Abstract
Jaakko Hintikka has recently proposed that the distinction between the standard and nonstandard interpretations of higher-order quantifiers be used as a new tool for investigations in the history of the foundations of mathematics.1 This distinction can be described succinctly as follows: let us take a second-order quantifier involving a one-place class variable X, whose values are classes of individuals of a domain do(M). Those adopting the standard interpretation would claim that the range of this quantifier is the entire power set P(do(M)), i.e. some values of X are arbitrary extensionally possible classes, while those adopting the nonstandard interpretation would consider only some such classes as constituting the range of the quantifier. (The same reasoning applies if X is a predicate variable or for function variables.)
Identity is the very Devil and immensely important; very much more so than I thought. It hangs — like everything else — directly together with the most fundamental questions.
L. Wittgenstein to B. Russell, 29.10.1913.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Bibliography
Andrews, P. B.: 1965, A Transfinite Type Theory with Type Variables, North-Holland, Amsterdam.
Demopoulos, W. and J. L. Bell: 1993, `Frege’s Theory of Concepts and Objects and the Interpretation of Second-Order Logic’, Philosophia Mathematica 1, 139–156.
Dirichlet, P. G. L.: 1837. L.: 1837, `Ober die Darstellung ganz willkürlicher Funktionen durch Sinus-und Cosinusreihen’, in L. Kronecker (ed.), Werke, reprint, Chelsea, New York, 1969, vol. 1, pp. 135–160.
Fogelin, R.: 1983, `Wittgenstein on Identity’, Synthese 56, 141–154.
Gödel, K.: 1931, `On Formally Undecidable Propositions of Principia Mathematica and Related Systems I’, in van Heijenoort (1967), pp. 596–616.
Gödel, K.: 1940, The Consistency of the Continuum Hypothesis, Princeton University Press, Princeton.
Gödel, K.: 1944, `Russell’s Mathematical Logic’, in P. Benacerraf and H. Putnam (eds.), Philosophy of Mathematics. Selected Readings, second edition (1983), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 447–469.
Gödel, K.: 1980, `On a Hitherto Unexploited Extension of the Finitary Standpoint’, Journal of Philosophical Logic 9, 133–142.
Hahn, H.: 1980, `Discussion about the Foundations of Mathematics’, in B. McGuinness (ed.), Empiricism, Logic, and Mathematics. Philosophical Papers, D. Reidel, Dordrecht and Boston.
Heck, R. G. and J. Stanley: 1993, `Reply to Hintikka and Sandu: Frege and Second-Order Logic’, Journal of Philosophy 90, 416–424.
Henkin, L.: 1950, `Completeness in the Theory of Types’, Journal of Symbolic Logic 15, 81–91.
Hilbert, D.: 1925, `On the Infinite’, in van Heijenoort (1967), pp. 367–392.
Hintikka, J.: 1956, `Identity, Variables and Impredicative Definitions’, Journal of Symbolic Logic 21, 225–245.
Hintikka, J. and G. Sandu: 1992, `The Skeleton in Frege’s Cupboard: The Standard versus Nonstandard Distinction’, Journal of Philosophy 89, 290–315.
Hintikka, J.: 1993, `Ludwig’s Apple Tree: On the Philosophical Relations between Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle’, in F. Stadler (ed.), Scientific Philosophy: Origins and Developments, Kluwer, Dordrecht, pp. 27–46.
Hintikka, J.: 1995, `Standard vs. Nonstandard Distinction: A Watershed in the Foundations of Mathematics’, this volume.
Johnson, W. E.: 1922, Logic. Part II. Demonstrative Inference: Deductive and Inductive, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Jourdain, P. E. B.: 1905, `On the General Theory of Functions’, Journal far reine und Angewandte Mathematik 128, 169–210.
L’Abbé, M.: 1953, `Systems of Transfinite Types Involving X-Conversion’, Journal of Symbolic Logic 18, 209–224.
Leblanc, H.: 1975, `That Principia Mathematica, First Edition, Has a Predicative Interpretation After All’, Journal of Philosophical Logic 4, 67–70.
Lewy, C.: 1967, `A Note on the Text of the Tractatus’, Mind 76, 416–423.
Majer, U.: 1989, ‘Ramsey’s Conception of Theories: An Intuitionistic Approach’, History of Philosophy Quarterly 6, 233–258.
