Abstract
Legal institutions can be roughly characterised as distinct legal systems governing specific forms of social conduct within the overall legal system. The hallmark of legal institutions is that they can be dealt with as independent social phenomena.
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References
Neil MacCormick and Ota Weinberger. An Institutional Theory of Law. New Approaches to Legal Positivism. (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1986), 54
MacCormick and Weinberger (1986), 55.
Searle (1969), 36; Searle (1995), 43–51.
Searle(1969),34.
Art. 2: 64 Dutch Civil Code.
Searle (1969), 63 and 179; Conte (1986), 46.
MacCormick and Weinberger (1986); Ruiter (1993), 208.
Alf Ross. Tû-Tû’ 70 (1957) Harvard Law Review. 812–825, at 812.
Ross (1957), 812,820.
Ross (1957), 817–821; Alf Ross, ‘Definition in Legal Language’. Logique et Analyse, 1 (1958b), 139–149, at 145.
Ross (1957), 820; Ross (1958a), 170–172; Ruiter (1993), 210. Dick W.P. Ruiter. ‘Normative and Real Institutions’ in: Bernard Steunenberg and Frans van Vught, Political Institutions and Public Policy. Perspectives on European Decision Making. (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997c), 67–81, at 73–74.
See on the problems associated with singular terms, definite descriptions, proper names, denoting and referring Danny D. Steinberg and Leon A. Jakobovits. Semantics. An Interdisciplinary Reader in Philosophy, Linguistics and Psychology. (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1971): Leonard Linksy, ‘Reference and Referents’, 76–85; P.F. Strawson, ‘Identifying Reference and Truth-values’, 86–99; Keith Donellan, ‘Reference and Definite Descriptions’, 100–114; Zeno Vendler, ‘Singular terms’, 115–113. All contributions are reprinted papers.
MacCormick and Weinberger (1986), 53; Ruiter (1993), 208, 213.
MacCormick and Weinberger (1986), 52–53; Ruiter (1993), 208.
This article is included in the treaty under the heading pacta sunt servanda.
I have paid attention to this distinction for the first time in ‘Structuring Legal Institutions’, in: Law and Philosophy 17,3(1998a), Special Issue: Laws, Institutions and Facts, 215–232, at 228. MacCormick’s reaction in the same issue was as follows: “Ruiter suggests that the typology of rules needs to be expanded to include, as well as ‘consequential rules’, what he calls ‘content rules’, to allow for the way the general background law may stipulate what can and cannot be included in a particular régime that instantiates a certain (abstract) institution. He is certainly correct in the point he makes, though for simplicity’s sake I should be inclined to reformulate the definition of ‘consequential rules’ so as to accommodate the point.” Neil MacCormick, ‘Norms, Institutions, and Institutional Facts’, Law and Philosophy 17,3(1998), 301–345, at 337–8.
The translation of the provisions of the French Constitution is taken from Finer, Bogdanor and Rudden (1995), 214–215.
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© 2001 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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Ruiter, D.W.P. (2001). Legal Institutions. In: Legal Institutions. Law and Philosophy Library, vol 55. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9765-4_4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9765-4_4
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