Abstract
Serious argumentation is not about opinions but about gaining orientation in new realms of reality. From a pragmatic point of view, orientation is the function of theory. In order to develop this view, the pragmatist and neopragmatist philosophy is critically examined. A concept of successful praxis is established as a basis of theoretical understanding. The growth of understanding is modeled as a differentiation of the theory concept into epistemic (old) and thetic (new) theory. Based on this, extensive conceptual clarifications of knowledge and truth are carried out with regard to the role of argument and via the critical examination of the respective work in analytical philosophy (e.g. the Gettier problem).
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Notes
- 1.
“epistemic” from the Greek episteme—knowledge and “thetic” from the Greek tithemi is to set down, to establish.
- 2.
“doxastic” from the Greek doxa—(fixed) opinion.
- 3.
Aristotle spoke of endoxa in this context. Cf. Aristotle (1960), Topics, I.1. 100B 20: Endoxa “are those (views) which commend themselves to all or to the majoritiy or to the wise – that is, to all of the wise or to the majority or to the most famous and distinguished of them.” (trans. E. S. Forster)
- 4.
Aristotle (1968), Nicomachean Ethics, Book 10.
- 5.
Cf. Popper (1968), Chapter III.
- 6.
Cf., for example, Thiel (1998).
- 7.
Cf. Stegmüller (1969), Chapter I.
- 8.
Peirce (1965c), 258, Collected Papers 5.402 (“How To Make Our Ideas Clear.”)
- 9.
For a critical discussion, cf. Bernstein (1971), 177–183.
- 10.
Peirce despised adjusting philosophy to the demands of everyday practical suitability. When he saw what had become of his “pragmatism,” he turned away angrily, describing his own views as “pragmaticism”—a name, as he wrote “ugly enough to be safe from kidnappers;” cf. Peirce (1965a), 5.414.
- 11.
Cf. James (1912b).
- 12.
“What would it (an assertion, H.W.) practically result in for us, were it true? It could only result in our orientation, in the turning of our expectations and practical tendencies into the right path;” cf. James (1912a), 32. Of course, this is only a colloquial use of the term; for an explicit introduction, cf. below, Sect. 1.3.
- 13.
Cf. my comments on the “Critical Thinking” movement in the Introduction.
- 14.
Dewey (1938).
- 15.
- 16.
Cf. Dewey (1938), e.g. 9, 10, 104.
- 17.
Mead (1938), 3–25.
- 18.
Mead (1934).
- 19.
- 20.
On the question of object constitution, Peirce was more sophisticated than his followers. He views the constitution of concepts not only in the context of practical consequences but particularly in the context of behavioral patterns; cf. Bernstein (1971), 53–57.
- 21.
With the inductive and particularly the abductive argument, Peirce had two truly nondeductive inference schemes whose prominent role for research he clearly recognized. But he understood them as quasi-logical conclusions and not as forms of substantial arguments that need to be controlled dialogically.
- 22.
- 23.
Bernstein listed even Popper and Feyerabend as pragmatists; cf. Bernstein (1971), 174.
- 24.
Cf. Sandbothe (2000).
- 25.
Cf. Putnam: “The Meaning of ‘Meaning.’” In: Putnam (1975).
- 26.
The philosopher of science Ian Hacking mocks Putnam’s “internal realism” and believes that he will illuminate this tricky debate by making the following statement (Hacking (1983)), 23: “Now how does one alter the charge on the niobium ball? Well, at this stage, said my friend, we spray it with positrons to increase the charge or with electrons to decrease the charge. From that day forth, I’ve been a scientific realist. So far as I’m concerned, if you can spray them then they are real.” (emphasis in original) This includes the correct suggestion that, in the case of such questions, we should reflect on technical practices. Yet it does not provide any reasons for adopting a philosophical or scientific realism. Even the reference to microphysics is superfluous. In fact, the operations in a car paint shop would be sufficient: By spraying them (the paint particles) onto the sheet metal, it really becomes corrosion proof. Do the workers represent any “realism” if they think this way?
- 27.
Even Habermas has by now positioned himself ontologically. He finds an argument for the fact-value dichotomy in the fact that in theoretical reason, we presuppose the objective world as something beyond our thinking. Hence, he asserts that a “justification transcendent” concept of truth would be applicable in this case; cf. Habermas (2003), Chapter 5. In Sect. 1.6, I sketch out a concept of truth which, for one, can be applied to both the theoretical and the practical realm and, moreover, is rooted in the foundations of fields of practice rather than in ontological presuppositions.