Majer, U.: 1991, ‘Ramsey’s Theory of Truth and the Truth of Theories: A Synthesis of Pragmatism and Intuitionism in Ramsey’s Last philosophy’, Theoria 57, 162–195.
Marion, M.: 1995, `Wittgenstein and Finitism’, to appear in Synthese.
Molk, J.: 1990, `Principes fondamentaux de la théorie des fonctions’, in J. Molk (ed.), Encyclopédie des sciences mathématiques pures et appliquées vol. II. 1, Gauthier-Villars, Paris, pp. 1–112.
Myhill, J.: 1974, `The Undefinability of the Set of Natural Numbers in the Ramified Principia’, in G. Nakhnikian (ed.), Bertrand Russell’s Philosophy, Duckworth, London, pp. 19–27.
Nedo, M. and M. Ranchetti: 1983, Ludwig Wittgenstein. Sein Leben in Bildern und Texten, Suhrkampf, Frankfurt.
Poincaré, H.: 1909, `La logique de l’infini’, Revue de métaphysique et de morale 17, 461–482.
Pringsheim, A.: 1899, `Grundlagen der allgemeinen Funktionenlehre’, in H. Burkhardt and W. F. Meyers (eds.), Encyklopädie der mathemtischen Wissenschaften mit Einschluss ihrer Anwendungen vol. IIai, Teubner, Leipzig, pp. 1–41.
Ramsey, F.: 1925, `The Foundations of Mathematics’, in Ramsey ( 1978 ), pp. 152–212.
Ramsey, F.: 1926, `Mathematical Logic’, in Ramsey ( 1978 ), pp. 213–232.
Ramsey, F.: 1978, Foundations, D. H. Mellor (ed. ), Routledge and Kegan Paul, London.
Ramsey, F.: 1990, Notes on Philosophy, Probability and Mathematics, M. C. Galavotti (ed.), Bibliopolis, Naples.
Ramsey, F.: 1991, On Truth, N. Rescher and U. Majer (eds.), Kluwer, Dordrecht, Boston and London.
Russell, B.: 1910, `La théorie des types logiques’, Revue de métaphysique et de morale 18, 263–301.
Tarski, A.: 1965, Introduction to Logic and the Methodology of Deductive Sciences, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Tarski, A.: 1983, Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics, second edition, Hackett, Indianapolis.
Heijenoort, J. (ed.): 1967, From Frege to Gödel. A Sourcebook in Mathematical Logic, 1879–1931, Harvard University Press, Cambridge Mass.
Wright, G. H.: 1993, `The Wittgenstein Papers’, in L. Wittgenstein: Philosophical Occasions, 1912–1951, J. Klagge and A. Nordmann (eds.), Hackett Pub. Co., Indianapolis and Cambridge, pp. 480–506.
Waismann, F.: 1977, `The Concept of Identity’, in B. McGuinness (ed.), Philosophical Papers, D. Reidel, Dordrecht, pp. 22–29.
White, R.: 1979, `Wittgenstein on Identity’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, N. S. 78, 157–174.
Whitehead, A. N. and B. Russell: 1925–27, Principia Mathematica, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, second edition: volume I, 1925; volume II, 1926; volume III, 1927.
Wittgenstein, L.: 1922, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London. Wittgenstein, L.: 1965, Philosophical Remarks, Blackwell, Oxford.
Wittgenstein, L.: 1973, Letters to C. K. Ogden, Blackwell/Routledge and Kegan Paul, Oxford/London.
Wittgenstein, L.: 1974, Philosophical Grammar, Blackwell, Oxford.
Wittgenstein, L.: 1978, Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, revised third edition, Blackwell, O xford.
Wittgenstein, L.: 1979a, Notebooks 1914–1916, revised second edition, Blackwell, Oxford.
Wittgenstein, L.: 1979b, Ludwig Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle, Blackwell, Oxford.
Wittgenstein, L.: 1979c, Wittgenstein’s Lectures, Cambridge 1932–1935, Blackwell, Oxford.
Wittgenstein, L.: 1980, Culture and Value, Blackwell, Oxford.
Wright, C.: 1985, `Skolem and the Skeptic’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (Supp.), 117–137.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1995 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Marion, M. (1995). Wittgenstein and Ramsey on Identity. In: Hintikka, J. (eds) From Dedekind to Gödel. Synthese Library, vol 251. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-8478-4_14
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-8478-4_14
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-90-481-4554-6
Online ISBN: 978-94-015-8478-4
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive