Abstract
Husserl’s phenomenology demands that it be the ultimately founded science based on the radical self-responsibility of doing philosophy. It means for phenomenology to be the critique of transcendental-phenomenlogical cognition and the critique of this critique. But the critique in the second sense remained latent in Husserl. Fink tried to deepen his reflection on the meaning of the being of doing philosophy and on the self-criticism of phenomenology. The question turned out for him to radicalize the dualism of transcendental life. For Husserl transcendental analysis was explication of the implications of the double temporalization.
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© 1993 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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Chida, Y. (1993). Phenomenological Self-Reflection in Husserl and Fink. In: Blosser, P., Shimomissé, E., Embree, L., Kojima, H. (eds) Japanese and Western Phenomenology. Contributions to Phenomenology, vol 12. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-8218-6_6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-8218-6_6
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
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