Abstract
Heinrich Hertz and Steven Weinberg — two illustrious physicists separated by a century — exemplify by their respective views of physics one of the crucial transitions in philosophy that this century of science has undergone. We are concerned here with the role assigned to theories, their constituting laws and consequently the criteria by which they are supposed to be compared and evaluated. Should a theory enable us to be solely “in advance of the facts,” as Hertz had stipulated [Hertz (1894) 1956], p.1, or should it aim at what seems to be a rather loftier objective: increasing our understanding of “why… [the world] is the way it is,” as Weinberg demanded [Weinberg (1992) 1994], p.219? The tension is then between on the one hand successful prediction based on appropriate representation of phenomena and on the other hand explanatory power grounded in schemes of explanation.
The most direct, and in a sense the most important, problem which our conscious knowledge of nature should enable us to solve is the anticipation of future events, so that we may arrange our present affairs in accordance with such anticipation. Heinrich Hertz The Principles of Mechanics [Hertz (1894) 1956], p.1.
Once again I repeat: the aim of physics at its most fundamental level is not just to describe the world but to explain why it is the way it is. Steven Weinberg Dreams of a Final Theory [Weinberg (1992) 1994], p.219.
At the end of this century we can seriously argue that, although metaphysics and theology may serve as sources of inspiration or consolation, intellectually illuminating explanations are to be found in the realms of natural science. It is not necessary to depart from science to have genuine understanding of the world and what transpires within it. Wesley Salmon Causality and Explanation [Salmon 1998], p.91.
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Hon, G. (2001). The Why and How of Explanation: An Analytical Exposition. In: Hon, G., Rakover, S.S. (eds) Explanation. Synthese Library, vol 302. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9731-9_1
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