Abstract
One of the major recent developments in the theory of belief change is the construction of models of belief change in which one or more of the postulates of the original AGM model [Alchourrón et al., 1985] are not satisfied. In studies of belief revision (consistency-preserving incorporation of new beliefs), the most controversial postulate seems to be that of success (α ∈ K*α), according to which the input sentence is always accepted, and incorporated into the new belief set. Several non-prioritized revision operators have been proposed, for which the success postulate does not hold. (See [Cantwell, 1997; Fermé and Hansson, 1999; Hansson, 1991a; Hansson, 1997; Hansson et al.,1999; Makinson, 1997; Olsson, 1997], and, for an overview, [Hansson, 1999b].)
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Fermé, E.L., Hansson, S.O. (2001). Shielded Contraction. In: Williams, MA., Rott, H. (eds) Frontiers in Belief Revision. Applied Logic Series, vol 22. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9817-0_4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9817-0_4
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