Abstract
The main assumption, perhaps, of the present investigation can be put as simply as follows: consciousness matters in mental representation. In this study, I have tried to show exactly how consciousness is involved in any of several more or less elementary varieties of mentally representing something. The reader will have understood that the range of what is referred to by the title of the present study, mental representation and consciousness, has been confined just to intuitive mental representation.
We will have to refuse to acknowledge as a proper science a psychology that knows the basic field of all psychological matters of fact, i.e. that of consciousness, in naturalistic misinterpretation only, that therefore does not know it at all according to its original nature
Husserl 1923/24 (Hua VII, p. 125)1
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Notes to Conclusion
Eine Psychologie, die das Grundfeld aller psychologischen Erfahrungstatsachen, das des Bewusstseins, nur in naturalistischer Missdeutung, also seinem ursprünglichen Wesen nach überhaupt nicht kennt, werden wir uns weigern müssen, als eigentliche Wissenschaft anzuerkennen“.
See, e.g., Hua HI/1 (1976), §§99ff.; Hua XXIII (1980).
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© 1993 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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Marbach, E. (1993). Conclusion: Two Basic Phenomenological Forms of Intuitive Mental Representation. In: Mental Representation and Consciousness. Contributions to Phenomenology, vol 14. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-2239-1_8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-2239-1_8
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
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