Abstract
With the exception of the replication models for nonsymmetric Nash and Raiffa-KalaiSmorodinsky bargaining solutions (subsection 2.4.4 and section 4.3) hitherto the number of players in a bargaining game was assumed to be fixed. In Thomson and Lensberg (1989) axiomatic characterizations of bargaining solutions are collected where the number of players may vary. The book shows that axioms based on such a variable population of players have proved to be powerful tools in axiomatic bargaining, leading to new characterizations of well-known solutions like the Nash, Raiffa-Kalai-Smorodinsky, and egalitarian solutions.
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© 1992 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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Peters, H.J.M. (1992). Bargaining with a variable number of players. In: Axiomatic Bargaining Game Theory. Theory and Decision Library, vol 9. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-8022-9_7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-8022-9_7
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-90-481-4178-4
Online ISBN: 978-94-015-8022-9
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