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Becoming a dictator

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Autocracy
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Abstract

So far we have devoted our attention mainly to what happens after the dictator gets in power. We now turn to how to get power. This may seem a perverse way of dealing with the problem since obviously they become dictator before they are faced with the problem of retaining power, but for analytical reasons it’s easier. The basic problem faced by a young man who wants to be dictator is the existing dictator himself. Hence unless we are fairly well informed about the defenses that that dictator may have, we’re not in a position to discuss the rise to rank of such a man as Sgt. Doe1 of Liberia.

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Notes

  1. General Samuel K. Doe assumed the presidency on April 12, 1980 following a pre-dawn coup by Army enlisted men. The existing regime was charged with the general crime of `rampant corruption’ by the attacking soldiers, and the raid produced the death of then Liberian Head of State Tolbert. The New York Times, April 13, 1980, p. 1.

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  2. Africian dictators who are civilians are commoner than those who are military men. In South America, the reverse is true. See Mair, 1977, and Pothelm, 1979; and for example Wheatcroft, 1983 respectively. In African societies, apparent control over environmental threats (drought, disease, etc) rather than military oponents has often served as the catalyst for a rise to power. In Rwanda, for example, tribal rulers have been popularly held `to have ritual powers; they controlled the weather, causing the rain to fall at the right time and not in excessive quantities, and they combated disasters such as locust invasion. Such powers were… an inseparable element in the quality of chiefliness.’ (Mair, 1977, p. 25, See also, Potholm, 1979, pp. 28–31.)

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  3. Chang Tso-Lin, a well known warlord of nothern China dominated the region of Manchuria from 1920 to 1928. At times he ran the area virtually as a distinct country, independently negotiating treaties with foreign governments. For example, he conquered Peking (1925–26) and claimed the title of `Grand Marshall’ of China, despite the fact that southern China was not under his control Revolutionary forces from the south toppled him from power in the `Northern Expedition’ (1928). (Sheridan, 1975, pp. 61–65. See also, Sheridan, 1966). It might be noted that there is some dispute about whether Chang himself was a practicing `bandit’, or was merely `accused of banditry only because the local defense unit he commanded was not part of the regular military establishment.’ (Sheridan, 1975, p. 63 ).

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  4. On Nurhachi’s modest beginnings, see Morton, 1980, pp. 138–9; Rodzinski, 1984, p. 156; Wakeman, 1975, pp. 75–79. Temuchin (Genghis Khan’s originally-given name) `came from a family of hereditary leaders but had to work long and hard to reach a position of power, since his father had been killed [when Temuchin was] a boy.’ (Morton, 1980, p. 116.)

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  5. See Dupuy and Dupuy, 1970, pp. 336–345; Bjorklund, Holmboe, and Rohr, 1962, Map ±42. So efficient were Genghis Kahn’s techniques that they were carefully studied by German Staff officers prior to the Second World War. (Crofts and Buchanan, 1958, p. 39.).

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  6. Absolutism’ is a term frequently used to describe the extent of government controls under Napoleon Bonaparte’s rule as emporer of France (1804–1815). For details of the economic and social regulations he instituted see, Ward, Protero, and Leathes, 1907, pp. 141–2; Blum, Cameron and Barnes, 1970, pp. 494–7, 503–4. Napoleon went so far as to regulate for example, the numbers and types of theatrical companies each city and town was to be allowed. (Ward, Prothero, and LEathes, 1907, pp. 129–130.)

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  7. See The New York Times, April 4, 1981, p. 3; The New York Times,Apri129, p. 5; The New York Times,June 14, 1984, p.25; The New York Times,July 1, 1981, p. 5.

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  8. His return by rail followed a period (beginning in 1943) of extensive indoctrination in the Soviet Union. See Ridgeway, 1972, p. 9; Han, 1970, p. 499.

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  9. See Han, 1970, pp. 500–504.

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  10. See Nelson, 1983, pp. 290–291; Dziewandoski, 1977, p. 233–236; Davies, 1984, passim; Carrere d’Encausse, 1980, pp. 343–346.

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  11. On the British `Raj’ in India, see Gipson, 1942, pp. 231ff.

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  12. See Han, 1970, passim.

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  13. See Dunnigan and Bay, 1985, pp. 130–138.

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  14. See Johnson, 1983, p. 528.

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  15. Ibid,pp. 76–77, 710–711.

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  16. The New York Times,August 26, 1981, p. 1, provides a summary of the last three successive Ugandan regimes, Nyerere has had a hand in installing.

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  17. Iraqi President Admad Hasan al Bakr expelled Khomeni from his country (to Paris) in early October, 1975. (Nyrop, 1979, p. 215).

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  18. It might be better for him to say the he proposes to overthrow a government and install a democrac., I doubt that very many people are deceived.

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  19. There are of course notable exceptions to this rule. See The Washington Post,June 27, 1985, p. 1, on the relevant transfer of power in North Korea.

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  20. See Dupuy and Dupuy, 1920, p. 814.

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  21. See Dupuy and Dupuy, 1921, p. 910–911.

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  22. See Tolstoy, 1981, p. 354.

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  23. Ibid,pp. 51–57, provides an account of the extreme precautions Stalin took to avoid attempts on his life.