- 28.
Cf. Gross (2004).
- 29.
Rorty died in 2007, after the completion of my manuscript.
- 30.
See Rorty (1998), 51.
- 31.
Cf. Rorty (1989), 81.
- 32.
Cf. Rorty (1989), 48 ff.
- 33.
Cf. Rorty (1998), 45.
- 34.
Cf. Rorty (1993).
- 35.
Cf. Rorty (1993).
- 36.
Cf. Rorty (1980). I must confess that during the study of this book, I sometimes could not help wondering whether Rorty understands the ideas he rejects well enough. One example would be his treatment of Kant’s “Copernican Turn” and the subjective constitution of objects (loc. cit., 148–164). Rorty has been criticized for his arrogant tone, especially in this work, and regrets this tone by now. Cf. Rorty (1998), 45. The shortcomings of his argument, however, do not concern his tone.
- 37.
Wohlrapp (1979).
- 38.
Cf. Wohlrapp (1998a).
- 39.
For the insight that felicity, or rather the felicity-infelicity opposition, is the decisive criterion for an action (at least for its ascent to the level of theory), I am indebted to Peter Janich (cf. Janich (1992).
- 40.
- 41.
Carnap (1971).
- 42.
Popper (1968).
- 43.
Originally a mathematician, Hugo Dingler was a professor of philosophy in Munich and Darmstadt after World War I. He recognized that the basic problems of the exact sciences arose from the ambiguity of their operational-normative foundations and published, among others, important papers on the concept and history of “the experiment” (cf. Dingler (1928)) and on the justification of physics (cf. Dingler (1938)). Due to certain voluntaristic and idealistic elements in his works, he was largely ignored after World War II when analytical philosophy began to receive attention. This was exacerbated by the fact that he had compromised himself under the Nazi regime—although others did, too, as is well known, without suffering the exclusion of their achievements.
- 44.
- 45.
Not even to mention the formal accomplishments. When it comes to formal theories, the fallibility theories sound differently anyway.
- 46.
Cf. von Wright (1971).
- 47.
For the distinction between action and action scheme, cf. Footnote 40 above.
- 48.
Cf. Bühler (1930), 20: “There was often this suddenness of the solution to the problem. The subjects did not know how to describe it better than to say that the solution came to them with an inner ʻAha!ʼ and I have therefore called that jolt the ʻAha! effectʼ” (Translation T.P.).
- 49.
The requirement that reality “exists” at all, which Putnam, for example, deems necessary despite all his criticism of ontology (cf. the discussion of “ontological problem cases” in: Gross (2004)), also is superfluous. Besides, no one even knows what this requirement actually means.
- 50.
The significance of the concept of “orientation” has been well understood in philosophy, but it is not yet central. Orientation is clearly an important issue for Kant; cf. Kant (1786) and Mittelstraß (1982) for a modern treatment of Kant. Apparently, interest in the topic of “orientation” has recently increased again in Germany; cf. Stegmaier (2005).
- 51.
The fact that practical and theoretical knowledge belong together is still clearly visible in Plato’s philosophy. The separation between the two types of knowledge began with Aristotle.
- 52.
To avoid possible misunderstandings, the distinction to which I am pointing here has been known since the ancient Greeks and refers to two kinds of knowledge (routine knowledge and scientific knowledge). In contemporary epistemology and the philosophy of science, however, the distinction between “know-how” and “know that” is widespread. It was introduced by Gilbert Ryle; cf. Ryle (1949), Chapter 2. However, he did not distinguish between two types of theory or knowledge. Ryle rather distinguished between practical and theoretical knowledge. We can, for instance, say, he knows how to make a reef knot—even though this could just be a competence to act or behave. Ryle has quite correctly pointed out (and in this, hardly anyone has followed him) that felicitous praxis systematically precedes its theory (l.c. 33). In the theory itself, however, he no longer distinguished knowing about the existence of facts from knowing how to explain them.
- 53.
Blumenberg (1973).
- 54.
- 55.
