
In the beginning of the occupation the N.S.B. expected to be permitted by the Germans to rule Holland. For that purpose more than 40 fronts and guilds were instituted, which were to dominate every phase of Dutch life. As the Germans never allowed the N.S.B. to run Holland, most of the fronts never amounted to anything. Some of them collapsed after a few months, and several had no other members than a cadre of N.S.B. fanatics. Quite a few fronts were nothing but “hobbies” of N.S.B. bigwigs who wanted to have their own “empires”.
In 1922, 48 parties participated in the parliamentary elections, in 1933, 54. However, of these 54 parties only 14 received one or more seats in the Second Chamber, while only 19 polled more than 10,000 votes. The Dutch Nazis attempted to make political capital out of the many factions participating in the elections. They created the myth of the hopelessly divided Dutch nation which would be saved only by destroying the party system. Actually, Dutch politics between the wars, and more so today, have been determined by about 6 major parties. This was the division of seats in the Second Chamber of 1933
Cf. Documentatie, p. 8; The Netherlands, p. 129. A former resident of the Dutch East Indies recalls how “like a prince”, Mussert was received in the Indies. “He was to speak in the Dutch club at Djokja, and all officials, including those from the native court of Djokja, were ordered (by local Dutch authorities) to be present.” (Kr. Strijd, Wat moet er met de N.S.B.’ers geheuren? [Almelo, 1945], p. 2). One observer distinguished between three general types of Dutch Nazis: the Southern Netherlands type, based on Italian-Fascist, and strictly authoritarian principles (Catholic region); the North-Eastern type, especially in the agrarian province of Drenthe, where the crisis-ridden small farmers have supposedly long believed in the “Race, Blood, and Earth” myth; finally, the Western-Netherlands type, especially of the big cities, where Nazism was at first a superficial fad and later was caused by commercial (anti-Semitic?) considerations. (Ds. H. Bardeloos, “De Geestelijke en Maatschappelijke Gevolgen van de Interneering”, Toezickt, I [1948], 29).
All of the following quotations are translated from 2 volumes published by the N.S.B.: L. Lindeman, Het Nationalisme van de N.S.B. (Leiden, 1940). L. Lindeman, Het Socialisme van de N.S.B. (Leiden, 1941). Also Dr. C. B. Hylkema — a former Protestant minister who joined the N.S.B. in 1934 — published a book about the doctrines of Dutch Fascism: Het Neder-landsch Fascisme (Amsterdam, 1934). Dutch Nazis contributed essays on political and other subjects to: Keurjaar-boek 1932–1942 (Amsterdam, 1942).
The leader of the N.S.B., Mussert, wrote the following to illustrate his idea of Socialism: “One of our members told me, when he first came to me: ‘I am just a peasant’. Whereupon I put my hand on his shoulder and answered: ‘Just a peasant? You are a peasant, one of those who are responsible for the cultivation of our land, so as to provide for the needs of our people’. It is equally wrong to say: ‘I am just a worker’. The liberal and marxist gentlemen, who for their own advantage preferred the struggle between classes, talked you into that. How maltreated our workers have been, how exploited, and enslaved. … In the National Socialist state the worker will regain his self-respect, … because he will be fully conscious that his labor … is essential for the existence of the community. …” (Het Socialisme van de N.S.B., p. 82). The greatest height of N.S.B. thinking in the economic and Socialist spheres was obviously reached with this statement: “The aim of political economy is the rational provision of reasonable needs”. This point was considered “so clearly formulated that no further commentary is actually required”. (Ibid., p. 26).
Helmut Otto, Die staatspolitischen Ziele der flämischen und holländischen Nationalbewegungen nach dem Weltkriege (Giessen, Germany, 1936), pp. 79–80.
Rebecca West, The Meaning of Treason (New York, 1947), p. 231. Dutchmen with German family ties were in general more attracted to the N.S.B. During the occupation, persons with German relatives are said to have accepted collaboration more readily than others. A. J. Fonteijn, “Duitsche Huisvrouwen in Nederland”, Toezicht, I (1948), 134-135. Also: D. Q. R. Mulock Houwer, Psychiatrisch-Juridisch Gezelschap, Vergade-ringen op 22 Februari 1947, 6 Maart 1948 (Amsterdam, 1948), p. 5.
Max Blokzijl. Zijn Berechting, Veroordeeling en Executie (Amsterdam, 1947), pp. 26–27.
From a speech by Mussert in March 1934. (Het Socialisme van de N.S.B., p. 8).
Mussert in the official N.S.B. newspaper Volk en Vaderland of August 14, 1934.
This was confirmed by the Solicitor General who prosecuted van Genechten after the Liberation. Van Genechten, zijn Berechting en Veroordeling (Amsterdam, 1947), p. 33. Van Genechten was a Flemish Belgian by birth. After World War I he was sentenced to death by Belgian authorities because of collaboration with the Germans. He managed to escape to the then neutral Netherlands and became a Dutch citizen in 1930.
Ibid., pp. 58-60. Van Genechten prepared this statement after the Liberation for the Dutch court which sentenced him to death because of his collaborationist activities. Van Genechten committed suicide while his case was about to be considered by the court of appeal (cassation).
For the case of invasion lists of persons to be arrested had been prepared by the government. Mr. van Thiel, then Solicitor-General in the North Holland-Utrecht district, testified before the Parliamentary Inquiry Commission that about 600 persons had been on these lists, in his district. However, when invasion came, more than 10,000 were actually arrested in Mr. van Thiel’s district alone. (Report Parlementaire Enquête Comtnissie [The Hague, 1949], Ic, 203).
Cf. Documentatie, pp. 127-128.
Het Proces Mussert, p. 311.
Ibid., p. 39.
Ibid., p. 313.
Ibid., pp. 56-57.
This was admitted by the Solicitor General who persecuted Mussert after the war. (Ibid., p. 76).
Ibid., p. 76.
Germany, “Greater-Holland”, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and possibly other “Nordic” states were to be the members of this Germanic League. Hitler was to be the first president of the League, with the title of Germanic Führer, while he was expected to resign as head of Germany. Mussert himself was to be the leader of “Greater-Holland” which was to be the most powerful state of the League after Germany. It was to include the Flemish regions of Belgium, the Belgium Congo, South Africa, and the Dutch colonies. The League and each of the member states were to be organized according to the leadership principle. Inspite of this, Mussert expected the member states to be self-governing except for military and economic affairs. Mussert took this project very seriously, and evidently expected that because of it Hitler would elevate him to the rank of a great statesman. (Cf. Vijf Nota’s van Mussert aan Hitler over de Samen-werking van Duitsland en Nederland in een Bond van Germaansche Volkeren 1940–44. [The Hague, 1947]).
Onderdrukking en Verzet, I, 335.
Het Proces Mussert, p. 47.
Documentatie, pp. 7, 107, 229, 263, 322, 376-377.
Cf. Documentatie, pp. 337-341.
This SS group within the N.S.B. must not be confused with the military SS, or Waffen SS, which was part of the German armed forces. Himmler usually managed to get all able-bodied foreign military volunteers into his Waffen SS. Only a few of the Dutch volunteers in the Waffen SS came from the SS group of the N.S.B.
For example, in the Flemish part of Belgium the organization “De Vlag” represented Himmler’s clique, while the more Flemish-nationalist V.N.V. was aided by the German National Socialist party. In the French speaking part of Belgium, and in France the SS was fighting hard, but not completely successfully, to eliminate its competitor. In Norway, on the other hand, Quisling’s “Natjonal Sammlung” was a tool of the SS. (Cf. Documentatie, p. 338).
