Other Minds and Scientific Inference

Abstract

The fashionable approach to other minds is to view them as theoretical entities. Scientific inference (hypothetic inference, the hypothetico-deductive method) is, consequently, the method used to ground belief in these (unobservable) entities. I have little hard evidence for my claim that this is indeed the fashionable approach to other minds, however. The problem of other minds is not much ventilated in the philosophical literature and when it is, it is unusual to fmd the suggestion that they are to be regarded as theoretical entities discussed never mind advocated. However, I find that the view is advanced informally, frequently, and it seems clear, anecdotely and otherwise, that the alternatives are generally out of favour. Unsatisfactory as the evidence is, it seems to support best the following options: there is no favoured solution to the problem of other minds; there is generally thought to be no answer currently to the problem; the solution is to treat other minds as theoretical entities. Of these, I am sure other minds as theoretical entities wins hands down.

Some of the material in this chapter appeared in an earlier version in my ‘Other Minds and Theoretical Entities’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, vol.54 (1976) pp.158–61.