Abstract
I have been arguing recently that a phenomenology of values such as we find in the work of Max Scheler1 may be much less vulnerable to the Heideggerian critique and much more promising, despite its neglect, than has been generally supposed.2 I have stressed, however, that this does not mean that theories such as Scheler’s will not continue to face challenging difficulties, not the least of which may be precisely the ontological difficulty of articulating the mode in which values exist. In this essay, I wish to examine some of these difficulties and then to offer a number of suggestions as to how these might be resolved.
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References
Max Scheler, Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die Materiale Wertethik, ed. Maria Scheler, Vol. II of Scheler’s Gesammelte Werke (Bern: Francke, 1954), 275; the English translation, Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values, is by M. Frings and R. L. Funk (Evanston: Northwestern, 1973), 261. Hereafter this work will be cited as “F,” followed by pagination, respectively, of German and English editions.
Reconnoitering Heidegger’s Critique of Value Theory,” a paper delivered at the annual meeting of the Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy in Memphis, Oct. 17–19, 1991; and “The Viability of Scheler’s Ethics in Light of Heidegger’s Implicit Critique of Value Theory,” a paper delivered at the Japanese/American Phenomenology Conference held in conjunction with the 23rd annual meeting of the Husserl Circle at Seattle University, June 24–30, 1991.
One must advise caution, therefore, against any unqualified assertions about the axiological “idealism” or “realism” of a theorist such as Scheler. This is doubly the case in view of the position he takes in his essay “Idealismus-Realismus.” Nevertheless, there is a sense in which either (continued...) (...continued) designation is warranted. Scheler may be called an “idealist” in the sense that values, although they are not conceptual representations (like Platonic ideas), are intuitable essences; and he may be called a “realist” in the sense that values, although they are not empirically real, actually exist as intuitable essences. Thus, one must not mistakenly assume that Scheler is denying that value has an intentional existence, when he simply states that value, as such, has no existence (“Der Wert ist überhaupt nicht”), as he declares in his Gesammelte Werke, I: Früheschriften, ed. Maria Scheler M. S. Frings (Berne Munich: Francke Verlag, 1971), 98. Scheler is denying here only the real, empirical existence of values.
If 1 am asked ‘What is good?’ my answer is that good is good, and that is the end of the matter. Or if I am asked ‘How is good to be defined?’ my answer is that it cannot be defined, and that is all 1 have to say about it,” writes G.E. Moore. “My point is that ‘good’ is a simple notion, just as’yellow’ is a simple notion ...” (G.E. Moore, Principia Ethica [1903; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982], 6f.).
I use the term “functional” to specify the peculiar nature of existence of values at the suggestion of Manfred Frings, in his “Introduction to Three Essays by Max Scheler,” in Person and Self-Value: Three Essays, ed. M. S. Frings (Dordrecht: Nijhoff, 1987), who writes: “A value exists only when it realizes itself with a thing, with a state of affairs, or with a person, i.e., the value enters into a functional relationship with these or other factors in order for it to exist. The existence of a value is functional existence” (xxvii, emphasis added).
Hans Reiner, Duty and Inclination: The Fundamentals of Morality Discussed and Redefined with Especial Regard to Kant and Schiller, Phaenomenologica, 93, trans. Mark Santos (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1983), 135. Unless noted otherwise, all further references to “Reiner” are to this volume.
Risieri Frondizi, What Is Value?: An Introduction to Axiology, 2nd ed. (La Salle: Open Court, 1971), 102f., 135; cf. 160. This is also a major argument in Imtiaz Moosa, “Scheler’s Philosophy of Value and Ethics in Relation to Kant’s Ethics,” Diss. Toronto 1986, Part II.
As D. W. Hamlyn points out, while there may be difficulties in trying to define terms like “red” purely ostensively, by reference to sensory experience alone, they certainly could not be understood fully without some sensory experience. D. W. Hamlyn, “A Priori and A Posteriori,” The Encyclopedia of Philosophy (New York: Macmillan, 1967), I, 141; cf. also his comments about the empirical element in a priori propositions of the form “Nothing can be red and green all over at the same time in the same respect” (which one finds in Scheler), as well as his remarks about the “relative” and “absolute” a priori (143f.).
Reiner, who reguards his own intuitionist ethics as free of the typical objections to intuitionism and non-naturalism (as noted by William Frankena in his Preface to Reiner’s Duty and Inclination, xiii), is keenly aware of these kinds of obstacles (265f).
A potential gold mine of material illuminating the connections between empirical perception and eidetic intuition may be found in psychological research on the phenomenon of”synesthesia.” The best relatively recent discussion is Lawrence E. Marks’ “On Colored-Hearing Synesthesia, Cross-modal Translation of Sensory Dimensions,” Psychological Bulletin 82/3 (1975), 303–31. But cf. Also Odbert, Karwoski, and Eckerson, “Studies in Synesthetic Thinking: I. Musical and Verbal Associations of Colors and Mood,” Journal of General Psychology 26 (1942), 153–73; Karwoski, Obdert, and Osgood, “Studies in Synesthetic Thinking: II. The Role of Form in Visual Response to Music,” Journal of General Psychology, 26 (1942), 199ff. And J. G. Snider and C. E. Osgood, eds., Semantic Differential Technique ( Chicago: Aldine, 1969 ).
