Abstract
The influx of the New Logic1 during the twelfth century made itself felt not only in the purely logical and linguistic discussions of the period but in the theological controversies as well. This is especially true for the theological schools of Paris in the mid-century. However, the new art was not always welcome. Thus, Walter of Saint-Victor, a conservative theologian, speaks very harshly about “the four Labyrinths of France”, i.e., about Peter Abelard, Peter of Poitiers, Peter Lombard, and Gilbert of Porrée, criticizing them for having introduced dialectic into theology.2 He considered this logicizing of the theological domain not only fruitless but pernicious.
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Notes
The New Logic (logica nova) is a collective name for Aristotle’s two Analytics, the Topics, and the Sophistical Refutations, recovered in the Latin West early in the twelfth century; to be distinguished from the Old Logic (logica vetus) which consisted basically of Aristotle’s Categories and On Interpretation in The Organon, Porphyry’s Isagoge, and Boethius’s logical writings.
L. M. De Rijk, Logica Modernorum, vol. I, van Gorcum and Co., Assen 1962, pp. 163 f.
For selective critique of Peter of Poitiers, see Walter of Saint-Victor, Contra quatuor Labyrinthos Franciae, crit. ed. by P. Glorieux, in Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Age 19 (1952), pp. 187–335.
There is a considerable body of literature found in contemporary Anglo-American philosophical and theological journals on each of these topics. A very useful anthology of articles on omnipotence is L. Urban and D. N. Walton, The Power of God: Readings on Omnipotence and Evil, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1978, which contains both historical and contemporary materials.
A monograph by A. Kenny, The God of the Philosophers, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1978, covers both topics.
A lengthy discussion of omnipotence is found in J. F. Ross, Philosophical Theology, Bobbs-Merrill, Indianapolis 1979.
Many analytic studies of concepts connected with the discussions of God’s properties, such as N. Kretzmann, ‘Omniscience and Immutability,’ Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966), 409–421;
E. Stump and N. Kretzmann, ‘Eternity’, Journal of Philosophy 78 (1981), 429–458, and others in the same family provide models for dealing with difficult concepts of philosophical theology
Finally, articles such as F. Alluntis and A. B. Wolter, ‘Duns Scotus on the Omnipotence of God’, Studies in Philosophy and the History of Philosophy, J. K. Ryan (ed.), 5 (1970), pp. 178–222;
W. J. Courtenay’s ‘John of Mirecourt and Gregory of Rimini on Whether God Can Undo the Past’, Recherches de Théologie ancienne et médiévale, 39 (1972), 224–256 and 40 (1973), 147–174;
J. Wippel, ‘The Reality of Non-existing Possibles,’ Review of Metaphysics 34 (1981), 729–758; and the like, provide models for concept analysis closely tied to historical figures.
See, for example, M. Grabmann, Die Geschichte der scholastischen Methode, reprinted Darmstadt 1956, vol. II, for development of Sentenzliteratur.
Die Sentenzen Rolands, Nachmals Papstes Alexander III (Hrsg. Fr. Ambrosius M. Gietl, O. P.), Freiburg im Bresgau 1891. Reprinted Amsterdam 1969.
Sententiae in IV Libris Distinctae, crit. ed. by A. Haysse, Grottaferrata, 1971.
Cf. F. Stegmüller, Repertorium Commentariorum in Sententias Petri Lombardi (2 vols.), Würzburg 1947.
Cf. P. S. Moore and M. Dulong (eds.), Sententiae Petri Pictaviensis, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame 1943, p. xv. The authors are referring to M. Grabmann, Die Geschichte der scholastischen Methode II, p. 406.
All references to Peter of Poitiers will be made to the edition of Moore-Dulong mentioned in n. 8.
Cf. Moore-Dulong, ‘Introduction’.
Peter Abelard, Introductio ad theologiam, V. Cousin (ed.) in Petri Abaelardi Opera II, Paris 1859.
Also in J. P. Migne, Patrologia Latina, Paris, 1844, (henceforth cited as PL) 178, cols 979–1114.
