Abstract
The chapter reconstructs the most relevant “flavors” of modality (alethic , deontic , deontic-practical , anankastic, and epistemic) in terms of a relational , discourse sensitive, context dependent , procedural approach to the interpretation of modal constructions . The approach, while inspired by Relative Modality and the formal semantics tradition, integrates pragmatic insights and it is cast as a tool for the actual analysis of discourse and argumentation . This approach to the typology of modal “flavors” is needed because the full indicative potential of a modal emerges only when its conversational background has been specified. At this point, the modal will act as a guide in the clarification of argumentative confrontations, in the specification of the logical type of the standpoint , in the recovery of premises as well as in the determination of the inferential structure of the argument (argumentation scheme ), where the flavor of modality can help by suggesting the locus-relation invoked by the argumentation scheme. The semantic category of evidentiality , which is closely related to epistemic modality , is also briefly examined in relation to argumentation , with a survey of the most basic categories of evidence sources encoded by languages (perception, testimony, inference ).
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Notes
- 1.
Here, as in the rest of the chapter, I use construction in a technical sense, albeit not far from the ordinary one, which comes from the theoretical trend of construction grammars , initiated by Charles J. Fillmore and Paul Kay (cf. Kay 2004, Kay and Michaelis 2008). In construction grammars a construction is “a form-meaning pair such that some aspect of its form or some aspect of its meaning is not strictly predictable from its component parts or from other constructions ” (cf. Goldberg 1995: 11). Constructions can specify syntactic slots as well as a part of the lexical and morphological filling of said slots and conventionally associate them with semantic constraints at the level of the propositional content, illocutionary force and discourse function of the utterance. Specific construction inherit formal and semantic features from the lexical and morphological material they embed as well as from more abstract syntactic templates, but also feature further specifications that are conventionally associated to the whole.
- 2.
- 3.
See example (65) in Chap. 4.
- 4.
In contrast, see Groefsema (1995) for an attempt at explaining the interpretations of the English modals with a sketchy context dependent semantics – broadly inspired by Kratzer – enriched by contextual inferences , without any recourses to broad classes of modal interpretation. In Rocci (2005a: 208–2011) I make some critical observation on the viability of this attempt. Partly similar observations can be found in Papafragou (2000).
- 5.
I mean empirical as opposed to the conceptually necessary aspects of human cognitive functioning.
- 6.
As it often happens for modern syntactic terminology, the terms raising and control are based on transformational metaphors rooted in early Generative Grammar. This makes them relatively opaque. In non-transformational terms (cf. Fried and Östman 2004: 63–66), raising and control structures are both constructions characterized by the co-instantiation of the subject of the non-finite verbal complement (e.g. the infinitival) and the subject of the main predicate (the modal verb in our case). The two constructions differs in that control main predicates (e.g. try) assign a semantic argumentS slot to their subjects, while raising predicates (e.g. seem) do not. While filling the syntactic role of subject also in the main predicate, in raising structures the co-instantiated subject is semantically tied only to the infinitival complement.
- 7.
Portner (2009: 188) proposes a nuanced position according to which “some deontic modals are control predicates and some are raising predicates”. For the purposes of the present investigation it is not necessary to enter this debate. Note that, in the perspective of Congruity Theory arguments can be recognized on semantic grounds irrespectively of the systematicity of their syntactic manifestation, and notions such as agent or deontic subject arguments remain important to understand certain flavors of modality even if they are only sporadically mapped ont complements.
- 8.
Note that force dynamic theory of Talmy (1985) and Sweetser (1990) has (had?) the ambition not only to offer a solution to the problem of the poly-functionality of modal expressions, but also, to offer a general semantic account of the underlying notional categories alternative to the logico-semantic treatments in terms of possible worlds. A discussion of the merits of the approach exceeds the concerns of this book, but see Rocci (2005a: 151–169) and Portner (2009: 110–115) for a critique.
- 9.
