Abstract
The history of the term “analogy” has shown that for both Aristotle and Aquinas analogy is first of all a logical category concerning the meaning of names. There is however a slight difference between the conceptions of Aristotle and Aquinas. Aristotle conceives analogy as a mode of signification of any term in general, whereas Aquinas conceives it as a division of a predicate.1 Two kinds of explanations may be offered for Aquinas’ innovation, (a) He may have been led to this restriction by the fact that in a sentence the signification of both subject and predicate is usually determined by the predicate.2 (b) Aquinas sometimes uses the term “predication” in a rather wide sense, that comes to be almost equivalent to that of signification.3 Consequently Aquinas’ conception becomes practically equivalent to Aristotle’s. The textual evidence drawn from Aquinas’ works does not prove conclusively either explanation. Only further research into Aquinas’ predecessors will be able to give the final solution to this minor historical problem.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
Cfr. Aristotle, Categ. I, 3; Topica 6, 10; Aquinas, S. Theol. I, 13, 5 & 16, 6; C. Gent. I, 33 & 34; De Pot. 7, 7; In IV Meta 535.
This view is still prevalent among modern Thomists. See Coffey, P., The Science of Logic (London: Longmans, 1918) vol. I, pp. 207 ff.;
Toohey, J. J., „The term ‘Being’,“ New Scholasticism (1943) pp. 107–129, especially pp. 111–113.
Cf. for instance In XI Meta no. 2197.
For an excellent study of Aristotle’s classification of the equivocal terms in Topica 110b, 16–11 la, 7 see H. A. Wolfson’s essay „The Amphibolous terms in Aristotle, Arabic Philosophy and Maimonides,“ Harvard Theol. Review 1938, pp. 151–173.
Francis Sylvester de Sylvestris, known as the Ferrariensis (1474–1528) wrote the best commentary on Aquinas’ Summa contra Gentiles. It is in his commentary to Ch. 34 of Book One that he presents his interpretation of Aquinas’ doctrine of analogy.
For a detailed analysis of Klubertanz’ St. Thomas Aquinas’ on Analogy (Loyola University Press: 1960) see our review in „A propositio dell’Analogia“, in Rivista di Filosofia Neoscolastica 1962, pp. 366–369.
In his recent work The Logic of Analogy (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1962) R. M. Mclnerny tries to show that Aquinas’ numerous types of analogy are reducible to only one, i.e., to the one known under the name of per prius et posterius. But we believe that this attempt has failed since the analogy of per prius et posterius cannot take care of such important instances as the analogous predication of being, substance, accident, potency, act, in a word of all the basic metaphysical categories. There are three ways in which something may be said by analogy. In the first place, according to intention only and not according to being (secundum intentionem tantum et non secundum esse). This happens when one intention refers to several things according to priority and posteriority, but has being in one only. For example, the intention health refers to animal, urine and diet, in a different manner according to priority and posteriority, but not according to a diversity of being, because health has being only in animals. In the second place, according to being and not according to intention (secundum esse et non secundum intentionem). This happens when several are considered equal in the intention of something they have in common, but this common element does not have a being of the same kind in all. For example, all bodies are considered equal in the intention of corporeity. Hence the logician, who considers only intentions, says that the name “body” is predicated univocally of all bodies. However, the being of this nature is not of the same character in corruptible and incorruptible bodies. Hence for the metaphysician and the philosopher of nature, who consider things according to their being, neither the name “body” nor any other name is predicated univocally of corruptible and incorruptible bodies, as is clear from the Philosopher and the Commentator in X Metaphysics. In the third place, according to intention and according to being (secundum intentionem et secundum esse). This happens when a thing is considered neither equal in a common intention nor equal in being. For example being is predicated of substance and accident in this way.
In I Sent. 19, 5, 2 ad 1.
In I Sent. 35, 1, 4: “Et igitur dicendum quod scientia analogice dicitur de Deo et creatura, et similiter omnia huiusmodi. Sed duplex est analogia. Quaedam secundum convenientiam in aliquo uno quod eis per prius et posterius convenit; et haec analogia non potest esse inter Deum et creaturam, sicut nec univocatio. Alia analogia est, secundum quod unum imitatur aliud quantum potest, nec perfecte ipsum assequitur; et haec analogia est creaturae ad Deum.” Cf. also In I Sent. 45, 1, 4 & In II Sent. 16, 1, 2 ad 5. However, there are few passages in the Commentary (e.g. In I Sent. 8, 1, 2; ibid. 22, 1, 2 ad 3) where the phrase pre prius et posterius is accepted as a valid description of the analogy between God and creatures. Klubertanz offers the following explanation for this terminological shift: “In those texts in which it is accepted, the expression seems to mean only that a perfection possessed by God in a more perfect manner and according to (causal) priority is shared by creatures in a less perfect manner and only consequently upon that possession by God. In those texts in which it is rejected, it implies that both God and creatures share in some common perfection which is somehow distinct from both and prior to both.” (Klubertanz, St. Thomas’ Aquinas on Analogy, pp. 30–31).