This does not mean, of course, that he also agreed with the views of Abelard but only that he considered them to be important philosophical views on the subject on which one needs to take some intellectual stand. As Gietl remarks: “Wohl theilt Roland manche Anschauungen Abälards..., in vielen und wichtingen Punkten aber tritt er mit Entschiedenheit den Ansichten desselben entgegen...” Cf. Gietl’s ‘Einleitung’ to Sentenzen Rolands, p. xxviii. It is amazing that neither Roland nor Hugh of St. Victor nor Peter Lombard cared very much for the work of Anselm.
Cf. the condemned theses on Abelard in H. Denzinger, Enchiridion Symbolorum, Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum (Editio 31, C. Rahner, S. J.), Herder, Barcelona 1957, nn. 368 sqq, 393 n. See esp. n. 374.7: “Quod ea solummodo possit facere vel dimittere, vel eo modo tantum vel eo tempore, quo facit et non alio”.
“Secundum magistrum Petrum non potuit plura predestinare quam predestinaverit; secundum nos vero plura potuit predestinare quam predestinavit”, Gietl, p. 65.
“Secundum magistrum Petrum non potuerunt plura beneplacuisse ei quam beneplacuerint; secundeum nos plura potuerunt ei beneplacuisse quam beneplacuerint, et plura possent tibi beneplacere quam beneplaceant”, Gietl, pp. 66f.
“Secundum magistrum Petrum non potuit plura permittere quam permiserit; sed secundum nos plura potuit permittere quam permiserit, et plura posset hodie permittere quam permittat”, Gietl, p. 68.
“Dicebat enim magister Petrus, quod Deus non potest plura scire quam scit... Nos vero dicimus Deum plura posse scire quam sciat, hec taliter distinguendo: ‘Deus potest plura scire quam sciat’, id est, de pluribus potest habere Deus cognitionem, de quibus non habet, hoc falsum est; habet enim cognicionem, scilicet scientiam de presentibus, preteritis atque futuris... et de his etiam que nec erunt nec esse possunt. Si vero dicatur, ‘plura potest scire’, etc., hoc est, plura possunt esse subiecta eius cognicioni de ipsis rebus, hoc verum est. Licet enim omnes res cognoscat et de omnibus scientiam habet, tamen de ipsis aliqua potest scire que non scit... Si vero obiciatur: ergo scientia eius potest augeri, dicimus, quod non sequitur. Non enim dicitur scientia augeri vel minui gratia scitorum, sicut nec visio dicitur augeri vel minui gratia visorum. Licet enim plura videam hodie quam heri viderim, non inde tamen dicitur mea visio augmentata: ita licet Deus plura possit scire quam sciat, non tamen dicimus eius scientiam posse augmentari”. Gietl, pp. 81ff. “For a locus classicus on the concept of scientia visionis, as opposed to scientia simplicis intelligentiae, see Aquinas, Summa theol. I, q. 14, esp. a. 9 and a.12. As J. Wippel reads Aquinas, “God’s knowledge of things that actually have been, are, or will be, is called his scientia visionis. His knowledge of possibles that neither are, were, nor will be is called his scientia simplicis intelligentiae”. Review of Metaphysics 34 (1981), p. 733, n. 8.
Cf. H. Denifle, ‘Die Sentenzen Abaelards und die Bearbeitungen seiner Theologia’, Archiv für Literatur-und Kirchengeschichte des Mittelalters 1 (1885), p. 621; Gietl, loc. cit;
D. E. Luscombe, The School of Peter Abelard, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1969, pp. 14–60;
D. E. Luscombe, The School of Peter Abelard, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1969, pp. 224–281.
Gietl considers the Sentences to be a fruit of Roland’s teaching in Bologna: “.. erweisen sich die Sentenzen Rolands als die reifste Frucht jener theologischen Schule, die Mitte des 12. Jahrhunderts vor der Constitution der Universität zu Bologna bestand. Der Einfluss, den Abälard schon auf Gratian ausgeübt, macht sich auch in ihnen geltend... Trotzdem ist der Einfluss Abälards kein so mächtiger wie in der Sentenzen Omnebene’s, den Denifle mit Recht einen Abälardianer nennt”. p. 1xi.
“Utrum plura possit facere Deus quam facit”. Gietl, p. 49.
“Utrum quicquid potuit ab eterno, possit modo, et quicquid potest modo, semper ab eterno potuerit et semper debeat posse. “Gietl, ibid.
“Utrum quicquid poterit in futuro, possit modo, et quicquid potest modo, semper in futuro poterit et semper debeat posse”. Gietl, ibid.
Cf. Introductio in theologiam III, n. 5, col. 1093 f.
“Quod autem Deus plura non possit facere quam faciat, auctoritate Salemonis probatur qua dicitur: ‘dominator Deus omnipotens, cui subest posse, cum vult’. Si subest ei posse tantum cum vult: ergo cum non vult, non subest ei posse. Tantum igitur que vult potest. Si tantum que vult potest: ergo tantum que vult operatur. Non ergo plura potest facere quam faciat”. Gietl, pp. 49 f.
This notation is an adaption of the notation of D. Walton’s article ‘Some Theorems of Fitch on Omnipotence’, in Power of God, pp. 182–191, and of his ‘The Omnipotence Paradox’, ibid., pp. 153–164.
Cf. L. M. de Rijk (ed.), Petrus Abaelardus: Dialectica, Van Gorcum and Company Assen, 1956, p. 278, for example, for the rule analogous to (q→r) → [(p→ q) (p→r)], “Quidquid antecedit ad antecedens, antecedit ad consequens”. Also, Garlandus Compotista: Dialectica, L. M. de Rijk (ed.), Van Gorcum and Company Assen 1959.
The quote comes from Augustine’s De civitate Dei, xxi, c. 7, n. 1, and can be found in Rolands text: “Non enim dicitur Deus omnipotens, eo quod omnia possit, sed quia quicquic vult potest, scilicet quicquic vult operatur”. Gietl, p. 50.
“Si idem est Deo velle et posse: ergo quicquic vult potest et quicquid potest, vult”. Ibid.
Cf. Gietl, pp. 50–56 for the total context of the discussion.
I am alluding here to the terminology and the structural historical interpretation as found in A. Lovejoy’s, The Great Chain of Being, A Study of the History of an Idea, Harvard University Press, Cambridge Mass. 1936. Whether Abelard would indeed accept the Principle of Plenitude of Being in just the form used by Lovejoy is certainly disputable; and as Eleanore Stump rightly pointed out in a discussion of this paper, even if he did accept the Principle, he need not do so in order to maintain his position on omnipotence. Nor were Abelard’s adversaries successful in their refutations of Abelard’s position as they may have thought. Professor Stump pointed out in a discussion that they should first face the problem of divine simplicity. After all, the concept of omnipotence is intertwined with related concepts such as immutability, goodness, and perhaps most important, with simplicity. As long as Roland, Peter Lombard, and Peter of Poitiers used simplicity in a noncritical way and at the same time endorsed the idea of immutable divine will (with the positive connotation of free choice), they were able to escape Abelardian necessitarianism, i.e., the position that whatever God does flows with necessity from his (simple) nature. But a fully-worked out concept of divine simplicity may make such an escape more difficult. Of course, one should also remember that neither Abelard nor his opponents could claim to be able to talk “literally” about such a being.
Cf. A. Lovejoy, op. cit., pp. 67–98; J. Hintikka, ‘Gaps in the Great Chain of Being’, in Proceedings of the APA 49 (1975/76), 22–38; and
S. Knuuttila, Reforging the Great Chain of Being, D. Reidel, Dordrecht 1980, pp. 163–257.
“Si enim omnia valde bona vellet creare et non posset, foret impotens; si posset et nollet, foret invidus. Idem quoque ratione probatur. Aliquid est quod Deus non potest facere. Illud erit aut peccare aut currere vel huiusmodi. Aliqua est ratio, quare id non potest facere. Hec erit, aut quia non convenit eum facere, aut quia iniustum est eum id facere. Si ideo non potest currere vel peccare, quia non convenit eum facere: ergo eadem ratione lapidem aliquem de loco suo non potest movere, quia non convenit, ut moveat, quod exinde apparet, quod dimittit. Si enim conveniret, ut moveret, et moveret. Idem alia ratione. Impossibile est, Deum aliquid facere, quod non sit iustum eum facere; sed non est iustum cum facere, quod nec fecit nec faciet: ergo non potest facere, quod non facit nec faciet. Quod non sit iustum eum facere, quod non facit nec faciet, exinde apparet, quia non facit. Si enim iustum esset, ut faceret, procul dubio illud faceret”. Gietl, p. 51.