The N.S.N.A.P. had been forbidden by the Dutch government in June 1939. After the German occupation, it was organized again. Dr. van Rappard received his degree at Vienna, where he had studied under the pro-Nazi economist Spann. Psychologists may find interest in the fact that Mussert married his aunt, and van Rappard his parents’ German housekeeper. Cf. on the N.S.N.A.P.: Documentatie, pp. 230-258.
Cf. for ex. Documentatie, pp. 11, 13. Concerning the strength of N.S.B. membership, cf. Onderdrukking en Verzet, II, 44.
Laval stated during his trial: “France needed a complete hand where its destiny and life were concerned. Not a single card must be lacking in her hand. Even if the German card was uncertain, even if it was bad, France had to have this German card in her hand, simply because it was a card”. (Quoted in: Albert Naud, Pourquoi je n’ai pas défendu Pierre Laval [Paris, 1948], p. 33-34). De Becker, a prominent Belgian collaborator, used the same defense: “From the Belgian point of view it is quite natural … that some Belgians play the German card, anticipating German victory, and that other Belgians play the Anglo-Saxon card, anticipating an Anglo-Saxon victory. Both types of Belgians are patriots, as long as they collaborate for national aims. …” (Quoted by J. Dautricourt, La trahison par collaboration avec l’ennemi occupant le territoir national [Brussels, 1945], pp. 77, 78).
Cf. Professor P. Geijl’s interesting study in which he analyses the fundamental differences between the “Patriotten” of the Napoleonic period and the Quislings of the recent war. (P. Geijl, Patriotten en N.S.B.’ers, een historische parallel [Amsterdam, 1946]).
Verslag der werkzaamheden van de Stichting Toezicht Politieke Delinquenten (The Hague, 1948), p. 10. In July 1945 the Netherlands Institute for Statistics held a public opinion poll in the three western provinces of the Netherlands. One of the questions was: “What is the most important reason for your dislike of the N.S.B.?” An analysis of the answers showed that 21 per cent condemned the N.S.B. for its treason; 18 per cent disliked its dictatorship and terror; another 18 per cent objected to its imitation of the German system; 7 per cent had religious objections; 6 per cent cited the anti-Semitic and racial theories; 8 per cent objected to the N.S.B.’s Nazi principles without giving any specific reason; 15 per cent disliked the N.S.B. men’s behavior; finally 7 per cent mentioned other reasons or could give no particular motive for their hatred. The Netherlands Institute for Statistics commented: “We note that the great majority of the population actually do not know why they dislike the N.S.B. We hate the N.S.B. violently, but our motives are not clear. … Very few bothered to get acquainted with the principles and aims of the N.S.B.” (B. M. Sweers, Vrije Meeningen in een vrij Land [Amsterdam, 1946]).
M. Ganshof van der Meersch, Reflexions sur la Repression des crimes contre la sïretê extêrieure de l’Etat (Brussels, 1946).
Report of the Central Bureau for Statistics, quoted in Keesings Historisch Archief, October 17-23, 1948. A number of Dutch German army volunteers are still in Russian hands. Some of these were repatriated in November 1950, and another shipment is expected during 1951.
Cf. the number of Dutchmen who lost their citizenship as a consequence of military or state service for the enemy. The official estimate of 60,000 includes about 20,000 wives, who, according to Dutch law, automatically follow the citizenship status of their husbands. (Cf. Chap. III). In May 1944 a U.S. Army source estimated that, at most, 25,000 Dutchmen had volunteered for the Eastern Front. (Civil Affairs Handbook, The Netherlands [Army Service Forces, 30 May 1944] section 2 a, p. 110).
In one established case, a few Dutch residents of Düsseldorf helped the Reichswehr with the surprise capture of a rail-and-foot bridge along the Dutch-German border. (Cf. Beknopt overzicht van de krijgsverrichtingen der Koninklijke Landmacht, 10-19 Mei 1940 [Leiden, 1947], p. XIV).
