Abstract
The following is yet another contribution to the vast corpus of Rawlsiana which has grown during the past two decades to reach a size rapidly approaching that of the literature on Kant. But at the same time, it is an attempt to critically examine Rawls’s reading of Kant and to come to some conclusions about Kant’s ethical theory.
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References
J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971).
J. Rawls, “Kantian Constructivision”, Journal of Philosophy 77 (1980): 515–577.
J. Rawls, “Justice As Fairness: Political Not Metaphysical,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 14 (1985): 223–252.
J. Rawls, “The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus,” Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 7 (1987): 2–25.
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© 1989 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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Heyd, D. (1989). How Kantian Is Rawls’s “Kantian Constructivism”?. In: Yovel, Y. (eds) Kant’s Practical Philosophy Reconsidered. International Archives of the History of Ideas / Archives Internationales d’Histoire des Idées, vol 128. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-2016-8_12
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-2016-8_12
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