“Si vero duo equalia bona esse dicantur, nulla erit ratio, quare quod facit faciat, et quod dimittit dimittat, et sic quicquid Deus facit, indiscrete et absque ratione facit”. Gietl, p. 52.
“Item, voluntas eius inmutabilis et invariabilis est. Ab eterno autem noluit facere quod dimittit; non potest autem facere aliquid nolens: ergo non potest facere eorum aliquid que dimittit, quia non potest facere ea que non vult facere. Item, non potest Deus facere contra suam dispositionem; ab eterno autem disposuit, se non facturum quod dimittit: ergo non potest illud facere, aut si potest facere, et contra suam dispositionem facere”. Gietl, p. 52.
“Contra probatur auctoritate Domini dicentis: ‘possum rogare Patrem meum, et exhibebit michi plus quam xii legiones angelorum’. Potuit rogare, non autem rogavit: potuit ergo quod non fecit... Idem... Potest Deus dare pluviam hodie, non autem dabit: ergo potest facere quod non est facurus”. Gietl, pp. 52f.
“Item, si Deus non potest facere quod non facit neque dimittere quod facit: ergo quicquic facit necessitate facit, et quicquic dimittit necessitate dimittit. Item, si Deus non potest plura facere quam faciat: ergo terminus interponitur potencie Dei, quare sub certo et determinato numero Dei cadit potencia”. Gietl, pp. 53f.
“Natura lapidis, qui est in fundo maris, non repugnat, quin lapis ille possit videri a me, et tamen ego non possum videre lapidem illum: ita natura Jude non repugnabat, quin Judas posset a Deo salvari, et tamen Deus non poterat eum salvare”. Gietl, p. 55
Introductio in theologiam III, in PL 178, n.4, col. 1099.
“Nobis autem asserentibus Deum plura posse facere quam faciat, obviare quodammodo videntur predicte auctoritates et rationes...” Gietl, p. 56.
“Item, ‘non dicitur Deus omnipotens, quod omina possit’, id est, non ea ratione dicitur omnipotens, quia potest omnia, sed quia quicque vult, potest ex se”. Gietl, p. 57.
“Quidam dicunt, quod creare est maius bonum. Nos vero dicimus, quod quantum in se est creare, et non creare quantum in se est, equalia, et tamen non sine ratione hec facit et illud dimittit”. Gietl, p. 57.
All references to Lombard’s sentences are to Book I of the Hayesse critical edition. See n. 6 above.
Cf. D. E. Luscombe, The School of Peter Abelard Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1969, p. 262.
As A. Kenny and J. Pinborg remark, “In writers such as Scotus and Ockham commentaries on the Sentences of Lombard follow the form of a Quaestio disputata”. Cf. Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy, N. Kretzmann et al. (eds.) Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1982, p. 26.
Lombard, Sent. I, d. 42, c. 1 (1984), p. 294.
“Ait enim Augustinus in libro Quaestionum veteris et novae Legis: ‘Omnia quidem potest Deus, sed non facit nisi quod convenit veritati eius iustitiae!” Ibid.
“Unde Augustinus in xv libro De Trinitate: ‘Magna, inquit Dei potentia est, non posse mentiri’.” Ibid., d. 42, c. 2 (185), p. 295.
Sent. I, d. 42, c. 3 (186), p. 295. Lombard probably got this characterization of omnipotence from Hugh of St. Victor, De Sacram. I, 2, 22.
“His auctoritatibus videtur ostendi quod Deus ex eo tantum dicatur omnipotens, quod omnia potest quae vult, non quia omnia possit”. Sent. I, d. 42, c. 3 (186), 2, p. 296.
Centuries later, John Eckius, lecturing at Ingolstadt around 1542 and writing his “annotatiunculae” on the first book of Lombard’s Sentences, read into Lombard’s text elements of the famous distinction between the absolute and the ordained power of God which would soon be employed by Aquinas and which in a more radical form played such an extensive role in the fourteenth century philosophy. Writing on Distinction 42 Eckius comments: “God’s ordained power is one through which he is himself cooperating with creatures according to the common law which he had implanted into them. St. Augustine says about this power: ‘God so governs the things which he created that he allows them to make their own proper motions’. Furthermore, God gives the fruits of the earth and other things, but by his ordained power. The absolute power of God is that power which does not concern the common rule which he has implanted in things but extends to all that which it would not be self-contradictory to come about. For example, when fire consumes clothing it is according to the common course and the nature of fire. But that it did not attack and consume the three boys in the furnace was due to God’s absolute power. Thus, by his absolute power God could save Judas, because it would not be self-contradictory for this to happen”. J. Eckius, In primum librum Sententiarum Annotatiunculae. W. L. Moore jr. (ed.), E. J. Brill, Leiden 1976, pp. 122f. Cf. W. J. Courtenay, ‘The Dialectic of Omnipotence in the High and Late Middle Ages’, in the present volume, for a detailed discussion of the development and the role in philosophical discussions of the de potentia absoluta/ordinata distinction.
