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Joint Ventures as a Means of Assembling Complementary Inputs

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International Joint Ventures: Economic and Organizational Perspectives

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Abstract

In recent years, economists have devoted considerable attention to mechanisms through which firms can cooperate, particularly in the conduct of R&D. This literature had tended to focus on cooperation’s effects in output markets. In contrast, the present analysis examines the effects of cooperation on input markets. In particular, joint ventures are often said to be motivated by the desire to assemble complementary assets into a package needed to conduct a successful project. Some of the ways in which joint ventures may faciliate the acquisition of needed inputs are explored.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Haas School of Business, University of California at Berkeley, Berkeley, California, 94720, USA

    Michael L. Katz

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  1. Michael L. Katz
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Center for Research in Conflict and Negotiation, The Pennsylvania State University, University Park, Pennsylvania, USA

    Kalyan Chatterjee  & Barbara Gray  & 

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© 1995 Springer Science+Business Media New York

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Katz, M.L. (1995). Joint Ventures as a Means of Assembling Complementary Inputs. In: Chatterjee, K., Gray, B. (eds) International Joint Ventures: Economic and Organizational Perspectives. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-1944-5_2

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-1944-5_2

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-94-017-1946-9

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-017-1944-5

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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