The official report of the Dutch army (ibid.), and also the Dutch army’s historian, General van Hilten (in Onderdrukking en Verzet, I, 156-157), state explicitly that there is no evidence for activities of a Dutch Fifth Column in spring 1940, except in the case mentioned above on the Dutch-German border. The outstanding and soberminded statesman, Dr. van Kleffens, then Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs, speaks in his otherwise excellent Juggernaut over Holland (E. N. van Kleffens, Juggernaut over Holland [New York, 1941], p. 126) of Dutch traitors who during the invasion, in The Hague and Rotterdam, “in some cases helped by their children, built barricades from behind which they shot at anyone who came in sight”. Dr. van Kleffens states that even in a few cases in The Hague artillery was used in the streets to destroy the houses of Quislings which had been turned into “regular little fortresses”. Equally unfounded for that matter, were the reports about German parachutists dropped disguised as “post-men, civilians, tram conductors, or even women”; or reports about the former German maid servants “who, landing in the neighborhood of houses that had once employed them, made themselves useful as guides for other parachutists”. (Ibid., p. 119). However, German soldiers did on several occasions use Dutch uniforms, especially those of the Royal Mounted Police (Koninklijke Marechaussee). One author suspects that German residents of Holland were responsible for minor acts of sabotage, such as light signals, to create panic. (Onderdrukking en Verzet, II, 75).
The Dutch army was greatly handicapped by the rumors of Fifth Column activities. Constantly, patrols had to be sent out by the already over-tired troops to investigate untrue reports of suspected shots and treacherous light signals.
Cf. on the Dutch Legion, the Landstorm, the N.S.K.K., etc.: Documentatie, pp. 182-185, 212, 273.
Documentatie, pp. 332-333.
A. F. G. van Hoesel, De Jeugd die wij vreesden (Utrecht, 1948).
About 16,000 persons died in the three western provinces during the winter of 1944–1945 as a direct consequence of not getting enough food. This figure does not include the various often fatal diseases which in turn were caused by the insufficient diet. (Cf. Keesing’s Historisch Archief, Oct. 17–23, 1948). During the “hunger-months” black market prices soared so high that only very few could afford them. A bread in the black market cost 40.-fl., which represented a worker’s average weekly wage. A kg. of butter cost 150.-fl. (Economische en Sociale Kroniek der Oorlogsjaren 1040–1945 [Utrecht, 1947], p. 266). Cf. also: Dr. G.J. Kruyer, Sociale desorganisatie — Amsterdam tijdens de honger-winter (Netherlands, 1951).
Vae Victis, ou deux ans dans la L.V.F. (Paris, 1948).
Mulock Houwer, op. cit., p. 11.
Cf. also Maandblad voor Berechting en Reclassering (1946), p. 155. The author of Vae Victis remarked that his comrades in the French Waffen SS hated politics, and never talked about them. (pp. 78, 111).
G. E. Langemeijer, “Oost West — thuis best”, Toezicht, I (1948), 17–19.
Van Hoesel, op. cit., p. 23.
G. Th. Kempe, Misdaad en Wangedrag voor, tijdens, en na den Oorlog (Amsterdam, 1946), p. 191.
Psychiatrisch-Juridisch Gezelschap, p. 18. Mr. J. R. ter Horst, in an unpublished essay prepared at Utrecht University in 1949 (Het Probleem der Politieke Delinquenten), also gives a table of motives for enlistment. However, this study was admittedly superficial, and limited to only 87 cases. Although Mr. ter Horst did also consider men born before 1922, most of his volunteers were youths. These were his results: Comparison of these results with Dr. van Hoesel’s is not particularly fruitful, especially since the “profiteers in the wide sense of the word” were not too clearly defined. Mr. ter Horst mentioned one significant fact: of the 52 married men in his group, 22 had German wives. In an article in the Belgian Revue de droit pénal et criminologie (1946–1947, pp. 843-855) the motives of Belgian volunteers for the German armed forces were discussed. In a fairly representative group, 68 per cent had enlisted to secure material benefits; 26 per cent were adventurers; for only 6 per cent political idealism seemed to be the dominating motive. To 90 per cent of the group enlistment had meant higher wages than they had had before; 45 per cent actually made twice as much as before. On the whole, Belgian circumstances seem to have been different from Dutch in military collaboration. In Belgium the Germans appear to have instituted more non-combat units than in Holland. In the group analyzed above only 25 per cent volunteered for combat duty; the rest went into purely guard and transport outfits.
