Abstract
The Soviet-Cuban intervention in Angola in 1975 and 1976 came as a surprise to many analysts of Soviet military strategy and politics. Here for the first time the Soviets deployed allied combat troops and naval warfare forces in a new and unprecedented way — at long distance, outside their sphere of influence. The intervention raised considerable doubt about Soviet intentions in strategic areas of the Third World and about the Soviet interpretation of détente.
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Notes
Thus, one school of thought sees the Soviet-Cuban involvement as a main factor in the escalation of the Angolan civil war and the role of the United States as that of a counterbalance. See Walter Hahn and Alvin Cottrell, Soviet Shadow Over Africa (Coral Gables, Fla.: Center for Advanced International Studies, University of Miami, 1976). Another school, represented by John Stockwell, former chief of the CIA’s Angolan Task Force, interprets the intervention as a response to early U.S. and South African escalation of the Angolan civil war. See J. Stockwell, In Search of Enemies: A CIA Story (New York: Norton, 1978). Stockwell offers convincing data concerning the U.S. involvement in Angola; however, his analysis of Soviet and Cuban behavior in Angola is less convincing. For the Soviet interpretation, see Oleg Ignatyev, Secret Weapon in Africa (Moscow: Progress, 1977). Ignatyev, who is the most authoritative Soviet source on the subject, visited Angola twice (September 1974 and October to November 1975) in the capacity of foreign analyst for Pravda. Many observers assumed that the Cubans acted in Angola as Soviet proxies. For example, see Peter Vannemann and Martin James, “The Soviet Intervention in Angola: Intentions and Implications,” Strategic Review 4, no. 3 (Summer 1976 ): 92–103. So far the only exception to that view is found in William J. Durch, “The Cuban Military in Africa and the Middle East: From Algeria to Angola,” Professional Paper No. 201, (Arlington, Va.: Center for Naval Analysis, September 1977 ).
John Marcum, “Lessons of Angola,” Foreign Affairs, 54, no. 3 (April 1976): 414.
See Charles C. Peterson and William J. Durch “Angolan Crisis Deployments,” in Bradford Dismukes and James McConnell, eds., Soviet Naval Diplomacy: From the June War to Angola (Arlington, Va.: Center for Naval Analysis, June 1978), p. 4–31, forthcoming from Pergamon Press.
New York Times,January 12, 1976. The CIA estimates were similar — 260 men by the summer of 1975. See Stockwell, In Search of Enemies,p. 170.
See Colin Legum, “The Soviet Union, China and the West in Southern Africa,” Foreign Affairs 54, no. 4 (July 1976).
Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs William E Schaufele, Jr., “The African Dimension of the Angolan Conflict” (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Public Affairs, February 6, 1976 ), p. 2.
Radio Moscow, August 16, 1975; Tass (Moscow), August 23 and 25, 1975. O. Ignatyev, “The True Face of Angola’s Enemies,” Pravda, September 9, 1975; B. Pilyatskin, “NCNA Covers Up the Traces,” Izvestiia, September 9, 1975.
Pravda, August 18, 1975; V. Yermakov, “Portugal and Angola’s Hour of Trial,” New Times, no. 37 (September 8, 1975 ): 14–15; Tass ( Moscow ), September 2, 1975.
M. Zenovich, “On the Road to Independence,” Pravda, February 26, 1975; Radio Moscow, November 21, 1975. For a serious analysis of Angolan economic potential, see A. V. Pritvorov, “The Economics of Angola,” Narody Azii i Afriky, no. 3 (March 1975): 122–30.
V. Sidenko, “The Intrigues of Angola’s Enemies,” New Times, no. 30 (July 1975): 14–15.
D. Kraminov, “A Skirmish at the Crossroads,” Za rubezhom (June 13–19, 1975 ): 12.
For a discussion of the U.S. covert program in Angola, see Stockwell, In Search of Enemies,pp. 40–56, 157–175. For Davis’s version of decision making regarding these activities, see his article “The Angola Decision of 1975: A Personal Memoir,” Foreign Affairs 57, no. 1 (Fall 1978):109–24.
Vannemann and James, “Soviet Intervention in Angola,” p. 97; also their essay “The Lessons of Angola: A Global Perspective on Communist Intervention in Southern Africa,” in Roger Pearson, ed., Sino-Soviet Intervention in Africa ( Washington, D.C.: Council on American Affairs, 1977 ), pp. 10–37.
In an interview in Mexico City in January 1975, Castro stated that “we must be realistic. Changes similar to those of the Cuban revolution are not within sight in the Latin American countries,” Radio Buenos Aires, January 10, 1975. See also an interview with Castro by Simon Alley, Afrique-Asie (May 16–29, 1977 ): 19.
Castro’s speech at the Congress of the Cuban Communist party, Radio Havana, December 22, 1975.
In September 1975 Castro predicted that in the future “the prestige of our revolution will increase,” and “we will be having more influence in the international revolutionary movement,” Radio Havana, September 29, 1975.
See Granma Weekly Review,April 25, 1976.
Schaufele, “African Dimension of the Angolan Conflict,” pp. 2–3.
For narratives describing military operations in Angola and the critical situation of the MPLA before November 11, see Stockwell, In Search of Enemies,pp. 164–68; and Ignatyev, Secret Weapon in Africa,pp. 155–74.
Ignatyev, Secret Weapon in Africa,p. 166.
Radio Havana, March 17, 1976.
In my discussion of the Soviet naval operation in Angola, I benefited immeasurably from the work of Peterson and Durch. See their discussion, “Angolan Crisis Deployments,” pp. 4–29 to 4–47.
James M. McConnell and Bradford Dismukes, “Soviet Diplomacy of Force,” Problems of Communism (January-February 1979 ): 20, 24.
Peterson and Durch, “Angolan Crisis Deployments,” p. 4–38.
Stockwell, In Search of Enemies, p 232.
For the text of the treaty and the agreement between the CPSU and the MPLA, see Pravda,October 9 and 14, 1976.
Marine Rundschau, November 4, 1977, p. 270.
Here I benefited from a discussion of Geoffrey Kemp and Robert Legvold on the Soviet and American strategic interests in Africa. See Jennifer Seymour Whitaker, ed., Africa and the United States Vital Interests, ( New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1978 ), pp. 120–86.
Colin Legum, “The African Crisis,” Foreign Affairs 57, no. 3 (1978): 634.
Expressen (Stockholm), April 30, 1978; Radio Liberty Research (RL 62/79), February 23, 1979.
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Valenta, J. (1980). The Soviet-Cuban Intervention in Angola. In: Rosefielde, S. (eds) World Communism at the Crossroads. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-7631-4_5
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