R.B. Perry, Realms of Value: A Critique of Human Civilization (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954), 9. For the development of Perry’s “interest theory of values,” see his article, “The Definition of Value,” in The Journal of Philosophy, 11 (1914), 141–162; General Theory of Value(New York: Longman’s Green Co, 1926); and see his article, “Value as an Objective Predicate,” in The Journal of Philosophy 28 (1931), 477–484.
Herman Dooyeweerd, A New Critique of Theoretical Thought, trans. David H. Freeman, et al. (Amsterdam and Philadelphia, 1953–1956; rpt. Jordan Station, Ontario: Paideia Press, 1984), II, 7ff., and III, 53ff.
A discrepancy exists between the first two values in this list (based on F, ch. 2, B, sec. 5) and the list of corresponding emotional strata (at F, ch. 5, sec. 8), where they are “spiritual” and “psychic,” not “religious” and “spiritual.” Dooyeweerd, New Critique, I, 3; cf. vol. II, entitled The General Theory of Modal Spheres, passim.
A brief treatment of this problem, however, can be found in my article “Moral and Nonmoral Values: A Problem in Scheler’s Ethics,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research XLVIII, No. 1 (Sept., 1987), 139–143. Its basic argument is summarized in the following discussion.
SDooyeweerd, of course, would consider these irreducible aspects of experience, which he would call “functional modalities of meaning” in a sense roughly analogous to Scheler’s “ranks” of value, as we have seen above. See references in n. 11, and cf. n. 13, above.
The idea of specifically moral values could, of course, be included under what Scheler terms “spiritual values” in his value-ranking as a species of the latter. The suggestion of specifically moral and nonmoral types of normativity and obligation implies a division within a genus calling for further examination in itself. “Chiefly in sec. 30 of his Duty and Inclination.
Reiner, 172f. Tapio Puolimatka, in his book, Moral Realism and Justification (Helsinki: Finnish Academy of Science and Letters, 1989), accepts Scheler’s remarks about “pharisaism” only in the sense that people should not intend to appear good to themselves in a self-satisfied sense. But he insists: “this does not mean that it is not legitimate to intend to be or to become benevolent” (147).
Reiner, 231–236. Hence, in an intriguing observation, Reiner points out that the thesis of Socrates that no one knowingly acts badly holds true in the case of choosing “rightly” as opposed to “wrongly” (that is, nobody knowingly chooses “incorrectly”); but it does not hold true in the case of choosing between moral “good” and “evil.” Only where people can knowingly choose evil, he says, can they be held morally accountable for their acts (232).
For a closer inquiry into this connection, Reiner directs his readers (on p. 233, fn. 1) to his lecture “Das Prinzip von Gut and Böse” (Freiburg, 1949), 20–30. But cf. also the selection by him entitled “Good and Evil: Origin and Essence of the Basic Moral Distinctions,” a translation by J.J. Kockelmans of pp. 7–41 of Reiner’s Gut and Böse (Freiburg im Breisgau, 1965 ) in Joseph J. Kockelmans, ed., Contemporary European Ethics ( Garden City, NY: Anchor, 1972 ), 158–181.
Puolimatka, in particular, makes a strong case for this point, arguing on the basis of the detailed research of Henry Sidgwick that the concept of “benevolence” specifies the intuitive essence and irreducible content moral value, and rebutting objections based on J. L. Mackie’s “multi-person prisoners’ dilemmas” and “paradox of retribution” (Moral Realism, 143–155).
Among other things, Scheler’s ranking of values alone is of no help in deciding between two alternatives where the choice is between realizing the same value for myself or for another, as Reiner points out (182). Furthermore, he failed to develop the implications of his analysis of “absolute” and “relative” values (F, 116ff./96ff.) in a way that could assist in showing when the realization of a value for another might be preferable to its realization for oneself (Reiner, 143). In another vein, Frondizi offers several specific criticisms of the criteria Scheler offers for determining the order of ranks among nonmoral values. For instance, with reference to the criterion of “the depth of satisfaction,” he asks: “In which persons are we going to ‘measure’ this supposed depth of satisfaction? Under what circumstances?” Again, with reference to the criterion of “duration,” he asks what such a criterion could mean in light of the fact that superior values are no more or less temporal than inferior ones (What Is Value?, 138f.).
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Blosser, P. (1997). Scheler’s Theory of Values Reconsidered. In: Hart, J.G., Embree, L. (eds) Phenomenology of Values and Valuing. Contributions to Phenomenology, vol 28. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-2608-5_10
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