In I Sent. Prol. q. 1, a, 2 ad 2: “Ad secundum dicendum, quod Creator et creatura redu-cuntur in unum, non communitate enivocationis, sed analogiae. Talis autem communitas potest esse duplex. Aut ex eo quod aliqua participant aliquid unum secundum prius et posterius, sicut potentia et actus rationem entis, et similiter substantia et accidens; aut ex eo quod unum esse et rationem ab altero recipit; et talis est analogia creaturae ad Creatorem: creatura enim non habet esse nisi secundum quod a primo ente descendit, nec nominatur ens nisi inquantum ens primum imitatur; et similiter est de sapientia et de omnibus aliis quae de creatura dicuntur.”
In IV Sent. 49, 2, 1 ad 6: “Ad sextum dicendum, quod quamvis finiti ad infinitum non possit esse proportio, quia excessus infiniti supra finitum non est determinatus; potest tarnen esse inter ea proportionalitas quae est similitudo proportionum; sicut enim finitum aequatur alicui finito, ita infinito infinitum... Vel dicendum quod proportio secundum primam no-minis institutionem significat habitudinem quantitatis ad quantitatem secundum aliquem determinaturn excessem vel adaequationem; sed ulterius est translatum ad significandum omnem habitudinem cuiuscumque ad aliud; et per hunc modum dicimus, quod materia debet esse proportionata ad forman; et hoc modo nihil prohibet intellectum nostrum, quam-vis sit finitus, dici proportionatum ad videndum essentiam infinitam.” See also ad 7 and In IV Sent. 1, 1, 1, 5, 3; In III Sent. 1, 1, 1, 3. A suggestive hypothesis has been recently advanced by Hayen concerning the interpretation of some other passages of the Commentary on the Sentences, where Aquinas divides analogy into proportion and proportionality. According to Hayen Aquinas is far less concerned to contrast proportionality with proportion than “large” with “strict” proportion or, in my terminology, proportion in its technical (strict) and ordinary (large) use. He believes that by proportionality Aquinas means proportion in lato sensu. Here are some passages where according to the author, Aquinas contrasts large with strict proportion: “Proportio secundum diversas species eiusdem generis (strict prop.)... proportio secundum diversum genus (large prop.)” (In II Sent. 9, 1, 3, 5; see also In I Sent. 48, 1, 1, where the proportio lato sensu is called proportionalitas). “Proportio convenientium in eadem natura (strict prop.)... proportio potentiae ad actum (large prop.)” (In II Sent. 30, 1, 1, 7). See also C. Gent III, 54: “Commensuratio proportione existente... quaecunque habitudo unius ad alterum” and Quodl. 10, 17, 1: “Determinatus excessus... quaelibet habitudo.” A. Hayen, L’Intentionnel selon St. Thomas d’Aquin (Paris, 1943), pp. 78–82. Hayen’s hypothesis has been recently applied by Mclnerny to the interpretation of the famous text of the De Veritate 2, 11 in order to show that there is no need “to see an opposition between proportion and proportionality” (o.c. p. 89) since what St. Thomas is stressing in this passage is that the proportion or relation between God and creatures is indeterminate. This may very well be true but we don’t see how this justifies Mclnerny’s attempt to reduce proportionality to proportion.
The Commentarium in Libros Sententiarum is generally dated around 1253–1255; the De Veritate is dated around 1256–1259.
De Veritate, 2, 11.
De Veritate 2, 11 ad 6: “Ad sextum dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de communitate analogiae quae accipitur secundum determinatam habitudinem unius ad alterum: tunc enim oportet quod unum in definitione alterius ponatur, sicut substantia in definitione acci-dentis; vel aliquid unum in definitione duorum, ex eo quod utraque dicuntur per habitudinem ad unum, sicut substantia in definitione quantitatis et qualitatis.”
De Veritate 21, 4 ad 2; cf. Klubertanz, op cit., p. 45.
De Veritate 23, 7 ad 9; see also De Veritate 5, 8 ad 3. This gives further support to Hayen’s and Mclnerny’s hypothesis. See note 2, pp. 11–12.
C. Gent I, 30.
C. Gent I, 31.
C. Gent I, 32.
C. Gent I, 33.
C. Gent. I, 33: “Non quidquid de Deo et de rebus aliis praedicatur, secundum puram aequivocationem dicitur, sicut ea quae sunt a casu aequivoca; nam in his quae sunt a casu aequivoca, nullus ordo aut respectus attenditur unius ad alterum, sed omnino per accidens est quod unum nomen diversis rebus attribuatur: non enim nomen impositum uni, signat ipsum habere ordinem ad alterum. Sic autem non est de nominibus quae de Deo dicuntuur et creaturis; consideratur enim in huiusmodi nominum communitate ordo causae et causati, ut ex dictis (c. 29 et 32) patet. Non igitur secundum puram aequivocationem aliquid de Deo et rebus aliis praedicatur.”
Contra Gentiles I, 34.
Ibid.
Cf. C. Gent. I, 29 & 32.
C. Gent. II, 16: “Quorumcumque in rerum natura est aliqua proportio et aliquis ordo, oportet unum eorum esse ab alio, vel ambo ab aliquo uno.”
For analogy between cause and effect cf. C. Gent. I, 29 & 31; for analogy between human intellect and divine intellect cf. III, 54, 13: “The proportion of the created intellect to the understanding of God is not, in fact, based on a commensuration in an existing proportion, but on the fact that proportion means any relation of one thing to another, as of matter to form, or of cause to effect. In this sense, then, nothing prevents there being a proportion of creature to God on the basis of a relation of one who understands to the thing understood, just as on the basis of the relation of effect to cause.” See also C. Gent. III, 47 & IV, 11, 14. For the analogy between created being and divine being cf. III, 97. For the analogy between created wisdom and divine wisdom cf. III, 162 & IV, 21 etc.
Cf. for example, De Potentia 7, 7 where Aquinas clearly presupposes the knowledge of C. Gent. I, 33. In the Contra Gentiles Aquinas fully elaborates his arguments against equivocal predication of divine names. In De Potentia he merely gives a list of the same arguments.
For some excellent studies on Maimonides’ doctrine of predication see the following essays by Prof. H. A. Wolfson: “Maimonides on Negative Attributes,” Louis Ginzeberg Jubilee Volume, pp. 411–446; “Maimonides and Gersonides on Divine Attributes as Ambiguous Terms,” Mordecai M. Kaplan Jubilee Volume, pp. 515–530; “Amphibolous Terms in Aristotle, Arabic Philosophy and Maimonides,” The Harvard Theological Review (1938), pp. 151–173.
De Potentia 7, 5: “Ideo licet huiusmodi nomina quae intellectus ex talibus conceptionibus Deo attribuit significent id quod est divina substantia, non tarnen perfecte ipsam significant secundum quod est, sed secundum quod a nobis intelligitur. Sic ergo dicendum est, quod quodlibet istorum nominum significat divinam substantiam, non tarnen quasi comprehendens ipsam, sed imperfecte.”
Cf. De Potentia 7, 5 ad 2.
De Potentia 7, 5 ad 14: “Illud est ultimum cognitionis humanae de Deo quod sciat se Deum nescire, in quantum cognoscit, illud quod Deus est, omne ipsum quod de deo intelligi-mus, excedere.”
De Potentia 7, 5 ad 8.
See Infra p. 90.
De Potentia 7, 6: “Non ergo sapiens dicitur Deus quoniam sapientiam causet; sed quia est sapiens, ideo sapientiam causat.”
De Potentia 7, 6 in corp.
Ibid.
Also noteworthy is the other argument used here by Aquinas against univocal predication of the divine names. The argument may be reformulated in the following way: A different relation to being precludes a univocal predication of being, e.g. being is not predicated univocally of substance and accident, because substance is a being as subsisting in itself, while accident is that whose being is to be in something else. Now God’s relation to being is different from that of any creature’s: for He is his own being, which cannot be said of any creature. Hence in no way can it be predicated univocally of God and a creature. See De Potentia 7, 7.
De Potentia 7, 7: “huius autem praedicationis duplex est modus. Unus quo aliquid prae-dicatur de duobus per respectum ad aliquid tertium, sicut ens de qualitate et quantitate per respectum ad substantiam. Alius modus est quo aliquid praedicatur de duobus per respectum unius ad alterum, sicut ens de substantia et quantitate. In primo autem modo praedicationis oportet esse aliquid prius duobus, ad quod ambo respectum habent, sicut substantia ad quontitatem et qualitatem; in secundo autem non, sed necesse est unum esse prius altero. Et ideo cum Deo nihil sit prius, sed ipse sit prior creatura, competit in divina praedicatione secundus modus analogiae et non primus.”
Some of the best analyses of the ontological ground of analogy are found in Aquinas’ In Librum Beati Dionysii De Divinis Nominibus Expositio. See especially Cap. I, Lect. 3, no 86 & ff.; Gap. II, Lect. 4, no 185 & ff.; Gap. IX, Lect. 3, no 832 & ff.
In X Libros Ethic. Aristoteles Expositio Lib. I, Lect. 7, no. 95–96.
Aquinas denies again and again that a creature can give being (i.e. can create) or any-other absolute perfection to another creature; see, for example, Summa Contra Gent. II, 21; Summa Theol. I, 45, 5. For their being creatures depend only on God, who does not fail to communicate to each one of them, intrinsically, the perfections required by their own being. Therefore “good,” “being” etc. are predicated of creatures by intrinsic denomination. Cf. In I Sent. 19, 5,2 ad 1.
In V Metaph. Lect. 8, no 879.
For a fairly complete list of the texts of the Commentary to the Metaphysics as well as of the other works, where Aquinas deals with analogy see Klubertanz’ St. Thomas Aquinas on Analogy, Appendix 1.
In the De Veritate 2, 11; C. Gent. I, 34 and De Potentia 7, 7 the predication of “being” of both substance and accidents is given as an example of the analogy of one to another; in In I Sent. 19, 5, 2 ad 1 it is given as an example of the analogy both according to intention and according to being; in In IV Metaph. Lect. 1 it is given as an illustration of the analogy of many to one.
In De Trinitate 4, 2. Cfr. ibid. 6, 3, where Aquinas suggests that it is by way of analogy that man comes to know God, but he does not elaborate how this takes place.
In De Trinitate 4, 2; 6, 3. This distinction is the ground for the type of analogy that in the Commentary to the Sentences was called “secundum esse, non secundum intentionem.”
In De Trinitate I, 2 ad 3; I, 4 ad 4; In Divinis Nominibus I, lect. 3; II, lect. 4.
S. Theol. I, 12, 12: “Sed quia (creaturae) sunt eius effectus a causa dependentes, ex eis in hoc perduci possumus, ut congoscamus de Deo, an est: et ut cognoscamus de ipso ea, quae necesse est ei convenire, secundum quod est prima omnium causa, excedens omnia sua causata.”
S. Theol. I, 13, 1.
S. Theol. I, 13, 2.
S. Theol. I, 13, 3: “Quantum igitur ad id, quod significant huiusmodi nomina, proprie competunt Deo, et magis proprie, quam ipsis creaturis, et per prius dicuntur de Deo. Quantum vero ad modum significandi, non proprie dicuntur de Deo: habent enim modum significandi, qui creaturis competit.”
See Supra, p. 23
S. Theol. I, 13, 5.
Cf. In Libros Sent. I, 35, 4 ad 1; II, 1, 2, 2; IV, 4, 3; C. Gent. I, 29; De Potentia 7, 1 ad 8; De Malo 4, 3; S. Theol. I, 4, 3; I, 13, 5.
Ibid.
S. Theol. I, 13, 6: “In omnibus nominibus, quae de pluribus analogice dicuntur, necesse est quod omnia dicantur per respectum ad unum. Et ideo illud unum oportet quod ponatur in definitione omnium.”
Cf. S. Theol. I, 13,5; I, 16,6; 1/2,61, lad 1; C. Gent. I, 34;De Potentia 7, 7; In IV Metaphy. Lect. 1; In VII Metaphy. Lect. 4.
Compendium Theologiae 27.
Cajetan, The Analogy of Names, transi. Bushinski & Koren (Pittsburgh, 1953), p. 9. The Latin quotations from the De Nominum Analogia are according to the Venetian edition of the Opuscula Omnia Thornae de Vio Cajetani, in Divi Thomae Opera Omnia (Venice, 1593).
Cajetan, De Nominum Analogia, 1, 3: “Ad tres ergo modos analogiae analoga omnia reducuntur, scilicet ad analogiam inaequalitatis, et analogiam attributions, et analogiam proportionalitatis.”
De Nominum Analogia 1,4: “Analoga secundum inaequalitatem vocantur, quorum nomen est commune, et ratio secundum illud nomen est omnino eadem, inaequaliter tarnen partici-pata.”
De Nominum Analogia 2,1: “Analoga autem secundum attributionem sunt quorum nomen est commune, ratio secundum illud nomen est eadem secundum terminum et diversa secundum habitudines ad ilium.”
De Nominum Analogia 2, 3: “Analogia ista fit secundum denominationem extrinsecam tantum, ita quod primum analogatorum tantum est tale formaliter, coetera autem talia denominantur extrinsece.”
De Nominum Analogia 2, 5: “Simile enim de bono. Licet omnia entia bona sint bonitatibus sibi formaliter inhaerentibus, in quantum tarnen bona dicuntur bonitate prima effective, aut finaliter aut exemplariter, omnia alia non nisi extrinseca denominatione bona dicuntur illa bonitate, qua Deus ipse bonus formaliter in se est.”
Ib.: “Omne nomen analogum per attributionem ut sic vel in quantum sic, analogum commune est analogatis sic, quod primo convenit formaliter, reliquis autem extrinseca denominatione.”
De Nominum Analogia 3, 1: “Dicimus analoga secundum proportionalitatem dici quorum nomen est commune et ratio secundum illud nomen proportionaliter eadem. Vel sic analoga secundum proportionalitatem dicuntur, quorum nomen commune est, et ratio secundum illud nomen est similis secundum proportionem; ut videre corporali visione et videre intellec-tualiter, communi nomine vocantur videre; quia sic intelligere rem animae offert ut videre corpori animato.”
De Nominum Analogia 3, 3: “Analogia fit metaphorice quidem, quando nomen illud commune absolute unam habet rationem formalem, quae in uno analogatorum salvatur, et per metaphoram de alio dicitur: ut ridere unam secundum se rationem habet, analogum tarnen metaphorice est vero risui et prato virenti aut fortunae successui; sic enim significamus haec se habere, quemadmodum homo ridens... Proprie vero fit quando nomen illud commune in utroque analogatorum absque metaphoris dicitur, ut principium in corde respectu ani-malis, et in fundamento respectu domus salvatur. Quod, ut Averroes in Com. 7 primi Ethic. ait, proportionaliter de eis dicitur.”
De Nominum Analogia 3,4: “Scimus siquidem secundum hanc analogiam rerum intrinsecas entitates, bonitates, veritates, etc. quod ex priori analogia non scitur.”
John of St. Thomas: Cursus Philosophiae Thomisticae, (Marietti Ed.) I, p. 481.
Cajetan, De Nominum Analogia, 3.
Cf. J. F. Anderson, “Some Basic Propositions concerning Metaphysical Analogy,” Review of Metaphysics (1951–1952), pp. 465 ff.
J. Le Rohellec, Problèmes Philosophiques (Paris, 1932), 97 ff.
Suarez, Disputationes Metaphysicae, disp. XXVIII, in Opera Omnia (Ed. Vives: Paris, 1877), Vol. XXVI, pp. 13–21.
In Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques, (1921), pp. 52 ff.
In Tijdschrift voor Phil. (1953), pp. 267–286.
Cf. Le Thomisme (5 ed.), p. 153: “Les textes de saint Thomas sur la notion d’analogie sont relativement peu nombreux, et chacun d’eux est si sobre, qu’on ne peut s’empêcher de se demander pour quelle cause cette notion a pris tant d’importance aux yeux de ses commentateurs.”
“Cajétan et l’existence”, Tijdschrift voor Phil. (1953), p. 284.
Cf. for example, A. Maurer, “The Analogy of Genus,” The New Scholasticism (1955), pp. 127–144
R. McInerny, “The Logic of Analogy,” The New Scholasticism (1957), pp. 149–171
S. M. Ramirez, “En torno a un famoso texto de S. Tomas sobre la analogia,” Sapientia (1953), pp. 166–192; Hayen, L’Intentionnel dans la Philosophie de St. Thomas, pp. 178 ff.
Besides in In I Sent. 19, 5, 2 ad 1 St. Thomas makes allusion to analogy of inequality in In II Sent. 12, 1, 1 ad 1; In X Metaph. Lect. 1, no 2142; S. Theol. I, 66, 2 ad 2; I, 88, 2 ad 4. For analogy of attribution see besides In I Sent. 19, 5, 2 ad 1, De Verit. 2, 11; 21,4 ad 2; C. Gent.
I, 34; S. Tehol. I, 13, 5; I, 16, 6; In V Metaph. lect. 8, In I Eth. lect. 7. For analogy of proportionality see De Verit. 2, 11 and 23, 7ad9; In Divinis Nominibus no 14; In I Eth. lect. 7. 1 Cf. De Potentia 7, 7;C. Gent. I, 34.
Cajetan, De Nominum Analogia, 1.
Cf. De Potentia 7, 7; C. Gent. I, 34.
Cajetan, De Nominum Analogia, 1.
Cf. for example Comp. Theol. 27, where it is pointed out that names designating both creation and God are attributed (attribuuntur) to God in accordance to the order in which He is related to the things. In other words: By regarding the things in relation to God as their origin, we attribute to God the names of all perfections found in things. Here the word “attribuere” refers to the attribution of intrinsic properties, for — here as always — Aquinas rejects the thought that the perfections by which God is designated are extrinsic to Him. Another passage in which “attribuere” refers to intrinsic attribution is De Potentia 3, 5, where Aquinas emphasizes that anything common to several must have the same common cause. As being (esse) is common to all created things, it must accordingly have been attributed (attribuitur) to them by a cause. Cfr. Klubertanz, op. cit., p. 43, note 10.
Cajetan, De Nominum Analogia, 2.
De Ver. 1, 4 & 5; 21, 4 ad 2; S. Theol. I, 6, 4; 1/2, 7, 2 ad 1.
Cf. Aquinas, In I Sent. 19, 5, 2 ad 1: “(analogy according to intention and not according to being occurs) when one intention refers to several things according to priority and posteriority, but has being in only one.” Cajetan sees the basic characteristic of analogy of attribution in the fact that “the primary analogate realizes the perfection formally, whereas the others have it only by extrinsic denomination.” (De Nominum Analogia, 2)
Cajetan, De Nominum Analogia, 3.
Aquinas, In I Sent. 19, 5, 2 ad 1.
Aquinas, In I Sent. 19, 5, 2 ad 1.
Cf. Aquinas In I Sent. 35, 1, 4; C. Gent. I, 34; De Potentia 7,7; S. Theol. I, 13, 6.
Cf. De Pofentia 7, 7; C. Gent. I, 34.
Cajetan, De Nominum Analogia 1: “All analogous terms can be reduced to three modes of analogy: analogy of inequality, analogy of attribution and analogy of proportionality.”
Cajetan, De Nominum Analogia 2, no 11 & 21 (according to the English translation).
Cf. De Nominum Analogia 2, no 17 ff.
Cf. De Veritate 21, 4 ad 2: “Ad secundum dicendum quod dupliciter denominatur aliquid per respectum ad alterum. Uno modo quando ipse respectus est ratio denominationis... Alio modo denominatur aliquid per respectum ad alterum, quando respectus non est ratio denominationis sed causa, sicut si aer dicatur lucens a sole... et hoc modo creatura dicitur bona per respectum ad bonum.” That the analogy of one to another (analogia unius ad alterum) cannot be reduced to analogy of extrinsic attribution is convincingly argued in Lyttkens’ The Analogy, pp. 288 ff. It needs however to be said that there are cases in which St. Thomas considers the analogy based on a relation of efficient causality as an analogy of extrinsic denomination, for example De Veritate 1, 4 & 5, S. Theol. I, 16, 6. This is possible since it is not efficient causality as such to require intrinsic attribution but the principle of similarity between cause and effect. Aquinas, however, never speaks of an analogy of extrinsic denomination in his discussion of the mode of predication of divine names. In the predication of names of absolute perfections with respect to God he never allows an analogy of this kind (cf. De Potentia 7, 7; Summa Theologica I, 13, 2 & 6). It is only in the predication of names of absolute perfections with respect to creatures that he sometimes seems to allow a predication of extrinsic denomination.
On this point see Lyttkens, The Analogy, pp. 300 ff.
Aquinas sometimes finds acceptable also the analogy of many to one, for example De Veritate 3, 2; De Potentia 7, 8. But in these cases God is no longer one of the many secondary analogates subject to some superior category, but the one primary analogate on which the many depends. In these cases Aquinas does not hesitate to speak of an analogy between God and creation in the form of a plurality of proportions to one and the same, since here the exclusive position of God in relation to creation is securely preserved, as in analogy of one to another.
Cf. Lyttkens, The Analogy, pp. 283 ff.
Traditional Thomists continue to consider analogy of proportionality as the only proper analogy, the only one metaphysically and theologically tenable. It is therefore a problem to them to explain why St. Thomas in the two Sunmae and De Potentia 7, 7 is teaching a direct analogy of one to another between God and creatures without any hint of the analogy of proportionality. They attempt to solve this problem in various ways. Most of the time they appeal to the thesis of “mixed” cases. See for example J. Maritain, Distinguer pour unir ou les degrés du savoir (Paris, 1946), p. 822 & 826
Garrigou-Lagrange, God, His Existence and His Nature (London, 1946) II, 217 note 19; p. 207
G. B. Phelan, St. Thomas and Analogy (Milwaukee, 1948), p.35. Cases in which intrinsic essential likeness of creation and God seem to be spoken of as analogous, when the analogy is not one of proportionality, are always mixed cases, i.e. cases of both analogy of one to another and analogy of proportionality, meeting in the same matter. In these cases analogy of one to another is to be discounted in favor of analogy of proportionality. The necessity for this procedure is usually said to be the fact that direct analogy between God and creature destroys the absolute qualitative distinction between the two. Goergen attacks analogy of intrinsic attribution of one to another on the ground that where the predication is intrinsic for all analogates there cannot be any primary analogate (cf. Kardinal Cajetans Lehre von der Analogie, p. 71). The argument shows how little the author has understood the nature of the analogy of one to another based on the principle of the similarity between cause and effect. In his attempt to solve the problem of the analogia unius ad alterum used by Aquinas in his more nature theological works, a rather Quixotic position is taken by Manser. He cuts the knot by declaring Summa Theologica to be one of Aquinas’ less important works, a Schoolbook in which there is no reason for him to discuss any profound problem (cf. G. M. Manser, Das Wesen des Thomismus, Fribourg, 1931, p. 476 ff.).