The German word for “education” (“Bildung”) does not denote the subject-shaping function of theory in a neutral way. It rather connects it with a value judgment which, however, is ambivalent. Traditionally, educated middle-class intellectuals of the 19th and early 20th century (“Bildungsbürgertum”) were guided by certain theories, in particular by the history and literature of the ancient world. These theories were not only supposed to shape people in a certain way but also to complete and improve them. Since many educated people in Germany sided with the nationalist ambitions that led to the world wars, however, the term lost its positive connotation. Today, it is becoming more important again—the point is to articulate the opposition to a smooth, instrumental concept of “training” that is aimed at pure economic applicability.
- 56.
The complaint about the “vagueness” of ordinary language is notorious, even among linguists and philosophers of language, who should know better. If someone were trying in vain to hammer down on a steel nail with a rubber hammer, though, we would not blame the hammer, but the handyman.
- 57.
Such examples are discussed in Bayer (1999), 148.
- 58.
Cf. Wittgenstein (2009), Philosophical Investigations, § 65–80.
- 59.
Kamlah and Lorenzen (1984), I. § 2 and III. § 3.
- 60.
Cf. Popper and Eccles (1977), viii: “Words should be used well and carefully […] but their meaning should never, we think, become a topic of discussion or be permitted to dominate the discussion, as happens so often in contemporary philosophical writing. And although it is sometimes useful to indicate in which of its various senses we use a word, it is not possible to do so by defining it, since every definition must make essential use of undefined words. […] [T]o put it in a nutshell, what we are interested in is not the meaning of terms but the truth of theories; and this truth is largely independent of the terminology used.”
- 61.
Cf., for example, the simple objection that Ulrich Charpa brings forth against this doctrine: Charpa (1996), 78 ff.
- 62.
For the idea of an “implicit definition” and criticism of it, cf. Kambartel (1968), 165 ff.
- 63.
Cf. Venzke (1991), 128.
- 64.
- 65.
These considerations are not too complicated. Indeed, for logicians and philosophers of science, they are trivial. Still, there are people who hope to improve the logical and argumentative competence of their listeners by teaching them to regard colloquial “if … then” sentences as material implications. Cf. Gähde (2004). An excellent criticism of this view has been brought forward by Geert-Lueke Lueken; cf. Lueken (2006).
- 66.
- 67.
Cf. Knigge (1788). Knigge was a German noble man who in the late 18th century had published a collection of conduct rules which is (partly) respected until today.
- 68.
Cf. Machiavelli (1977).
- 69.
Translator’s note: The German original has “Beweis” in both the case of “proof” and “evidence,” as the demonstration that compels the mind to accept an assertion as true in formal disciplines and the statement or material object presented in a court of law are both called “Beweis” in German.
- 70.
Wittgenstein pointed this out (cf. Wittgenstein (2009), Philosophical Investigations, § 68) using the example of tennis. As is the case with all games, tennis is constituted by rules. But these rules do not, for example, say anything about the exact height and speed of the ball when it is flying over the net.
- 71.
The prime numbers below a number n are obtained if all the numbers up to n are written down and then first the 1 and, successively, the proper multiples of 2, 3, 5, 7, 11, etc. up to m with m2 > n are crossed out.
- 72.
This view was developed by Paul Lorenzen; cf. Lorenzen (1987), 18.
- 73.
For the career of the concept of will in philosophy cf. Mittelstraß (1989a), who ends his account with a plea for the substitution of “will” with “decision.”
- 74.
Apparently, William James experienced this insight as a conversion that turned him into a man aware of his freedom in the first place. Cf. his letter in James (1920), 147: “I think that yesterday was a crisis in my life. I finished the first part of Renouvier’s second Essais and see no reason why his definition of free will—‘the sustaining of a thought because I choose to when I might have other thoughts’—need be the definition of an illusion. At any rate, I will assume for the present—until next year—that it is no illusion. My first act of free will shall be to believe in free will.”
- 75.
This is a fallacy, pars pro toto, a specification of the fallacy of “hasty generalization.” The understanding of a mere part of the state of affairs in question is simply presented as an understanding of the whole of it.
- 76.
The locus classicus for the “self-fulfilling prophecy” is Merton (1957). In substance, however, the thought had already been clearly expressed in 1931, when Otto Neurath published his text on empirical sociology; cf. Neurath (1973), 405: “Predicting an eclipse of the sun does not affect the eclipse; but predicting the position of the market does influence the stock exchange.”