Examples adapted from Knott (2001: 129).
- 10.
- 11.
In principle, a similar, but not identical, distinction between alethic and non-alethic conversational backgrounds operates also within the epistemic conversational backgrounds separating the properly epistemic conversational backgrounds understood as selecting the set of known facts and the merely doxastic ones, comprising sets of beliefs which “may bear”, as Papafragou (2000: 70) puts it, “a variable degree of correspondence to the actual world”.
- 12.
Cf. Kronning (1996: 70) “qui sont vraies en vertu de leur sens indépendamment de toute verification émpirique”.
- 13.
- 14.
- 15.
This does not preclude that, by stipulating a null contract, the parties might have thereby violated some deontic obligation. For instance, if they knowingly did so in order to commit a fraud or if there was negligence on their part in ascertaining that the conditions of validity subsist.
- 16.
They are a good reminder of the fact that not only the peculiarities of each language – where central modal words may have restrictions that inhibit certain conversational backgrounds – but also the entrenched traditions of exemplification and grammatical description, can create blind spots in the most astute analysts. Ordinary language philosophers were sometimes criticized for being dilettante lexicographers, all too prone to see important philosophical distinctions under the patterns created by English idioms. I believe this criticism to be partly unwarranted. It may have merit as long as it concerns the linguistic dilettantism sometimes displayed by ordinary language philosophers, but not as regards the philosophical interest of linguistic analyses. The proper description of semantic distinctions enshrined by linguistic conventions regularly raises fundamental and difficult questions about the categories we use in reasoning . “Idioms” can be illuminating, provided that they are systematically analyzed with the right tools. That said, the “idioms” of other languages do not have a lesser status and should not be dismissed as something only descriptive linguists should care about. As we close towards the Italian language case studies of Chap. 6, I hope the reader will appreciate them for what they tell us about the nature of modality in connection with the essential structure of arguments .
- 17.
On quantificational modals see also Chap. 4, § 4.3.3, which explores their indirect indicative power in the determination of argumentation structure .
- 18.
- 19.
Here I remain agnostic as to the syntactic, semantic , pragmatic or simply cognitive nature of this stratification. Where these scope issues are dealt with is a highly theory-dependent issue exceeding the boundaries of the present work.
- 20.
This Italian example is taken from from the corpus of Italian business and financial news that I have exploited for the case studies expounded in Chap. 6.
- 21.
Actually, Hacquard (2011: 1508) believes that for tense the situation is more clear-cut: “epistemics cannot scope under tense”. This may be correct for English, but the data about Italian modal verbs examined in Rocci (2005a: 256–259) suggest that the necessity modal dovere and the possibility modal potere behave differently with respect to tense and the interpretation of epistemic potere under the scope of tense, while impossible with most tenses, seems to be possible with the imperfect tense (cf. Rocci 2005: 258).
- 22.
Leaving aside, here, does not imply a negative evaluation . Simply, the investigation syntax-semantics interface lays beyond the confines of the present study and a discussion of Hacquard’s implementation of event relativity in term of syntactic binding of the modal ’s event variable will be out of place.
- 23.
Note that in (Def. 2) this notion is expressed using the possible worlds semantics and ontology adopted by the theory of Relative Modality , saying that w belongs to the inter of the set of propositions selected by the conversational background function f for w. As observed in Chap. 4, § 4.2.7.1, since a proposition is a set of possible worlds (the set of worlds the proposition is true at), the set of propositions f(w) can immediately be translated in to a set of worlds ∩f(w), corresponding the inter of all the propositions (i.e. sets of worlds) in f(w). Thus, saying that the inter of f(w) includes w is equivalent to saying that every proposition of f(w) is true at w. These idioms of possible worlds semantics may well seem counterintuitive to readers unfamiliar with the formal semantic tradition. Possible worlds provide a powerful framework for semantics, but there is a price to pay, as well as certain limitations, which will become more apparent in the fine grained linguistic semantic analyses of Chap. 6. To the reader perplexed by possible worlds semantics, it is perhaps worth reminding that, as observed by Kratzer herself, the key ideas of Relative Modality , are not tied to a possible worlds ontology and “can be implemented in any framework that provides suitable notions of logical consequence and compatibility” (Kratzer 2012 [1977]: 10, see Chap. 4, § 4.2.7.1 above).
