Abstract
Most of this survey is in the context of non-cooperative games in strategic form, and is essentially devoted to concepts which gravitate around the idea of Nash equilibrium (briefly: NE): for standard terminology in game theory and for general reference, see [36] or [13].
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Patrone, F. (1995). Well-Posedness for Nash Equilibria and Related Topics. In: Lucchetti, R., Revalski, J. (eds) Recent Developments in Well-Posed Variational Problems. Mathematics and Its Applications, vol 331. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-8472-2_9
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