Abstract
At the close of the preceding chapter, I not only asserted that Hume’s general conception of imagination is the most important single element of his theory of imagination; I also tried to support that assertion. It follows from this that I conceive the task of bringing to light this general conception to be the most important single task connected with his theory. Nevertheless, it does not follow from this that I conceive it to be the only important task connected with it. On the contrary, one of the fruits of the examination of other Humanian commentators’ interpretations is precisely this: that it leaves me with several important tasks to perform with regard to Hume’s theory, even when it is considered apart from its involvement with the argument of his philosophy of the human understanding. These tasks, though, are reducible to the following general ones: (i) that of enumerating and articulating all of the essential elements of Hume’s theory as they appear in, or emerge from, Treatise I; and (2) that of determining which of these elements are present in and which, if any, are absent from Enquiry I.1
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I am clearly assuming here that it is not the case that there are any elements of the theory which are present in Enquiry I but absent from Treatise I; in other words, that whatever else may be the case, there are no new elements in the theory in Enquiry I. However, I believe that this is a warranted assumption. At any rate, I have been unable to find any evidence to falsify or even to cast doubt on it.
Treatise I, p. 1; Enquiry 7, p. 18.
Treatise J, pp. 1–2; Enquiry I, pp. 17–18.
Treatise I, pp. 1–3; Enquiry I, pp. 17–19.
It is of importance, as well, to Hume’s discussion of causation, inasmuch as the impression from which our idea of necessary connexion is derived is held by him to be an impression of reflexion, not of sensation. See Treatise I, p. 165.
Treatise 7, p. 2; Enquiry I, pp. 19, 62.
As is well-known, Hume feels that he is forced to modify this claim somewhat — or, rather, to admit that it may have a few exceptions. My reference, of course, is to the notorious example of the missing shade of blue (cf. Treatise I, pp. 5–6; Enquiry I, pp. 20–1). Maybe it is worth mentioning, in passing, that this so-called experiment, if valid, does not refute the looser principle that all ideas are ultimately derived from impressions, but only the precise principle which implies an exact correspondence between the two.
Unless we admit this, we seem to be at a loss in understanding what Hume means when he raises such questions as “whether it be the senses, reason, or the imagination, that produces the opinion of a continu’d or of a distinct existence (Treatise I, p. 188). Furthermore, Hume explicitly says in Enquiry I that “it cannot be doubted, that the mind is endowed with several powers and faculties, that these powers are distinct from each other… [and that] there are many obvious distinctions of this kind, such as those between the will and understanding, the imagination and passions, which fall within the comprehension of every human creature…” (Enquiry I, pp. 13–14).
Basson, op. cit., p. 24.
Ibid., pp. 27, 29.
Ibid., p. 27.
Cf. Treatise I, pp. 8–9, 85–86; Enquiry I, p. 17.
Treatise I, p. 9.
Ibid., p. 85.
Ibid., p. 86. 2 Ibid., p. 2.
For instance, I see this confusion to be at the very heart of Smith’s contention that the primacy of imagination in Hume’s Treatise I amounts to nothing more than a mere corollary to his early doctrine of belief.
See my discussion of Smith’s view, where I pointed out that he refers to Hume’s other sense of “imagination” as signifying vivacity of conception and thus claims that these two senses have an almost directly opposite meaning from each other (Chapter I, pp. 23–24).
See Treatise J, p. 117 (note).
See Ibid., pp. 8–9.
See Ibid., p. 117 (note).
Cf. Treatise I, pp. 9, 85. It seems to me that, literally interpreted, this distinction of Hume’s is a spurious one. In truth, it appears to be just one instance of his tendency to drift into the language of a proponent of the “little prime movers” theory of the mental faculties. It is simply not the case that faculties themselves are free to do what they please with their data; nor are they actually restrained from doing what they do with them. It is the mind and mind alone which is free, or determined, in regard to the ordering of its data. The question then is whether the mind, in imagining, is free or determined in regard to its data, and whether, in remembering, it is free or determined. It is one thing to assert that imagination is the power to modify the order and form its data originally had; it is another to assert that it is free to do this modifying.
See Ibid., p. 85.
Ibid., p. 10.
Enquiry I, p. 47.
Treatise I, p. 10.
Ibid., p. 11. Cf. Enquiry I, p. 24.
Treatise I, p. 92.
Basson, op. cit., p. 50. That Basson seriously maintains this position is clear from a criticism he subsequently offers of Hume’s doctrine. He says that “Hume does not prove that these three principles: resemblance, contiguity, and cause and effect are the only principles of association, but reports that he has been unable to discover any others. In fact he omits one obvious associating relation, namely logical consequence…” (Ibid., pp. 51–52). While I admit that Hume is not entirely clear on this matter, I do not believe that this criticism is a just one. I am inclined to think that he would deny that logical consequence is an associating relation and assert that it is solely a philosophical relation (see Treatise I, p. 69).
It is true that Hume suggests in Enquiry I that the principles of association influence the memory as well as the imagination; but I think that this is just carelessness on his part (see EnquiryI p. 23).
Basson, op. cit., p. 52.
Treatise I, p. 92.
Ibid., p. 223.
For instance, one who makes out Hume to be a kind of phenomenalist with regard to the mind would most likely deny that he held such a doctrine, or that he could consistently hold such. See H. A. Prichard, Knowledge and Perception (London, 1950), p. 177.
Treatise II, p. 339. Cf. Treatise III, p. 493.
Cf. Treatise I, pp. 5, 8–9, 85, 117–18 (note), 149, 188, etc.
Enquiry I, pp. 13–14.
Ibid., p. 13.
