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Domestic Politics and China’s Assertive Foreign Policy: Why China’s Rise May Not Be Peaceful

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Decoding the Rise of China

Abstract

The debate centered on China’s ascent in the global political arena and whether such a rise will be peaceful or violent has generated lively debate amongst international relations theorists. However, whilst most analysis on this subject is deeply entrenched in the realist/liberal/constructivist prism of traditional international relations theory, little analysis is given to China’s domestic politics and its implications for China’s rise, especially in the context of China’s increased assertiveness. This chapter provides an alternative perspective to this debate by exploring the role of China’s domestic politics and its implications on the country’s dramatic rise. This chapter further argues that the source of China’s new assertiveness is in part due to a number of dysfunctional dynamics typifying China’s domestic politics, namely elite competition, rising nationalism, and leaders’ preferences. With China now one of the world’s leading powers, the characteristics of its domestic politics matter more than ever, and along with a number of international factors, this chapter suggests that both of these combine to show that China’s peaceful ascent may be heavily constrained.

Nien-chung Chang Liao is an assistant research fellow at the Institute of Political Science at Academia Sinica (IPSAS), Taipei. This chapter was first presented as an article at the IPSAS workshop on “New Directions in Chinese Foreign Policy,” Institute of Political Science at Academia Sinica, Taipei, June 4, 2016. The author would like to thank Szu-Chien Hsu and Richard Weixing Hu for their insightful comments.

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Notes

  1. 1.

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  2. 2.

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  3. 3.

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  4. 4.

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    Some scholars disagree with the assertiveness argument and argue that there is more continuity than change in China’s foreign policy since 2008. For example, see Johnston; Björn Jerdén, “The Assertive China Narrative: Why It Is Wrong and How So Many Still Bought into It,” The Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 7, No. 1 (March 2014), pp. 47–88.

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  34. 34.

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  35. 35.

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  36. 36.

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  37. 37.

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  38. 38.

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  39. 39.

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  40. 40.

    See for example, Tim Huxley and Benjamin Schreer, “Standing up to China,” Survival (December-January 2015), Vol. 57, No. 6, pp. 127–144.

  41. 41.

    For example, China’s more active role in the issues of climate change may be related to its own environmental challenges.

  42. 42.

    For example, see Graham Allison, Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s trap? (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2017). Henry Kissinger also warns that, if China’s peaceful rise does not work, Sino-U.S. relations could look like a version of the Anglo-German rivalry that haunted Europe on the eve of World War I. See Henry Kissinger, On China (New York: Penguin Press, 2011), pp. 513–30.

  43. 43.

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  44. 44.

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  47. 47.

    While each of these factors operates at a different level of analysis, it is possible that all three types—from the overall system, to domestic politics, to the individual—are conducive to China’s more assertive foreign policy. For a level analysis approach to China’s assertive foreign policy, see Nien-Chung Chang Liao, “The Sources of China’s Assertiveness: The System, Domestic Politics or Leadership Preferences?” International Affairs, Vol. 92, No. 4 (July 2016), pp. 817–833.

  48. 48.

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  49. 49.

    Scobell and Harold, “An ‘Assertive’ China?” p. 115.

  50. 50.

    Chinese leaders have long been familiar with the concept of “strategic opportunity” (zhanlue jiyuqi) which implies that a country can concentrate on its own policy goals. For example, during the CCP’s 16th Congress in 2002, Jiang Zemin declared that the next 20 years would be a “period of strategic opportunity” for China’s growth and development. In his first work forum on peripheral diplomacy in October 2013, Xi Jinping also emphasized that the country should strive to “maintain and use well the important strategic opportunity of our country’s development.” See “Xi jinping zai zhoubian waijiao gongzuo zuotanhui shang fabiao zhongyao jianghua [Xi Jinping Delivers Important Speech at the Periphery Diplomacy Work Forum],” Xinhua, October 25, 2013, http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2013-10/25/c_117878897.htm.

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  1. Institute of Political Science, Academia Sinica, Taipei City, Taiwan

    Nien-chung Chang Liao

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  1. Institute of Political Science, Academia Sinica, Taipei City, Taiwan

    Tse-Kang Leng

  2. Graduate School of Asia-Pacific Studies, Waseda University, Tokyo, Japan

    Rumi Aoyama

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Chang Liao, Nc. (2018). Domestic Politics and China’s Assertive Foreign Policy: Why China’s Rise May Not Be Peaceful. In: Leng, TK., Aoyama, R. (eds) Decoding the Rise of China. Palgrave Macmillan, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-8288-7_5

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