Abstract
With the above analysis of the causal relation in hand (i.e., causation as a circumstantial counterfactual dependence with a specific physical infrastructure as its circumstantially necessary condition) we have reached a point where we can address the first of the five problems of mental causation, described in the Introduction: the problem of mental anomalism. The problem was that while our beliefs and desires are causes of our actions, they do not seem to be such in virtue of nomically necessitating them (or nomically raising their probability). But given that cause and law are inseparable, how can this be?
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References
For an account along these lines see also Armstrong 1997, Ch. 15.
The actual background of this denial is, of course, Hume’s psychologistic claim that causality is a matter of association of ideas, motivated by regularities in our sense impressions, rather than matters of fact in the world of objects. But Hume was right, in my view, in claiming that the idea of a relation’s being causal could not get into one’s mind via the senses.
A more sceptical version of this view would be the claim that the notion of causality is a naive projection of our own will, action and sensitivity on other items in the world.
See, for instance, Plotkin (1997, 186–200), who refers to experimental work of Baillargeon, Leslie, and Spelke.
E.g., Plotkin 1994 and Buskes 1998.
We will see that this normative notion is appropriate: our senses are not there to create illusions, but to make us aware of what is really the case. But biological economy does not care for infallibility.
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© 2003 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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De Muijnck, W. (2003). Causation and Natural Law. In: Dependencies, Connections, and Other Relations. Philosophical Studies Series, vol 93. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-0121-1_8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-0121-1_8
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