Abstract
The chapter summarizes the BP-Deepwater Horizon accident 2010 in the Mexican Gulf, which caused 11 deaths and the largest oil spill in history. The chapter builds on secondary sources and a resilience analysis is made using the theoretical framework developed in the book. It is described what the main causes of the accident were and the events that took place before, under and after the accident. The resilience analysis clearly shows that maintaining time limits and budget was made at the expense of reliability and safety, and that unnecessary risks were taken in order to improve project economy. The end results were one of the most costly human made disasters in the history (over 50 billion USD).
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Notes
- 1.
This description of the accident and its causes are based in large part on the National Commission’s report on the oil catastrophe: The National Commission on the BP-Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling 2011; see also www.oilspillcommission.gov/media/history/history-of-offshore-oil.html, that was presented in the USA on 1 March 2011, and Barstow et al.’s (2010) article, “Deepwater Horizon’s Final Hours”, The New York Times, 25 December.
- 2.
The National Commission on the BP-Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling 2011, pp. 77–81. See also p. 91 on the difficulties in ensuring that the pressure of the hydrocarbon gas counterbalances the pressure of the drilling mud in the well.
- 3.
See National Academy of Engineering and National Research Council: Macondo Well Deepwater Horizon Blowout (2012). For more detailed information regarding the foam cement density change (p. 30 ff).
- 4.
The National Commission on the BP-Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling 2011, pp. 5–6.
- 5.
See Macondo Well Deepwater Horizon Blowout (2012). See Footnote #3 for a more detailed description.
- 6.
Det Norske Veritas Final Report for United States Department of the Interior Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement. Report No. EPO3084220, March 2011.
- 7.
See also Macondo Well Deepwater Horizon Blowout (2012), 71 ff.
- 8.
For a more detailed description of the different steps and actions before the blowout, see Macondo Well Deepwater Horizon Blowout (2012), Chap. 2.
- 9.
Barstow et al. (2010). “Deepwater Horizon’s Final Hours”, The New York Times, 25 December.
- 10.
See Barstow et al.; National Academy of Engineering and National Research Council Report, 2013.
- 11.
Svanberg claimed in an interview that, in actuality, BP had tried to arrange the meeting. He called the visit to the White House a turning point for BP. C:\Users\mou\Documents\BP\Svanberg BP var riktigt illa ute—Råvaror—E24.mht.
- 12.
“Anadarko announces settlement with BP”, www.anadarko.com/Investor/Pages/NewsReleases/NewsReleases.aspx?release-id=1617533.
- 13.
Information on Transocean Ltd. is from the company’s annual report for 2010 and its home page: www.deepwater.com.
- 14.
Information on Cameron International is from the company’s annual report for 2010 and its home page: www.c-a-m.com.
- 15.
Information on Halliburton is from the company’s annual report for 2010 and its home page: www.halliburton.com.
- 16.
McAlister, T. (2014). “BP could face up to $18 billion in extra fines after US ruling on Gulf of Mexico spill”, The Guardian, 4 September.
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Oudhuis, M., Tengblad, S. (2018). BP and Deepwater Horizon: A Catastrophe from a Resilience Perspective. In: Tengblad, S., Oudhuis, M. (eds) The Resilience Framework. Work, Organization, and Employment. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-5314-6_5
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