Ibid., p. 12.
However, I must admit that they are considerably more numerous in Treatise I than in Enquiry I.
Treatise I, p. 3; “imagine,” “form,” and “idea” were italicized by me.
Ibid., p. 6. Cf. Enquiry I, p. 21.
Treatise I, p. 32. Cf. Enquiry I, pp. 19, 48.
Ibid., p. 260.
Ibid., p. 164.
Ibid., p. 10. Cf. Enquiry I, pp. 19, 47.
Treatise I, p. 13.
Ibid., p. 16.
There are problems here, especially in regard to the kind of theory of sense-perception Hume actually maintained or presupposed. Did he hold a representative theory? Was he some sort of phenomemalist ? Did he hold a causal theory ? In my opinion, Hume qua philosopher never abandoned the distinction between sense-impressions and the qualities of material things. And in several places in Treatise I (e.g., pp. 27–28, 33–34, 38) he quite clearly seems to be presupposing a straight-forward Lockean representative realism. There are also several passages, again in Treatise I (e.g., pp. 7, 67, 84), indicating that he held some sort of causal theory of sense-perception (cf. also Treatise II, p. 275). What he seems to be convinced of is that we can never be certain of the true nature or character of these causes. The primary source of difficulty, of course, is his discussion “Of scepticism with regard to the senses,” in Part IV of Treatise I — and, I might add, the abbreviated version of this discussion in Section XII of Enquiry I.
Treatise 7, p. 9.
Ibid., p. 85.
See Enquiry I, p. 47; cf. also p. 19.
Treatise I, p. 73.
See Ibid., pp. 13–14.
R. Descartes, “Rules for the Direction of the Mind,” The Philosophical works of Descartes, transl. by E. S. Haldare and G. R. T. Ross, Vol. I, p. 55.
Treatise I, p. 73.
Ibid., p. 95. Cf. also pp. 70, 79, and Enquiry I, p. 34.
Treatise I, pp. 70, 79.
Ibid., p. 124.
Ibid.
Ibid.
I have already examined Hume’s use of “reason” as virtually identical with imagination (when the latter is determined or influenced by the causal principle of association). See my discussion of Taylor’s view of “instinctive” reason in Hume, Chapter I, pp. 47–48, 54–55.
It really ought to be pointed out that Hume’s considered position in regard to probable reasoning is not, as he suggests in his general conception of the latter, that it discovers relations between impressions and ideas — although the latter of necessity involved in all such reasonings. It is careless of Hume not to make unambiguously clear his view that in probable reasoning we discover relations between objects, and not relations between impressions and ideas. To be sure, “probability… must in some respects be founded on the impressions of our memory and sense, and in some respects on our ideas (Treatise I, p. 89). But what this means is (1) that “‘tis… necessary, that in all probable reasonings there be something present to the mind, either seen or remember’d,” and (2) that ‘tis also necessary “that from this we infer something connected with it, which is not seen nor remember’d” (ibid.). Hume’s view is that in such inferences ideas are involved, but these ideas are ideas of objects or states of affairs which are supposed to exist; it is the relation between observed (i.e., seen or remembered) objects or states of affairs and the unobserved but supposed objects or states of affairs which probable reasoning is held to discover. The involved ideas themselves are not that “which is not seen nor remember’d,” although they are neither seen nor remembered. The distinction which Hume does not fully explicate is that between the materials involved in the process of probable reasoning or inference (viz., impressions and ideas) and the product of this inferential process (viz., the supposed objects or states of affairs inferred).
Treatise I, p. 16.
Ibid.
Ibid.
See Ibid., pp. 220–21. See also his letter to Henry Home (July 24,1746), in which he says that “as to the Idea of Substance, I must own, that as it has no Access to the Mind by any of our Senses or Feelings, it had always appeared to me to be nothing but an imaginary Center of Union amongst the different & variable Qualitys that are to be found in every Piece of Matter” (R. Klibansky and E. C. Mossner, New Letters of David Hume [Oxford, 1954], p. 21.).
Treatise I, p. 218.
Ibid., p. 216; cf. also p. 234.
Annis Flew, “Images, Supposing, and Imagining,” Philosophy, 1953 (28), p. 248.
Treatise I, p. 218.
Ibid., p. 53.
Ibid., p. 65.
Ibid., p. 221. The word “original” was italicized in the text.
Price, op. cit., pp. 15–17.
Ibid., p. 16.
T. E. Jessop, “Some Misunderstandings of Hume,” Revue Internationale de Philosophie, 1952 (6), p. 167.
Price, op. cit., p. 73.
Ibid., pp. 94–95.
Treatise I, p. 32.
Treatise I, p. 32.
See Enquiry J, p. 35.
Treatise I, p. 40.
Ibid., pp. 39–40. Of course, it is debatable whether Hume has shown that such ideas are logically impossible. I suspect that there is a kind of ambiguity in the concept of logical impossibility involved here, even if Hume is correct. But whatever the case may be, I think that it is Hume’s view that this is an instance of imagining the logically impossible (in some sense).
Ibid., p. 238.
Ibid., pp. 235–38.
Taylor, op. cit., p. 186.
Ibid.
Smith, op. cit., p. 460.
Hendel, op. cit., p. 411.
Treatise I, p. 209. This is not the only instance of this kind of talk by Hume about imagination (cf. Ibid., p. 149).
Some philosophers (e.g., Hume) seem to want to collapse the distinction between conation and affection, treating them as two “dimensions” of one and the same aspect of consciousness.
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Wilbanks, J. (1968). The Elements of Hume’s Theory of Imagination. In: Hume’s Theory of Imagination. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-0709-7_3
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