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Enforcement of Environmental Laws and Regulations: A Literature Review

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Stochastic and Statistical Methods in Hydrology and Environmental Engineering

Part of the book series: Water Science and Technology Library ((WSTL,volume 10/2))

Abstract

The effective enforcement of environmental laws and regulations is crucial for proper environmental management. As emphasized in Canada’s Green Plan (Government of Canada, 1990, p. 156), “Legislation and regulation are only as good as their enforcement.” This paper contains a detailed literature survey covering verification and enforcement theory and its applications, plus summaries of current environmental enforcement policies in Canada and the United States. In addition, the applicability of verification theory to environmental enforcement policies is assessed. Finally, some conclusions are drawn.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Mechanical Engineering, Ryerson Polytechnic University, 350 Victoria Street, Toronto, Ontario, Canada, M5B 2K3

    Liping Fang

  2. Department of Systems Design Engineering, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada, N2L 3G1

    Liping Fang, Keith W. Hipel & D. Marc Kilgour

  3. Department of Statistics and Actuarial Science, University of Waterloo, Canada

    Keith W. Hipel

  4. Department of Mathematics, Wilfrid Laurier University, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada, N2L 3C5

    D. Marc Kilgour

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  1. Liping Fang
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  2. Keith W. Hipel
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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Departments of Systems Design Engineering and Statistics and Actuarial Science, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada

    Keith W. Hipel (Professor and Chair) & Liping Fang (Assistant Professor) (Professor and Chair) &  (Assistant Professor)

  2. Department of Mechanical Engineering, Ryerson Polytechnic University, Toronto, Ontario, Canada

    Liping Fang (Assistant Professor) (Assistant Professor)

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Fang, L., Hipel, K.W., Kilgour, D.M. (1994). Enforcement of Environmental Laws and Regulations: A Literature Review. In: Hipel, K.W., Fang, L. (eds) Stochastic and Statistical Methods in Hydrology and Environmental Engineering. Water Science and Technology Library, vol 10/2. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-3081-5_1

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-3081-5_1

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