For an interesting attempt of a systematic logical division of analogy see G. P. Klubertanz, “The Problem of Analogy of Being,” Review of Metaphysics (1957), pp. 261 ff.
“In general, analogies have always been divided into intrinsic and extrinsic... The distinction between predicates which mean intrinsic perfections present in the subjects of which they are predicated and predicates which are denominated of subjects for reasons of various kinds is a traditional and very simple distinction which does not need further elaboration” (Klubertanz, St. Thomas on Analogy, 129).
The name of analogy of participation has recently been suggested for the analogia unius ad alterum (cf. T. M. Flanigan, “The Use of Analogy in the Summa Contra Gentiles” The Modern Schoolman 1957–1958, p. 33). But I cannot find the name appropriate for this mode of analogy, since participation is not opposed by Aquinas to univocation but to essential predication. According to St. Thomas both univocal and analogous predication are predications through participation. On this point cf. L. B. Geiger, La Participation dans la Philosophie de St. Thomas d’Aquin, (Paris, 1953), pp. 123 ff. & 264 ff.
C. Fabro La Nozione Metafisica di Partecipazione, (Turin, 1950) passim; Phelan, St. Thomas and Analogy, pp. 18–19.
The view of a natural language as an adequate mirror og the world of objects is very common among scholastics, who have inherited it from Airstotle (cf Meta. IV, 7). Also St. Thomas, assuming that the true meaning of the terms is to be sought in their original use, since it is in the original use that words are mirrors of things, frequently resorts to the philology of words in order to discover the essence of things. On this matter see Rousselot, L’Intellectualisme de S. Thomas (Paris, 1908), pp. 177 ft
Some penetrating analyses on the conventional nature of language may be found in Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations; see § 6, 15, 37, 40, 43, 55 etc.
The fact that, in the imposition of new names for newly discovered objects or concepts, man does not choose names arbitrarily but selects meaningful words (as it may be seen in the choice of words like television, airplane, motorcar, bicycle, etc.) is a good argument in support of the scholastic theory that names are implicit definitions of the objects named. But this is not true of all names. It isn’t true, for example, of names of individual things. Names of individual things are usually only labels. E.g. Peter is the name of my cousin but does not signify anything of his nature.
Cf. A. Biese, Die Philosophie des Metaphorischen (Hamburg, 1893). Biese shows how all the vocabulary we use to describe the soul, its faculties and states is taken from the external, physical world. At p. 24 he says: “Aus allen Sphären der Erfahrungswelt übertragen wir die mannigfachen Erscheinungen zur Umschreibung und Deutung des Geistigen; wir sprechen von Stimmung der Seele, von Wärme der Gesinnung, von Festigkeit des Charakters, von Lauterkeit des Herzens, von Herbheit des Sinnes, von Bitterkeit, Trockenheit, Wetter-wendigkeit, von schwüler Leidenschaft, gährendem, kochendem, aufbrausendem Zorn, von rosiger Laune u.a.m.”
Cf. Sandmann, M., Subject and Predicate, pp. 55–56; Menges, M., The Concept of Univocity, pp. 30 ff.
According to Isidore de Seville (Etymologies, lect. 1, c. 29) “the ancients have named many objects according to their nature” therefore “the knowledge of a thing is easier when one knows the ethymology of its name.” According to Rousselot the terminology used by Aquinas to signify the acts of the intellect, e.g. videre, speculari, habere, teuere etc. is metaphorical: “ces mots sont empruntés à l’exercice de nos pouvoirs corporels” (p. 12). Cf. Rousselot, L’Intellectualisme de S. Thomas, pp. 12–13, 77 etc.; Biese, Die Philosophie des Metaphorischen, especially pp. 23–33; M. Foss, Symbol and Metaphor in Human Experience (Princeton, 1949), pp. 3, 53, 56, 57 ff.