Cf. Gietl, op. cit., pp. v–lxx; also Luscombe, op. cit., pp. 14–59 and pp. 224–260; and Lombard, Sent. I. d. 43, pp. 298–303.
Not only is he arguing against the position which would have limits on God’s power imposed from the outside; he also expresses himself sarcastically against the persons holding such opinion when he says: “... quidam tamen, de suo sensu gloriantes, Dei potentiam coarctare sub mensura conati sunt”. d. 43, c. unicum (187), 1; p. 298.
“Non potest Deus aliud facere quam facit, nec melius facere id quod facit, nec aliud praetermittere de his quae facit”. Sent. I, d. 43 (187). 1, p. 298.
“Non potest Deus facere nisi quod bonum est et iustum fieri; non est autem iustum et bonum fieri ab eo nisi quod facit. Si enim aliud iustum est et bonum eum facere quam facit, non ergo facit omne quod iustum est et bonum eum facere. Sed quis hoc audeat dicere?” Ibid., pp. 298f.
Ibid., p. 299.
Ibid., pp. 299ff.
A. Lovejoy, op. cit., p. 70.
Ibid., pp. 70f.
Capitula Haeresum Petri Abelardi: in St. Bernardi Opera in PL 182, col. 1052; quoted by Lovejoy, op. cit., p. 73, n. 9.
Scil., De div. quaest. 83, p. 50 (PL 40, 31s).
“Deus quem genuit, quoniam melioriem se generare non potuit; nihil enim Deo melius, debuit aequalem. Si enim voluit et non potuit, infirmus est; si potuit et noluit, invidus. Ex quo conficitur aequalem genuisse Filium”. Sent. I. d. 44, c. 1 (188), p. 304.
Cf. Sent. I, d. 44, c. 1 (188).
Cf. De Genesi ad litt., XI, c. 7, n. 9 (PL 34, 433).
“Talem potuit Deus hominem fecisse, qui nec peccare posset nec vellet; et si talem fecisset, quis dubitat eum meliorem fuisse?” Lombard adds: “Ex praedictis constat quod potest Deus et alia facere quam facit, et quae facit meliora ea facere quam facit”. Sent. I, d. 44, c. 1 (188), p. 304. An interesting contemporary discussion of the problem at hand is that by J. Hick, ‘Can God Create a World in Which All Men Always Freely Choose the Good?’ found in The Power of God, Urban and Walton (eds.), pp. 217–222.
Cf. also J. Hick’s Evil and the God of Love, Macmillan, New York 1966.
“Si modus operationis ad sapientiam opificis referatur, nec alius, nec melior esse potest... Si vero referatur modus ad rem ipsam quam facit Deus, dicimus quia et alius et melior potest esse modus”. Loc. cit., pp. 304f.
“Unde Augustinus in xii libro De Trinitate dicit quod fuit et alius modus nostrae liberationis possibilis Deo, qui omnia potest; sed nullus alius nostrae miseriae sanandae fuit convenientior”. Loc. cit., p. 305.
“Potest igitur Deus eorum quae facit quaedam alio modo meliori, quaedam alio modo aeque bono, quaedam etiam minus bono facere quam facit; ut tamen modus referatur ad qualitatem operis, id est creaturae, non ad sapientiam Creatoris”. Loc. cit., p. 305.
Cf. Moore-Dulong (eds.), Sent. I, c. 7, p. 49.
Ibid., p. 52.
Cf. Ibid., pp. 57f.
Ibid., p. 59.
“Deus in terra claritatem illam non potest dare fidelibus suis, quam eius reservat in celis. Sed accipiendum est ‘non potest’, id est non vult, vel ‘non poest’ de institia”. Bede: In Marc. evang. exposit. III, 8 (PL 92, 218A). Quoted in Moore-Dulong, p. 60.