Langemeijer, op. cit., p. 19. Regular and reserve officers of the Dutch armed forces who volunteered to fight for the Germans did in several cases get the death penalty. However, all of these received pardons. (Mr. J. Le Poole, letter to author, Jan. 9, 1951). In Norway, too, volunteers for the German armed forces were treated leniently. Average sentences were from three to four years, or even less. (Cf. Professor J. M. van Bemmelen’s article on the Norwegian purge in the Nederlandsch Juristenblad of April 27, 1946).
After the Liberation one dollar was equal to 2.65 guilders. Recently the guilder dropped to 3.80.
Economische en Sociale Kroniek, p. 7.
Ibid., pp. 2, 6, 15.
I bid., p. 54.
Ibid., p. 58.
Ibid., p. 159.
Ibid., p. 4.
A Belgian author believed that in today’s total war and total occupation the required standards of civilian conduct should equal those of soldiers. Where the soldier is required to risk his life, the civilian should at least be required to risk internment in a concentration camp. (Cf. Jacques E. Duval, Des notions de contrainte morale et d’état de nécessité appliqués aux crimes et délits contre la sureté de l’état [Brussels, 1945]). This view was not accepted in either Belgium or Holland. Except in one or two cases, the courts decided that if a person had been threatened with internment in a concentration camp, even military service for the enemy could be excused. Cf. W. M. E. Noach, De Bijzondere Rechtspleging [The Hague, 1948], p. 130). In accordance with such a view, the necessity to earn a living was always accepted as an excuse for economic collaboration.
Cf. Directoraat-Generaal voor Bijzondere Rechtspleging, Algemeen Voor-lichtingsrapport inzake Collaboratie (The Hague, April 1947), p. 17 (mimeographed).
Cf. Algemeen Voorlichtingsrapport, pp. 8, 17. Also Kortenhorst, op. cit., p. 41.
Mr. Kortenhorst, President of the Dutch Second Chamber, believed that “the great majority” of Dutch employers acted on patriotic motives when they accepted German orders. (Kortenhorst, op. cit., pp. 49-50). Cf. the general subject of Verlagerung — this was the term used by the Germans for the placing of German orders in Dutch enterprises — in Algemeen Voorlichtingsr apport, pp. 2-3, 7, 17-23.
Algemeen Voorlichtingsr apport, pp. 3, 19, 21-23. Cf. the article by a Rotterdam Tribunal president in the Tijdschrift voor Strafrecht, LVI, 151.
Rapport over de Collaboratie in de Bouwnijverheid in het District Amsterdam, prepared by the Politieke Opsporingsdienst te Amsterdam, Bureau Vooronderzoek Collaboratie (Amsterdam, 1946), p. 10. No other figures were released by Dutch authorities for publication. A report concerning the occupation attitude of the Dutch steel industry, for example, was never made public.
Ibid., p. 11.
Revue de droit pénal et criminologie (1946–1947), p. 840. After the liberation one dollar equalled 44 Belgian francs.
A public opinion poll, held in summer 1945, asked the Dutch public to judge the resistance attitude of different occupational groups. The answers were put into the following table: (The Netherlands during German Occupation, The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science [Philadelphia, 1946], p. 178). The medical profession only accepted a minimum of German coercion. At one time 90 per cent of Dutch physicians handed in their resignation as a protest against a Nazi measure; as a result of this the Germans admitted defeat, and gave up Nazification attempts. The medical profession as such was probably least dependent on the occupier’s favors. According to Professor Romein, “it has been established that, generally speaking, students behaved themselves better than professors”. (Ibid., p. 172). The low opinion of the judiciary was probably connected with the Dutch Supreme Court’s reputation of weakness. This is discussed in Chap. IV. Inexplicably, farmers were not included among the groups considered in the poll.
J. Dautricourt, L’article 115 du code pénal et la repression de la collaboration économique (Brussels, 1945), p. 18. Kempe, op. cit., pp. 154-155.
Verslag Stichting Toezicht, p. 12.
Kortenhorst, op. cit., pp. 24-26.
Keesing’s Historisch Archief, Oct. 17-23, 1948.
Cf. on German pressure to Dutch workers: Documentatie, pp. 38-40, 333-334.
The Netherlands during the German Occupation, pp. 4-5. Cf. the Solicitor-General’s curt remarks during the Mussert trial. (Het Proces Mussert, pp. 77-78).
Onderdrukking en Verzet, I, 402.
“It is certain that by sticking to the posts of command … many high officials were able to sabotage cleverly the enemy’s plans, even if they did have to submit often. … It can be said that in the great majority of cases, Belgian officials of all ranks practised in this way a policy of intelligent resistance.” (Minister Struye in Belgium under Occupation, p. 23).
Cf. a brochure by Dr. K. J. Frederiks, who before and during the occupation was the secretary-general of the crucial Ministry of the Interior. (K. J. Frederiks, Op de Bres 1940–1944, Overzicht van de Werkzaamheden aan het Departement van Binnenlandsche Zaken gedurende de Oorlogsjaren [’s-Gra-venhage, 1945]). Mr. A. L. Schöalten — unlike Mr. Frederiks a person whose “purity” was doubted by no one after the Liberation — is of the same opinion. Mr. Schöalten was secretary-general of the Ministry of Labor (Sociale Zaken) before and after the invasion; he resigned, however, as early as July, 1940. (Onderdrukking en Verzet, I, 402).
The Aanwijzingen and the Commentary of 1943 are cited in ibid., pp. 389-394.
Ibid., pp. 386, 396-397.
L. G. Kortenhorst, Was Samenwerking met den Vijand geoorloofd? (’s-Graven-hage, 1945), p. 30.
Mr. Bosch Ridder van Rosenthal in Onderdrukking en Verzet, I, 385.
Mr. H. M. van Randwijk in Onderdrukking en Verzet, I, 383.
Reported in the Nationale Rottetdamsche Courant, Jan. 23, 1946.
Cf. Mr. A. L. Schoalten in Onderdrukking en Verzet, I, 403.
Handboek Militair Gezag (London, April 1945), pp. 24-25. Statistics indicating the number of civil servants who resigned during the occupation or were fired by the Germans were not available.
In Na-Oorlogsche Rechtspraak (Tjeenk Willink, Zwolle) II, p. 77, mention is made of a man who admitted delivering 40 Dutch Jews to the Germans, at five guilders a head.
According to a public opinion poll, held in late 1947, informers [verklikkers] were regarded as the most disgusting type of collaborators. (Nederlandse Stichting voor Statistiek, Opinie Onderzoek inzake Bestraffing van Politieke Delinquenten [The Netherlands, 1948]). Mr. J. Le Poole estimates that thousands of Dutchmen acted as “men hunters” and informers. (Letter to author, Jan. 9, 1951).
Not only sexual relations, but also movie-dates and dancing with Germans was considered taboo. Cf. on the Danish girl friends of German soldiers: Grete Hartmann, The Girls They Left Behind (Copenhagen, 1946). The majority of the girls interviewed by Miss Hartmann preferred German soldiers to Danes because they were more courteous and had better manners. (Ibid., p. 61).
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Mason, H.L. (1952). The Pattern of Collaboration. In: The Purge of Dutch Quislings. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-9532-4_1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-9532-4_1
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-94-011-8704-6
Online ISBN: 978-94-011-9532-4
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