- 24.
- 25.
In Hacquard’s (2010, 2011) original contribution, event relativity is presented chiefly as a hypothesis on the syntax-semantics interface, while the procedural variant presented here frames it as a hypothesis on the interaction between linguistic semantics and discourse interpretation, analogous to procedural models of tense. One can imagine that a comprehensive formulation integrating these two aspects is possible. In every case, it remains a linguistic-semantic , rather than logico-semantic, endeavor.
- 26.
The view of alethic modalities expressed here goes against the view aired by Papafragou (2000) and by others that the so-called “alethic modalities ” are, in fact, a variant of epistemic interpretations.
- 27.
- 28.
Admittedly, putting side by side Relative Modality – a very abstract but also formally precise semantic theory – with AMT – a framework for the study of argumentative inferences adopting a richer ontology, but still lacking proper formalization and a semantics – may seem an exercise in futility. It is important to stress, though, that what is mapped onto AMT here is not the possible world implementation of Relative Modality , but just the key idea of a premise semantics based on notions of logical consequence and compatibility.
- 29.
The comparison cannot be drawn beyond a certain point, though. Institutional and natural alethic modalities are alike in their respect of Axiom T. There are, however, crucial differences connected with the ontological specificities of institutional facts In brief, while changes in physical circumstantial alethic modalities originate in physical causality, changes in institutional alethic modalities originate from a renegotiation of a collective assignment of status function (cf. Searle 2005: 7–10), in our example the status function that “Such and such a set of procedures counts as the election of a president of the United States” (Searle 2005: 7).
- 30.
- 31.
Nor I will discuss finer, but philosophically important, distinctions among different types of teleological ethics such as eudaimonism vs. utilitarianism. In his Guildford Lectures von Wright (1963b) contrasts the teleological views of moral norms with prescriptivist views (moral norms are akin to commands) and deontological views (moral norms are entirely sui generis and do not need to be brought back to a source or justification).
- 32.
In this respect Kronning’s view on nomic regularities differs from Freeman’s. Freeman (2005) does not use the notion of nomic regularity in his treatment of evaluations .
- 33.
I translate from the French original: “ces régularités nomiques sont donc, elles-mêmes, le produit d’une composition inférentielle” (Kronning 1996: 36).
- 34.
While I adopt here the term thetic, which Carmello (2009) derives from philosophers of law, such as Amedeo G. Conte, the view of the landscape of deontic modality espoused by Carmello’s chapter could not be farther from the one defended here. For Carmello theticity is the very essence of deontic modality , which covers just performative thetic statements and their reports. On the (presumable) thetic origin of moral norms nothing is said.
- 35.
According to a widespread hypothesis in formal linguistic studies of discourse , attachment relations between discourse sequences are subject to the right frontier constraint (Asher and Lascarides 2003): a discourse sequence can “attach” only to sequences that are either adjacent to it or to sequences that dominate hierarchically over those adjacent to it. These sequences are said to be on the right frontier. Attachment to sequences deeply buried down and left in the discourse is presumed to be impossible. While the right frontier constraint has a certain predictive power in calculating some attachment phenomena – e.g. the functioning of structural discourse connectives (cf. Chap. 4, § 4.3.6.2, and see Forbes-Riley et al. 2005)– there are also more indirect and inference -driven forms of anaphoric recovery that can circumvent it, and pick-up virtually any discourse meaning, making it the object of reprise. Anaphoric connectives in the sense of Forbes-Riley et al. (2005), and modals even more so can function in this manner. To these phenomena, I refer generically with the term resumption.
