Abstract
In the above chapters, I have sketched a naturalistic conception of the mind, and criticized a cluster of views that has been influential in shaping the debate on mental causation. It should now be possible to explicate how mental reality, as discussed in the previous chapters, relates to the ontological picture of Part I. How is the mind physically realized? What is the ontological character of perception, thought, and action? This, of course, is the issue that will decide which form our account of mental causation should take on.
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References
Feyerabend (1963) and Rorty (1965) have also put forward eliminativist views, but they have not been involved in any recent debate about this issue.
See, however, Clark 1997, 113–19.
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© 2003 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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De Muijnck, W. (2003). Against Reductionism. In: Dependencies, Connections, and Other Relations. Philosophical Studies Series, vol 93. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-0121-1_19
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-0121-1_19
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
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