Skip to main content

Institutional Construction (2)—Deposit Insurance System

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
Financial Security in China
  • 660 Accesses

Abstract

China has adopted implicit deposit insurance with government credibility as the guarantee. This is determined by the characteristics of China’s national economy. With public ownership as the foundation of the banking system, the state provides credibility support to state-owned banks, providing a guarantee for deposits. People do not have to worry about the security of their deposits and deposit their money in state-owned banks, accepting low interest rates. Bank savings have always been the preferred way for people to dispose of unused funds since an environment of risk awareness has not been cultivated. Although the government has to bear a huge burden, this plays a very important role in the stable operation and development of the Chinese financial system in the midst of economic reform.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 84.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    Source: Public reports of the central bank capital injection into the China Development Bank.

  2. 2.

    Also known as the “provision adequacy ratio,” this refers to the loan loss reserve ratio for non-performing loans (i.e. the use rate of provisions for doubtful and bad debts). It mainly reflects a bank’s ability to make up for loan losses and prevent loan risks.

  3. 3.

    Including ICBC, CCB, ABC, and BOC.

  4. 4.

    Refers to banks with total foreign currency assets of less than 2 trillion yuan and cross-border operations (foreign currency assets at the end of 2008 for each bank as the reference standard).

  5. 5.

    Source: People’s Bank of China website historical statistics for financial institution credit balance of payments.

  6. 6.

    People’s Bank of China website historical statistics for financial institution credit balance of payments.

  7. 7.

    Deposit insurance agency subrogation repayment authority means that after compensating depositors for their losses, the agency has the same subrogation rights priority as general creditors.

References

Chinese Language Documents

  • Chen Xiangcong (2006) Cunkuan baoxian jigou daiwei shouchang youxianquan lifa tanjiu [Exploration into the legislation of deposit insurance agency subrogation repayment priority]. Guoji jinrong yanjiu, vol 7

    Google Scholar 

  • Fu Bo, Zhu Zhiqin (2009) Woguo jinali cunkuan baoxian zhidu de kexingxing fenxi [Feasibility study for the establishment of a deposit insurance system in China]. Quanguo shangqing (jingji lilun yanjiu). vol 20

    Google Scholar 

  • He Dexu, Shi Xiaolin, Zhao Jingyi (2010) Woguo xianxing cunkuan baoxian zhidu de jianxing lujing tanxi [Exploration and analysis of an explicit Chinese deposit insurance system in practice]. Caimao jingji, vol 10

    Google Scholar 

  • Li Menggang (2007) Zhongguo jianli cunkuan baoxian zhidu de lujing xuanze yu guizhi yanjiu [Choice of path and study of the rules and system for a Chinese deposit insurance system]. Zhongguo xingzheng guanli, vol 10

    Google Scholar 

  • Li Yanping, Han Liyan (2008) Texuquan jiazhi, yinxing baoxian, yu fengxian chengdan [Franchise value, implicit insurance, and assumption of risk]. Jinrong yanjiu, vol 1

    Google Scholar 

  • Li Yunhong, Jiang Hai (2009) Zhongguo jinrong anquanwang jianshe: lilun huigu, guoji jingyan, yu zhidu sheji [The construction of a Chinese financial safety net: theoretical review, international experience, and system design]. Nanfang jinrong, vol 6

    Google Scholar 

  • Li Hua, Ma Xinrong (2009) Woguo cunkuan baoxian fazhan de zhidu zhang’ai ji duice [Institutional barriers and responses for the development of Chinese deposit insurance]. Xiandai jingji taolun, vol 3

    Google Scholar 

  • Ling Tao, Du Yaozhong, Yang Mingqi (2007) Cunkuan baoxian rongzi zhidu sheji zhong de gongping wenti [Problems of fairness in the institutional design of deposit insurance financing]. Jinrong yanjiu, vol 5

    Google Scholar 

  • Meng Bo (2010) Jianli cunkuan baoxian zhidu de sikao [Considerations for establishing a deposit insurance system]. Jingjishi, vol 1

    Google Scholar 

  • Peng Xingyun (2005) Women weishenme xuyao cunkuan baoxian [Why we need deposit insurance]. Nanfang zhoumo, October 28, 2005