“Notandum igitur est tria esse genera operum que a Deo sunt quorum alia fiunt auctoritate Dei, mediante seminali causa, ut quod arbores florent, fructificant, et alia huiusmodi, et ea dicuntur opera naturalia; sunt alia que fiunt ab hominibus — quod tamen fiunt, a Deo est — qualia sunt artificialia omnia, scamma, templa, et huiusmodi; sunt alia que operatur auctoritate sua, nullo mediante, ad gratiam suam nobis ostendendam, ut quod virgo peperit, quod virga in serpentem mutata est, mulier in statuam salis versa, et hec omnia sunt opera miraculosa”. Moore-Dulong, p. 66.
“Est igitur in uniuscuiusque natura ut Deus possit de ea facere quod voluerit, non est tamen in natura eius ut faciat, si facit, quia non agit opus miraculosum mediante natura, sed sola sua voluntate. Unde quod hec substantia est serpens non est aliqua inferiori causa mediante, sed sola Dei voluntate id efficiente; non tamen ideo minus est verus serpens. Sicut et quod Adam de limo terre factus est homo, non fuit mediante inferiori natura, sed sola Dei voluntate”. Ibid., pp. 66f.
“... ut verum est virginem peperisse secundum superiorem naturam, verum est non virginem peperisse secundum inferiorem naturam. Sed quod ambo sint vera secundum superiorem naturam, id non posset Deus efficere, cum in hoc eius excellentia minueretur, quia auctor esset contrarietatis et discordie. Nec etiam potest Deus facere ut ambo sint vera secundum inferiorem naturam”. Ibid., p. 67.
Ibid.
“Utrum quidquid Deus potest modo, semper potuit et semper debeat posse, et utrum quicquic ab eterno potuit, possit modo et semper debeat posse, et utrum quicquic poterit in futuro, ab eterno potuit et possit modo”. Gietl, p. 58.
Ibid., p. 59.
“Quod dicitur: ‘ad eterno potuit mundum de nichilo creare’ etc., dicimus, quoniam et illud hodie potest et habet illam eandem potenciam, quam ab eterno habuit mundum de nichilo creare, ut si mundus hodie non esset, et ipsum de nichilo creare posset”. Ibid., p. 60.
“Praeterea quaeri solet utrum Deus semper possit omne quod olim potuit. Quod quibusdam non videtur, dicentibus: Potuit Deus incarnari, potuit mori et resurgere, et alia huiusmodi, quae modo non potest. Potuit ergo quae modo non potest, et ita habuit potentiam quam modo non habet: unde videtur eius potentia imminuta”. Lombard, Sent. I, d. 44, c. 2 (180), p. 305.
“Quia sicut omnia semper scit quae aliquando scivit, et semper vult quae aliquando voluit, nec unquam aliquam scientam amittit vel voluntatem mutat quam habuit, ita omnia semper potest quae aliquando potuit, nec unquam aliqua potentia sua privatur. Non est ergo privatus potentia incarnandi vel resurgendi, licet non possit modo incarnari vel resurgere. Sicut enim potuit olim incarnari, ita et potest modo esse incarnatus”. Ibid.
S. Knuuttila, op. cit., pp. 195–98.
“Ut enim olim scivit se resurrecturum, et modo scit se resurrexisse; nec est alia scientia illud olim scivisse, et hoc modo scire, sed eadem omnino. Et sicut voluit olim resurgere, et modo resurrexisse; in quo unius rei voluntas exprimitur. Ita potuit olim nasci et resurgere, et modo potest natus fuisse et resurrexisse; et est eiusdem rei potentia”. Lombard, Ibid., pp. 305f.
“Fateamur igitur Deum semper posse et quidquid semel potuit, id est habere omnem illam potentiam quam semel habuit, et illius omnis rei potentiam cuius semel habuit; sed non semper posse facere omne illud quod aliquando potuit facere: potest quidem facere aut fecisse quod aliquando potuit”. Ibid., p. 306.
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Boh, I. (1985). Divine Omnipotence in the Early Sentences . In: Rudavsky, T. (eds) Divine Omniscience and Omnipotence in Medieval Philosophy. Synthese Historical Library, vol 25. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-7719-9_11
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