- 36.
I note in passing that accepting that the conditional antecedent if America is to be a great nation contributes to the evaluative – i.e. properly deontic – part of the conversational background would not be obvious from the viewpoint of Kratzer’s original version of Relative Modality , where if-clauses contribute propositions that are added to the modal base f(w). The problem is that in the original theory (cf. Kratzer 1991: 649, Portner 2009: 72) deontic conversational backgrounds are supposed to only contribute ordering sources g(w). The semantics of a deontic reading of a modal like must is obtained through a modal base f(w) of factual circumstances selecting a set of worlds which is then ordered thanks to the norms in the deontic ordering source . As a consequence, the theory fits well if-clauses that modify the circumstantial base of the deontic (e.g. If you arrive late, you must wait outside) but does not allow for if-clauses contributing to the properly normative , bouletic or teleological part of the conversational background – as (114) seems to do – because conditional antecedents are not added to ordering sources.
- 37.
By deontic subject I mean the person – physical or juridical – who is under the obligation to act or has the faculty to act.
- 38.
The World Game, June, 9, 2006. Retrieved August 15, 2006 from http://www6.sbs.com.au/socceroos/index.php?pid=st&cid=71987
- 39.
It has to be observed, though, that a view of deontic-practical possibility as mere compatibility with reaching the goal is not adequate. Examples such as To reach the summit of Monte Brè you can eat tomato salad or To prepare a good coffee you can wear pink underwear strike us as nonsensical even if eating tomato salad does not prevent us from reaching the summit and the color of underwear is not negatively affecting our ability to prepare coffee. Should we conclude that deontic-practical possibility modals indicate sufficient conditions for attaining the goal? Actually, a sufficiency presupposition would be too strong. In ordinary causal interpretations, as observed by Freeman (2005: 144), causes are hardly sufficient conditions. When I say The match lit because it was struck I presuppose (or “presume” as Freeman says) a host of out of focus necessary conditions (a force of sufficient magnitude, the presence of oxygen, the match being dry). A fully fledged account of deontic-practical can would require this predicate to have a presupposition of sufficiency given a conversational background of normal conditions. Such a presumptive sufficiency operator would be a special kind of necessity operator.
- 40.
If these preferences fail to make a difference we enter a “Buridan’s ass” type of situation.
- 41.
This set of dialectical rules can be conceived either as an ideal model – like the Pragma-Dialectical model of the critical discussion – or as a set of institutionalized argumentatively relevant conventions that hold in a given argumentative activity type, like, for instance, an adjudication in court (Cf. van Eemeren 2010, Chap. 6). This gives rise to two distinct flavors of meta-argumentative possibility : something may well be at the same time a possible standpoint to defend in a critical discussion and an impossible case to bring to court in view of the procedural constraints of the relevant judicial system.
- 42.
The nature of epistemic modality in ordinary language and the path through which epistemic interpretations of context -dependent modals are obtained have already been discussed at some length in this chapter (§ 5.2.4), as well as in Chap. 3 (§ 3.3.3, in particular). Here, I take stock of what has emerged in the previous s and prepare the terrain for Chap. 6, which will delve deeper into the argumentative properties of epistemic readings of specific modal constructions in Italian.
- 43.
The problem of logical omniscience affecting epistemic and doxastic logics interpreted via a possible worlds semantics arises because under these logics knowers know all the logical consequences of their knowledge. Whether this obviously unrealistic feature truly is a problem or an acceptable idealization depends very much on the intended applications of the logic.
- 44.
The expertise variant of the locus from authority remains marginally possible.
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Rocci, A. (2017). Types of Conversational Backgrounds and Arguments. In: Modality in Argumentation. Argumentation Library, vol 29. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-024-1063-1_5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-024-1063-1_5
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Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-94-024-1061-7
Online ISBN: 978-94-024-1063-1
eBook Packages: Social SciencesSocial Sciences (R0)