    Google Scholar 

  • Tang Hongbo (2008) Cunkuan baoxian zhidu yu yinhang gongsi zhili [The deposit insurance system and bank corporate governance]. Jinrong yanjiu, vol 7

    Google Scholar 

  • Wang Yongli (2005) Cunkuan baoxian zhidu de tuichu xuyao xiangguan zhidu de peitao gaige [Introduction of a deposit insurance system requires the reform of related systems]. Guoji jinrong yanjiu, vol 4

    Google Scholar 

  • Wang Zili (2006) FDIC jingyan yu woguo cunkuan baoxian zhiu jianshe FDIC [The FDIC’s Experience and the construction of a Chinese deposit insurance system], vol 3

    Google Scholar 

  • Wang Guogang (2007) Shishi cunkuan baoxian zhidu buyi caozhiguoji [A deposit insurance system should not be implemented in haste]. Guoji jinrong yanjiu, vol 7

    Google Scholar 

  • Wu Jun (2009) Woguo dangqian tuixing cunkuan baoxian de libi fenxi [Analysis of the pros and cons of China introducing deposit insurance]. Shangchang xiandaihua, vol 2

    Google Scholar 

  • Yan Haibo (2004) Zhongguo jianli cunkuan baoxian zhidu suo mianlin de kunjing yu xuanze [The difficulties and choices China faces in establishing a deposit insurance system]. Jinrong yanjiu, vol 11

    Google Scholar 

  • Zhang Wei (2005) Cunkuan baoxian, xinxi bu duicheng, yu yujing jizhi [Deposit insurance, information assymetry, and early warning mechanisms]. Shijie jingji, vol 11

    Google Scholar 

  • Zhang Zhengping, He Guangwen (2005) Woguo yinhangye shichang yueshuli de shizheng yanjiu (1994–2003) [Empirical study of the market binding force of China’s banking industry (1994–2003)]. Jinrong yanjiu, vol 10

    Google Scholar 

Foreign Language References

  • Angkinand A, Wihlborg C (2010) Deposit insurance coverage, ownership, and banks’ risk-taking in emerging markets. J Int Money Financ 29:252–274

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Beck T (2002) Deposit insurance as private club: is Germany a model? Q Rev Econ Finance 42:701–719

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Buch CM, Delong G (2008) Do weak supervisory systems encourage bank risk-taking? J Financ Stab 4(1):23–39

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • DeLonga G, Saunders A (2008) Did the introduction of fixed-rate federal deposit insurance increase long-term bank risk-taking?. J Financ Stabil (in press)

    Google Scholar 

  • Demirgüç-Kunt A, Huizinga H (2004) Market discipline and deposit insurance. J Monet Econ 51:375–399

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Demirgüç-Kunt A, Sobaci T (2001) Deposit insurance around the world. World Bank Econ Rev 15:481–490

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Demirgüç-Kunt A, Kane EJ, Laeven L (2006) Deposit insurance design and implementation: policy lessons from research and practice, World bank policy research working paper 3969. World Bank, Washington, DC

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Freixas X, Rochet JC (1998) Fair pricing of deposit insurance: is it possible? Yes. Is it desirable? No. Res Econ 52(3):217–232

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Giammarino R, Lewis T, Sappington D (1993) An incentive approach to banking regulation. J Financ 48(4):1523–1542

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hardya DC, Nieto MJ (2010) Cross-border coordination of prudential supervision and deposit guarantees. J Financ Stabil (in press)

    Google Scholar 

  • Hoelscher DS, Taylor M, Klueh UH (2006) The design of implementation of deposit insurance systems. International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Ioannidou VP, Penas MF (2010) Deposit insurance and bank risk-taking: evidence from internal loan ratings. J Financ Intermed 19:95–115

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Klueh U (2005) Safety net design and systemic risk: new empirical evidence. Department of Economics, University of Munich, Discussion paper

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2016 Social Sciences Academic Press and Springer Science+Business Media Singapore

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

He, D. (2016). Institutional Construction (2)—Deposit Insurance System. In: Financial Security in China. Research Series on the Chinese Dream and China’s Development Path. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-0969-3_9

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics