Examination of the Platonic Assumptions

Abstract

As is well known, the metaphysical aspects of Plato’s theory of Ideas were targets of attack by Aristotle and by Aristotelians throughout the middle ages. Yet these attacks did no achieve their objective and the ghost of Ideas, i.e. Universals, in its metaphysical form, in one way or other remained unperturbed. Few realized, it seems, that what ought to be attacked is the root of the theory, namely its semantic aspect. Berkeley and Hume, to some extent, were able to undermine a Platonic assumption which constitutes part of the semantic aspect of Ideas, namely that there is something in common, something identical among entities, by virtue of which we apply a common name to them. Their attack, however, suffered a great deal from the preoccupation with what is supposed to be a basic element of experience (impressions or ideas) and from their inability to provide a theory which explains how we do in fact learn general words and use concepts with success when we are supposedly surrounded with nothing but entities like impressions or ideas.