Abstract
Who has the other minds problem? Are there views of the human mind that avoid the problem? Those who believe that people are more than complex (physico-chemical) machines, are more than complex aggregates of sub-atomic particles which have only material properties, have non-material properties as well as material properties, certainly have the problem. So all Dualist views of the nature of human beings have the problem. So clearly do Idealist views, believing there are only minds and their ideas.
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Notes to Chapter Two
D.M. Armstrong, A Materialist Theory of the Mind (Routledge, 1968) p. 125.
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© 1995 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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Hyslop, A. (1995). Who Has the Problem of Other Minds?. In: Other Minds. Synthese Library, vol 246. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-8510-1_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-8510-1_3
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-90-481-4497-6
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