In his Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein says repeatedly (see § 15, 37, 43 etc.) that names usually are nothing but labels, that naming something is like attaching a label on a thing. It seems to me that this is only partly true, for names like television, airplane, bicycle, etc., are full of conceptual meaning from the very beginning of their usage, and even words like sputnik, (which for persons ignorant of the Russian language when it was first introduced was only a label) after having been used long enough, are filled up with meaning so that they can be defined without resorting to an ostensive definition.
M. Sandmann, Subject and Predicate, pp. 55–56.
Suarez, Disputationes Metaphysicae, Disp. 28, sect. 3, 3: “(Nomen analogum) in hoc convenit cum aequivoco quod non una impositione positum est ad significandum multa, sed pluribus; differentia vero est quod in aequivocis casu accidit, ut unum nomen ad alias res significandas imponatur, in analogis vero prius fit impositio ad significandam unam rem, deinde per similitudinem vel per proportionem extenditur ad aliam; in praesenti vero (i.e. in praedicatione entis de Deo et creaturis) non ita est, sed unica impositione nomen entis id quod est significat, et ex vi illius convenit Deo et creaturae, quia in utroque illud commune significatum reperitur; nulla ergo potest analogiae ratio excogitari.”
It is, however, necessary to qualify this statement. For, though both univocal and analogous concepts have unity, their unity is not the same, because the meaning of the univocal concept is exactly the same in every predication, while the meaning of the analogous concept is subject to some modification.
Sandmann, Subject and Predicate: “copula and attribute together form the P (predicate) of the proposition. This has been taught with slight variations by Aristotle, Port-Royal and Christian Wolff” (p. 53).
Cf. Menges, The Concept of Univocity, p. 38.
This, however, as it will be shown later, does not justify Gilson’s claim that analogy does not consist in concepts but in judgments, (cf. Being and some Philosophers, pp. 190–215). This is only partly true.
There is no need to give here a more detailed analysis of the way the concept of being is modified in analogy of intrinsic attribution and in analogy of proper proportionality (which are the two main modes of analogy of intrinsic denomination). This will become clear from our epistemological analysis of the analogous concept.
This distinction between two different kinds of analogous judgments may be used to solve the problem as to the logical nature of being (existence), i.e. whether it is a concept or a judgment. Gilson has argued that since analogy is a property of judgments and being is analogous, being is not a concept but a judgment (cf. Being and Some Philosophers, pp. 190–215). Now, it seems to us that this conclusion is false. It is true that judgments of existence are analogous. It is also true that existence cannot be expressed in definitions but only in propositions. This, however, is true of all analogous concepts and is no peculiarity of existence. It does not prove that we do not have a concept of existence. If the fact that existence can be expressed only in judgments were sufficient to justify Gilson’s conclusion that there is no concept of existence, we should also maintain that there is no concept of cause, truth, knowledge, identity, etc. But this conclusion would be fateful to metaphysics, something which Gilson will certainly not welcome. But if judgments of existence are analogous not because of a variation in the meaning in the copula but because of a variation in the meaning of the predicate attribute as we have shown, no such danger exists. Cf. Mondin, “Triplice analisi dell’analogia e suo uso in teologia” Divus Thomas Pc. 1957, pp. 417 ff.
Cf. Revesz, Thinking and Speaking (Amsterdam, 1954), especially the essay by Revesz.
On this problem conflicting statements are found both in mediaeval and modern scholastics. Aquinas maintains a priority of analogy over univocation: “in pradicationibus omnia univoca reducuntur ad unum primum non aequivocum, sed analogicum, quod est ens” (S. Theol. I, 13, 5 ad 1). Cajetan, on the contrary, believes that univocation precedes analogy: “omnia fere analoga proprie fuerunt prius univoca, et deinde extensione, analoga communia proportionaliter illis quibus sunt et aliis vel aliis, facta sunt” (De Nominum Analogia, c. 11). Among the moderns Anderson has expressed himself for the priority of analogy over univocation; but Przywara has defended the priority of univocation. Do we have her a flat contradiction, or is there some way to reconcile these apparently contradictory views? It seems to me that there is a way out, by distinguishing the psychological from the ontological level. On the psychological level univocation precedes analogy; on the ontological level analogy has a priority over univocation.
For an exact logical definition of analogy see I. M. Bochenski, “On Analogy”, Thomist 1948, pp. 424–448.
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1963 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Mondin, B. (1963). Aquinas’ Division of Analogy. In: The Principle of Analogy in Protestant and Catholic Theology. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-4734-9_2
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-4734-9_2
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-94-017-4567-3
Online ISBN: 978-94-017-4734-9
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive