Abstract
There is an element of paradox in a work of this type which sets out to examine themes in John Dewey’s metaphysics and epistemology. The paradox stems from the fact that important strands in his thinking are entwined in the unified suggestion that the essentials of his philosophy rest upon one commitment only—a commitment to the use of the empirical method in every range of inquiry. Given this suggestion, it would appear wrong to identify Dewey’s thought with definite assertions on any subject, especially in the sphere of metaphysics. Presumably, those who use the empirical method proceed without presuppositions. Initially, they must be neutrals with respect to traditional philosophical disputes. At a later stage, even when use of the method enables them to find a position, their conclusions must be recognized as tentative, open to revision, and always less secure than further reliance upon the method itself. It would seem therefore that we are dealing with a point of view which takes no essential position in regard to other matters. Accordingly, before examining Dewey’s metaphysics and epistemology, we must first consider the extent to which he does seek to provide a philosophy based solely upon commitment to the empirical method.
Pragmatism represents a perfectly familiar attitude in philosophy, the empiricist attitude, but it represents it, as it seems to me, both in a more radical and in a less objectionable form than it has ever yet assumed. A pragmatist turns his back resolutely and once for all upon a lot of inveterate habits dear to professional philosophers. He turns away from abstraction and insufficiency, from verbal solutions, from bad a priori reasons, from fixed principles, closed systems, and pretended absolutes and origins. He turns towards facts, towards action and towards power. That means the empiricist temper regnant and the rationalist temper sincerely given up. It means the open air and possibilities of nature, as against dogma, artificiality, and the pretence of finality in truth.
At the same time it does not stand for any special results. It is a method only.
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Literature
William James, Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1907), p. 51.
For an extensive account of what was done at The Laboratory School, see Katherine Camp Mayhew and Anna Camp Edwards, The Dewey School (New York: D. Appleton-Century Co., 1936).
For a brief account, see Melvin C. Baker, Foundations of John Dewey’s Educational Theory (New York: King’s Crown Press, Columbia University, 1955), Ch. VIII.
See, for example, John Dewey and Evelyn Dewey, Schools of To-morrow (New York: E.P. Dutton and Co., 1915).
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© 1977 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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Dewey, R.E. (1977). Philosopher of Method. In: The Philosophy of John Dewey. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-4740-0_1
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