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  24. Sometimes when he retires he will apt to setup a democratic government rather than a dictatorial one. This will be dealt with below. President Omar Torrijos Herrera of Panama, for example, retired as head of government in October, 1978 and was immediately replaced by President Aristides Royo. (Nyrop, 1980, p. 136) Despite his official retirement, however, Torrijos retained a large share of supreme power in his country until 1980. (p. 133 ).

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  25. Upon his death by heart attack on September 28, 1970, Egyptian President General Gamal Abdul Nasser was smoothly followed by his successor a then vice-President, Sadat. Sadat was installed as president the following day. ( See for example, Hirst and Beeson, 1981 ).

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  26. Rafael Trujillo resigned as president of the Dominican Republic on April 1, 1962, and was succeeded by his hand-picked vice president, Dr. Joaquin Balaguer in August of that year. (Crassweller, 1966, 00. 273,375–377.) Trujillo assumed the presidency of anohter institution, the Central Bank, during his reign. By no mere coincidence were outstanding loans of $38 million borrowed by Trujillo’s sugar company suddenly `repaid’ at about the same time. (p. 380).

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  27. Also Moi of Kenya.

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  28. See Crassweller, 1966, pp. 375.

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  29. Ibid,p. 377.

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  30. The Politics of Bureaucracy,Public Affairs Press, Washington, 1965.

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  31. This is of course characteristic also of democratic politics, He who follows the policy of neutrality in a presidental election is unlikely to retain his job. Secretary Forrestal, of course, was a very, very prominent example. On the career of James V. Forrestal, Secretary of Defense (1947–49), see for example Batchelder, 1961, pp. 197ff.

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  32. In the case of Mao Su Dung, this was rather concealed. In China the position of a general is not one of great prestige, so he always maintained a opium sodden senile wreck of a professional general called Chu Teh, as the formal commander of the army. He, himself was chairman of the committee that dealt with the army. No one in the army however, was deceived by the arrangement. Possibly some intellectuals outside were. When Chu Teh assumed the post of Commander of the People’s Liberation Army in 1969 he was 84. On Mao’s effective control of the Army, see Domes, 1985, p. 113.

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  33. Professor Marcello Caetano took over as the new Prime Minister of Portugal on September 25, 1968, after Salazar suffered a stroke (September 6) and could no longer perform the duties of that office. (See Kay, 1970, pp. 413–416; Marques, 1972, pp. 223–224) Salazars condition and the subsequent change in power was brought on by a freak accident; a chair collapsed under him, and his head hit the ground, producing a blood clot in his brain. (Marque p. 224.)

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  34. On Robert Devereux, 2nd Earl of essex, his failed attempt at a coup to install himself as King (February 8, 1601), and subsequent exectuion by Queen Elizabeth I, see Blum, Cameron and BArnes, 1970, p. 171; or Harris and Levey, 1975, p. 893.

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  35. It’s also sometimes said that the fact that General Beck turned up for the coup wearing civilian clothes rather than a uniform was of some significance. In any event, of course, the fact that Hitler had not actually been killed would probably have scuppered it even if these other difficulties had not occurred. See FitzGibbon, 1956, p. 210.

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  36. See Johnson, 1983, pp. 321ff.

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  37. Actually two full dress wars, there was an intermediate. period of peace. On the other hand, the restoration of the Stuarts after the death of Oliver Cromwell, was a more classical and quick affair with substantially no military opposition. See Cantor, 1967, pp. 412–433; Trevelyan, 1953, pp. 184–198.

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  38. See Paxton, 1983, p. 90.

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  39. See Fitzpatrick, 1984, pp. 98–102.

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  40. On the development of the collective leadership between Stalin’s death in March, 1953, and Kruschev’s assumption of effective control in early 1955, see Dmytryshyn, 1984, pp. 265–273.

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  41. Although about a year and a half separated the coup against Kruschev in October 1964 and Brechnev’s appointment as General Secretary of the Communist Party in March-April 1966, the latter had assumed an increasingly dominant position in the collective leadership beginning with a month of Kruschev’s ouster, and shortly thereafter was for all intents and purposes sole leader. See Dmytryshyn, 1984, pp. 334–336.

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  42. Andropov died in February, 1984, after a brief 15-month rule. See The Washington Post, July 28, 1985, p.1, for details on the recent regimes of Andropov and Chernenko.

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  43. What was essentially a collective leadership arose after Mao’s death in 1976, in which Hua Kuo-Feng emerged as ‘first among equals’ as the Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party. But by late 1980 another member of this collective leadership, Teng Hsiao-Ding, assumed effective control after defeating Hua in a bloodless power struggle. Interestingly, Teng refrained from naming himself Chairman. See Domes, 1985, pp. 116–176.

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  44. Albania’s dictator, Enver Hoxha, did recently expire, and he hand-picked (before death, of course) his successor, Ramiz Alia. See The Washington Post, August 8, 1985, p. A27.

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  45. Since Tito’s death, Yugoslavia has remained nominally without an acknowledged individual ruler, with the politburo ostensibly forming a collective leadership. On the decisions leading to this post-Tito organization, see Stankovic, 1981, pp. 104–110.

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  46. Possibly two.

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  47. Perhaps by that most permenant of methods, a firing squad.

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© 1987 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht

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Tullock, G. (1987). Becoming a dictator. In: Autocracy. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-7741-0_7

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-7741-0_7

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-94-015-7743-4

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