- 77.
Social and political scientists in Popper’s wake recommend “piecemeal technology,” cf. Popper (1957), § 21.
- 78.
Readers should be aware that this is a fundamental decision: Knowledge should be seen as a mature state of a theory. Mainstream epistemology nowadays takes knowledge to be a state of mind. This leads into a maelstrom of problems, in which inner-subjective elements and outer-objective elements, and thus epistemology and philosophy of mind, science, and psychology, spin around among aspects of language and experience. In the line of thought developed here, the basic term is “orientation in action.” Felicity in action then corresponds to truth in theory. Any coherent line of thought needs an appropriate starting point as well as some effective theoretical structures. These are the steps here: action, orientation, praxis, theory, research, argument, realization, knowledge, and truth. On the basis of a definition of knowledge as a mature theory, we can move to a definition of knowledge as a state of mind: Someone knows something if he or she possesses knowledge and obtains some orientation from it. Thus, knowledge is never an original state of mind caused by some state of affairs in the outside world. This view, which is held, e.g. by T. Williamson (cf. Williamson (2000)), uses the term “knowledge” where we better speak of “orientation.”
- 79.
To my mind, Imre Lakatos gave the most impressive account of how futile it is to establish accurate prediction as the criterion of a theory’s quality. Cf. Lakatos’ example of the astronomer who infers from his theory the existence of a planet that, subsequently, cannot be found—but this fact can be explained again and again. Cf. Lakatos (1970), 100/101.
- 80.
Cf. the scorn that Feyerabend heaped on the “arguments” which prestigious representatives of the natural sciences brought forth in their criticism of astrology, in Feyerabend (1982), Part II: The Strange Case of Astrology.
- 81.
The expression “closed theory” does not stand for a strict concept with selective criteria for its application. It refers to an idea that needs to be clarified with reference to concrete cases and examples. Those who find this too vague and hence reject it should at least consider that our scientific grandmasters do not have more than this idea, either. For instance, Heisenberg’s attempts to define a concept of “closed theory” were far more ambitious—closed theories were supposed to be valid “everywhere and at all times;” cf. Heisenberg (1971), 308 ff. But aside from Newtonian mechanics, they were also supposed to include quantum theory, whose “closure” Einstein vigorously denied and which Popper even called “the great quantum muddle;” cf. Popper (1982), 50, 52, 64, 77.
- 82.
“In order to build a house, the foundation must be laid down first. Only then can the rest be built on top of it. In all cases where an action A creates the condition for executing an action B in the first place, the order is clearly ensured. We want to call such a sequence the “pragmatic order” of actions.” Cf. Dingler (1938), 116. (Translation T.P.).
- 83.
Cf. Rescher (1977), 6–7.
- 84.
Cf. Wohlrapp (1978).
- 85.
- 86.
Cf. the classical study Rescher (1973). Rescher also combines coherentism with pragmatism, but his understanding of the latter follows William James and focuses on instrumentalism.
- 87.
Cf. Laurence Bonjour, The Elements of Coherentism, in: Bonjour (1985), 87–110, 239–241.
- 88.
Cf. Russell (1907), 33–34.
- 89.
Cf. Gettier (1963).
- 90.
Readers who are familiar with contemporary philosophical epistemology are well aware that the discussion of Gettier’s paper has brought about a giant flock of approaches and theories about justification, among them foundationalism, externalism, internalism, reliabilism, coherentism, etc.—each of them comprising several variants—and has also revived the problematic position of skepticism (in at least five different forms). Useful overviews such as Hetherington (1996) and Bernecker and Dretske (2000) present an enormous amount of highly sophisticated considerations, but no solution to the question of how to conceive human knowledge. Indeed the concept of knowledge developed in the present approach utilizes some of the basic ideas of foundationalism, coherentism, internalism, and reliabilism, but it has a completely different structure. It makes no alethic or ontological presuppositions. It is a rather evolutionary (but non-naturalistic) concept that describes how knowledge arises from a general orientation in our life praxis via increasingly differentiated research activities. Its main elements are the pragmatic concept of theory and the model of research, which consists of a cycle of argumentation, tentative action and realization in the world. Even if I have provided no more than an outline in the present context, I think I have elucidated and illustrated it with so many (non-artificial) examples that I am justified in hoping to have shown the following: This is a new and promising direction in the development of a workable understanding of human knowledge.
- 91.
For ordinary people, both statements mean the same thing. For philosophers of science, it is obvious that knowledge is something that is valid generally, that it is something universal. Nevertheless, it can only be invariant with regard to known changes in conditions, not also with regard to changes that are not yet known. “As far as we know” is a phrase that is added to all of our knowledge—from everyday banalities to the cutting edge of science. It is the colloquial formulation of the ceteris paribus clause already discussed above.
- 92.
Cf. Putnam (1983), 84.
- 93.
They are not “relativistic” in the usual sense. The judgment of validity or truth is relative to the state of argumentation, which, in turn, is relative to each achieved understanding of the world. But the limits of this particular understanding are always only recognizable when exceeded; cf. the Section “Relativism” in Chap. 7.
- 94.
Cf. Wellmer (1989), 340.
- 95.
Cf. Wright (1992), 60 f., 75, 865, 922.
- 96.
Cf. Wolfgang Klein’s proposal (Klein (1980), 19) that the goal of argumentation is to “transform something collectively questionable into something collectively valid with the help of something collectively valid.” That sounds like an interesting alchemical process of transformation. However, this process does not result in anything stable if, as Klein believes; what is “collectively valid” is simply what has been accepted factually. Nevertheless, Klein’s paper contains some interesting and valuable thoughts. Particularly its inventive way of describing the dynamics of argumentation made sense to me at the time. Klein considered it meaningful, albeit with a bit of bad conscience, that argumentation “displaces what is debatable” (24). I have incorporated this insight into my proposal for a “successor thesis” (Chap. 4). The main weakness of Klein’s approach is, I believe, its narrow conception of pragmatism (which is restricted to a linguistic pragmatism).
- 97.
Cf. Mittelstraß (1991).
- 98.
Ulrich Steinvorth, for example, considers sentences such as “The wall is white” or “There is a glass of water on the table” to be the unproblematic beginnings of knowledge; cf. Steinvorth (2002).
- 99.
I will discuss this in Chap. 3 under the title “The Level of Existential Meaning in the System of Orientation.”
- 100.
Translator’s note: The phrase “Nuremberg Funnel” is a description of a mechanical way of teaching and learning. It has its origins in the title of a German textbook on poetics published in Nuremberg in 1647. The phrase became a common idiomatic expression whose wide distribution is still reflected in contemporary German expressions such as “etwas eintrichtern” (literally “to funnel something in”).
- 101.
Even during my university days, there were still professors who read a text aloud while students would transcribe as much of it as possible (often with the help of a shorthand, they had learned or developed for that very purpose) and then memorize the text at home. Some of what is considered to be the most advanced kind of academic learning today under the rubric of “e-learning” is structurally akin to this old-authoritarian kind again.
- 102.
It is true in an abstract way that we could theorize a respective praxis differently. In a concrete situation, though, we have no reason to. The fact that a theory does not exhaust the potencies of a praxis, that there are other possibilities which we explore when our orientation proves to be deficient is the pragmatic significance of Quine’s indeterminacy thesis. Cf. Quine (1960) and Quine (1981).
- 103.
Cf. Psarros (1999), 155.
- 104.
It is feasible that there could have been other actualizations of what is possible. In light of this, our history would have to be considered an anthropocentric actualization. But even this idea is still too general. The actualization of what is possible contains structures of framing (cf. Chap. 5) and hence selections that shape some lines of development and suppress others. It is not simply “man” in his interactions with the world who develops this world and himself. He always only pursues certain possibilities. Whether possibilities that have been ignored or suppressed will ever turn up again is unpredictable. Cross-cultural medicine is an instructive example in this regard. European traditional medicine has turned the human body into a technical mechanism whose parts are repaired, reactivated, and replaced if they do not function properly. In traditional Chinese medicine, on the other hand, the body is an ensemble of energies that flow along specific pathways (meridians). Such energies may be blocked, so they have to be stimulated to break the blockades. The current hope that this view may not be lost in the process of globalization is probably rooted in the fact that this kind of medicine remains affordable.
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Wohlrapp, H.R. (2014). Knowledge. In: The Concept of Argument. Logic, Argumentation & Reasoning, vol 4. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-8762-8_1
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