Skip to main content

TISCO During the Decade of the 1900s: The Formation Period

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
The House of Tata Meets the Second Industrial Revolution

Part of the book series: Studies in Economic History ((SEH))

  • 333 Accesses

Abstract

Growing market integration , improving institutional setting, and changes in government economic policy during the 19th century were important developments in the founding of the first full-fledged iron and steel maker in colonial India , the Tata Iron and Steel Company (TISCO) . This chapter will cover TISCO during its formation in the first decade of the 20th century by focusing on the two aspects of the procurement of necessary inputs and the realization of corporate structure .

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 139.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 179.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 179.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    Basic biographical information on J. N. Tata and his family can be found in Elwin (1958), Fraser (1919), Harris (1958), Lala (1981, 1984, 1992, 1995, 2004, 2007), Sen (1975), and Wacha (1914).

  2. 2.

    The managing agents of the Tatas changed the name several times after the founding in 1887. We use Tata Sons throughout this monograph to avoid confusion.

  3. 3.

    The report was written at the Government’s request by R. H. Mahon , who was deputy director -general of ordnance with experience during the second half of the 19th century as the superintendent of Cossipore Ordnance Factory, where the production of steel was successfully undertaken. At the time, Mahon was recognized as “the first expert” in India on iron and steel manufacturing (Sen 1975, p. 32).

  4. 4.

    Sen has noted that both Hamilton and Curzon “eagerly sought…the investment of British capital in Indian iron and steel industry ” (Sen 1975, p. 34).

  5. 5.

    C. U. Wills , third Secretary of the Chief Commissioner of Central Provinces , to Secretary to Government of India (Department of Commerce and Industry), 15 May 1912, Geology and Mineral-A (Department of Commerce and Industry), May 1912, pro. 25–26, File 79, part B, National Archives of India, Delhi, India (NAI).

  6. 6.

    ibid. The underline is in original.

  7. 7.

    C. P. Perin had worked as a chemist, superintendent , and general manager of blast furnaces and steel works in Alabama, Kentucky, and Tennessee before he was hired by TISCO. Concerning his career as TISCO see TISCO (1937, p. 253ff).

  8. 8.

    This means that the Tatas basically were to follow the US model of iron and steelmaking. Bagchi has remarked on the cotton mill industry of colonial India , “India’s early retardation in textile technology and business organization in comparison with Japan may have owed as much to the blinkered imitation of British models ” (Bagchi 1997, p. 21). In contrast, the Tata iron and steel venture would take a different path.

  9. 9.

    Progress report on iron and steel manufacturing in Central Provinces of India, 1903, Weld Papers, File A 24, p. 28, Tata Steel Archives , Jamshedpur , India (TSA).

  10. 10.

    Gupta and Chaliha, ‘Nostalgia: Life and times of P. N. Bose ’, P. N. Bose Papers, Box 646, File 5, Tata Central Archives , Pune , India (TCA).

  11. 11.

    Ibid.; Harris (1958, pp. 179–80).

  12. 12.

    Gupta and Chaliha, ‘Nostalgia: Life and times of P. N. Bose ’, P. N. Bose Papers, Box 646, File 5, TC, Pune , India.

  13. 13.

    Mahon wrote in his report that, “ore of a promising nature… yielded 71.2, 63.4, 59.7 of iron … and 0.03, 0.16, 0.19 of phosphorus, respectively” (Mahon 1899, p. 12). Because of its high percentage of iron and a low percentage of phosphorous , the iron ore from Gorumahisani hill and the Dhalli and Rajhara hills was excellent for iron and steel making.

  14. 14.

    C. P. Perin and C. M. Weld , Perin and Weld Report , 1905, TSA (PWR).

  15. 15.

    Perin and Weld reported in 1905 that “The cost of mining this ore [of the Dhalli and Rajhara Hills] will be the same as at Gorumahisani…The railway lead will bring the total cost [of the Dhalli and Rajhara Hills] delivered Sini [proposed worksite at that time] up to Rs. 580 per ton” while “Freight [of iron ore from Gorumahisani Hill ] to Sini…brings the total estimate for the ore delivered Sini up to Rs. 240” (PWR, pp. 18–9).

  16. 16.

    Thomson, Kilburn and Co. to Shapurji Saklatvala , Tata and Sons, 4 November 1904, Padshah Papers, Box 1, File 1, TSA.

  17. 17.

    TISCO, Annual report of TISCO (ART), 1906/07, TSA.

  18. 18.

    The names, locations and dates of acquired TISCO’s collieries are Bhelatand, Jharia, 1 Jan. 1910, Malkera-Choitodih, Jharia, 1 May. 1913 Jamadoba, Jharia, 1 Jan. 1917, Pits 6 and 7, Jharia, 1 Jan. 1917, Digwadih, Jharia, 1 Jan. 1917, Ovirampur, Raniganj, 18 May 1917, Sijua, Jharia, 17 Feb. 1918, and Purusottampur, Raniganj, 11 Sep 1918 (Simmons 1977).

  19. 19.

    According to Morris, the Tatas ’ success in securing a cheap and reliable mineral supply was one of the most important factors in the successful development of TISCO (Morris 1983, p. 588).

  20. 20.

    C. M. Weld , Progress report on iron and steel manufacture in Central Provinces of India, 1903, Weld Papers, File A 24, TSA.

  21. 21.

    Ibid.

  22. 22.

    Ibid.

  23. 23.

    PWR.

  24. 24.

    Ibid.

  25. 25.

    Ibid.

  26. 26.

    Ibid.

  27. 27.

    Ibid.

  28. 28.

    Ibid.

  29. 29.

    Ibid.

  30. 30.

    Padshah to R. D. Tata , 28 July 1905, Padshah Papers, Box 2. The 40,000 sterling pounds mentioned was about equivalent to Rs. 600,000 in 1905. We have no information on the surnames of “Ardeshir and Bejonji,” although we may assume them to have been leading figures at Tata Sons .

  31. 31.

    Alex Sahlin , Report on conditions in India favouring a Swadeshi Iron Industry as found during a 10 weeks visit, January–April 1908, Kennedy Papers, Box A47, TSA. Alex Sahlin was the partner of Julian Kennedy , who had advised J. N. Tata during his US visit, in the firm of Julian Kennedy , Sahlin and Company Limited headquartered in Pittsburgh with a branch in Brussels (Harris 1958, p. 166).

  32. 32.

    Bahl also notes that TISCO revised the original design for the works by modifying the capital requirements due to a shortage of funds. Based on confidential files of the Department of Commerce and Industry, Bahl has shown that TISCO unofficially enquired at the Secretary of the Geological Survey Office in India whether “the Government would be willing to take about 50 lakhs of Rupee-worth of 5% debentures in TISCO, in case they failed to raise the money in the open market” (Bahl 1995, p. 76), to which the Government replied in the negative, although TISCO offered to place a representative of the Government on its board of directors .

  33. 33.

    Alex Sahlin , Report on conditions in India favouring a Swadeshi Iron Industry as found during a 10 weeks visit, January–April 1908, Kennedy Papers, Box A47, TSA.

  34. 34.

    Ibid.

  35. 35.

    ART, 1906/07.

  36. 36.

    How the Tatas constructed the industrial centre at Kalmati, now Jamashedpur, is an interesting subject although we do not study it in detail here. See, for instance, Dutta (1977).

  37. 37.

    ART, 1907/08 and 1908/09.

  38. 38.

    ART, 1911/12.

  39. 39.

    Ibid.

  40. 40.

    The facts presented below on capital funding was originally published in Nomura (2014).

  41. 41.

    Godrej to Padshah, 14 September 1906, Padshah Papers, Box 3, File 1, pp. 1–2, TSA. Bahl also quotes this letter (Bahl 1995, pp. 72–3).

  42. 42.

    ART, 1911/12. The investment made by the Maharaja Scindia of Gwalior, who “advanced a large part of the necessary working capital” in 1911, was a boon for the company in its initial operations (Morris 1987, p. 143).

  43. 43.

    Annual Reports state that the capital raised by the company by 1907/1908 and 1908/1909 came to Rs. 6.6 million and Rs. 9.7 million, respectively (ART, 1907/08 and 1908/09). According to the Annual Report of 1908/09, the board of directors of TISCO was composed of D. J. Tata, Thakore Sahib of Morvi, A. J. Bilimoria , Sassoon David , J. Cowasji Jehangir , Vithalds Damodher Thackersey , Gordhandas Khattau , Fazulbhoy Currimbhoy Ebrahim , Narottam Morarjee Goculdas , M. A. Tana and P. D. Pattani.

  44. 44.

    According to Johnson (1966), the Parsi community purchased 36% of TISCO’s share capital in 1911, adding that the community still held 26% of the shares, even when contribution by the House of Tata is excluded. The significance of Parsi network communities for industrial investment has been considered to be the result of limited informational asymmetries between members of the community (Gupta 2014, 2016, pp. 72–3). Moreover, there is a view assuming that Parsis are people with a preference for investment, on which Chandavarkar has cast doubt, stating, “it would be misleading to assume that entrepreneurial behaviour can be understood exclusively in terms of community . Business in Bombay often cut across these primordial lines. Vanias invested in the carrying trade of Parsis and Khojas (Chandavarkar 1994, p. 58)… The development of a Parsi enterprise demonstrates rather more clearly that their acceptance of greater risks in the export trade or factory industry was largely a function of their narrowing options elsewhere” (p. 59).

  45. 45.

    The share capital of TISCO increased by only Rs. 100,000 over the 24 years after 1927/28.

  46. 46.

    In this chapter, we use information from the initial period of company formation in addition to information from the later colonial period. The use of information from the later period to describe corporate structure in initial phase of TISCO business is justified because of basic continuity in the framework of the company’s corporate structure throughout the colonial period.

  47. 47.

    ART, 1908/09 and 1931/32.

  48. 48.

    When the separation of ownership and management is present, a principal-agent problem may develop between shareholders and managers (Amatori and Colli 2011, Chap. 10; Lamoreaux et al. 2009, Chap. 3), a problem that was not seriously experienced by TISCO during the colonial period.

  49. 49.

    List of minutes forwarded to the chief accountant of Jamshedpur , 13 Feb. 1941, General Managers’ Correspondence (GMC) Papers, File 176 part 2, p. 334, TSA.

  50. 50.

    Datta (1990, p. 47) calls directors with Mahajan origins “prestige directors ” based on Brimmer’s definition.

  51. 51.

    The facts presented below on voting rights was originally published in Nomura (2014).

  52. 52.

    Minutes of the meeting of the board of directors of TISCO on 15 August 1918, Minutes of the Meeting of the board of directors of TISCO Papers No. 2, Box 509, p. 93, TCA.

  53. 53.

    We have no evidence on proxies entrusted to the House of Tata or to other directors of TISCO.

  54. 54.

    Minutes of the meeting of the board of directors of TISCO held on 18 November 1924, Minutes of the Meeting of the board of directors of TISCO Papers No. 4, Box 509, p. 68, TCA, Pune . Table 3.2 shows that Tata Sons purchased their second preference share after 1924, presumably in response to Jehangir’s criticism.

  55. 55.

    Tata Sons to D. J. Tata and R. D. Tata , 28 July 1905, Company’s Formation Papers, File 1, TSA.

  56. 56.

    List of subjects to be taken up by the directors at the Sakchi (renamed as Jamshedpur in 1919) Meeting, December 1918, GMC Papers, File 95 pp. 264–5, TSA.

  57. 57.

    Markovits also noted the busy business life of directors (Markovits 1985, pp. 15–6).

  58. 58.

    For the features of the managing agency contract , see, for example, Nomura (2014).

  59. 59.

    Notes regarding Tata Ltd. London, 14 October 1924, Tata Sons Limited Papers, File Tata Limited London, TSA.

  60. 60.

    Because we lack sufficient organizational details, we will refrain from drawing any definitive conclusions; however, there is the impression that Tata Sons had a organization similar to a multi-divisional, decentralized managerial structure (M-form) or holding managerial structure (H-form) , according to business history terminology. The features of these forms are explained by Cassis. “(In the interwar period,) this new (M-form) structure, which appeared in the United States in the 1920s in such firms as General Motors or DuPont, was decentralized and consisted of autonomous divisions, each of them corresponded to the firm’s main product lines and responsible for the various functions previously found in the multifunctional (U-form) structure …. In the meantime, other organizational structures continued to exist or to co-exist with others. In France , for example, holding companies controlling dense networks of crossed ownerships and interlocking directorships proved a flexible structure facilitating cooperation, financing, and technological transfers while saving managerial resources” (Cassis 2009, pp. 183–4). Interestingly, Bird and Heilgers , one of the leading UK managing agents in colonial India , also had a corporate structure similar to the M-form. (Nomura 2014). In any case, we will leave categorization of the organizational setup of managing agents such as Tata Sons open to future analysis.

  61. 61.

    Peterson’s career seems to indicate that Tata Sons employed individuals with Government connections, as noted by Markovits, who found that Tata Son’s employing ex-government officials to be a lobbying channel to the Government. Such a hiring strategy was of mutual interest to both the company and the Government as dominant suppliers and purchasers of iron and steel in the Indian market, and placed the Tatas in an advantageous position vis-a-vis other Indian industrialists (Markovits 1985, p. 27). In addition to Peterson, the Tatas employed several other British ex-officials and businessmen, such as S. K. Sawday , R. H. Mather and Frederick James , all of whom probably maintained close ties with the Government (Bagchi 1972, p. 198).

  62. 62.

    TSA at Jamshedpur stored these lists regularly from the early 1910s until the beginning of the 1930s.

  63. 63.

    Extract from the minutes of the meeting of board of directors on 2 August 1919, GMC Papers, File 99, pp. 116–7, TSA.

  64. 64.

    Padshah to Perin, 29 May 1908, Padshah Papers, Box 1 File 3, TSA.

  65. 65.

    Tata Sons to Woolsey, 11 December 1912, GMC Papers, File 46A, pp. 97–100, TSA.

  66. 66.

    Ibid.

  67. 67.

    Even these checks were irritating to the second general manager , Woolsey. After writing the letter of criticism, Woolsey resigned (Woolsey to Tata Sons , 26 September 1913, GMC Papers, File 51 part 2, pp. 52–5, TSA).

  68. 68.

    Tata Sons to Woolsey and Darlington, 12 June 1913, GMC Papers, File 49, pp. 189–91, TSA. The letter also stated, “The General Manager should submit to the board for their consideration and sanction a schedule of maximum and minimum salaries attached to all covenanted posts.”

  69. 69.

    “The proposed new post of General or Chief Accountant will be under the supervision of the General Manager but the appointment or dismissal of that officer will be in the Board’s hands (Tata Sons to Woolsey, General Manager of TISCO, and Darlington, 12 June 1913, GMC Papers, File 49, pp. 189–91, TSA).

  70. 70.

    The facts presented here on foremen and millhands was originally published in Nomura (2010).

  71. 71.

    Keenan, General Manager , to Saklatvala, chairman of board of directors of TISCO, 18 February 1935, GMC Papers, File 169 part 1, p. 296, TSA.

  72. 72.

    “Staff Training Department Break New Ground,” Supervisors’ News Letter, vol. 5, no. 5, 1960, pp. 7–8, TSA.

  73. 73.

    To be more precise, it was skilled and semi-skilled workers who were supervised by foremen directly, while unskilled workers, who occupied a small portion of the workforce at the fifth tier, were placed under the supervision of contractors. More details are provided in Chaps. 5 and 7.

  74. 74.

    As will be examined in detail in Chap. 5, these workers basically received relatively higher, and more attractive, wages during the 1910s compared to workers at other modern business corporations, such as railway companies and the Bombay cotton mills.

  75. 75.

    Please refer to the final paragraphs of Sect. 2.4 in Chap. 2 for a description of the “jobber ” system in India.

  76. 76.

    For example Morris states, “In neither of these enterprises [TISCO and the railway companies] did we find the jobber [sub-foreman or overseer] developing the special power he developed in Bombay [cotton mills]” (Morris 1965, p. 131), adding later on, “the management [of TISCO] never found itself forced to give to its low-level jobber equivalents the basic responsibilities for the administration of its workforce. The ramshackle discipline appropriate in Bombay mills…was never feasible in Jamshedpur , and it never appeared” (ibid., p. 209).

  77. 77.

    Chandavarkar notes that also in the case of Bombay cotton mills, timekeepers were at a similar management level as foremen or jobbers (Chandavarkar 1994, p. 305).

  78. 78.

    Handwritten memo from Bilimoria to Tata Iron and Steel , 19 January 1914, GMC Papers, File 52, p. 55, TSA.

  79. 79.

    Tata Sons to Wells, General Manager , 24 February 1912, GMC Papers, File 43 A, pp. 268–9, TSA.

  80. 80.

    Archival evidence cited by Bahl (1995, p. 130) also indicates that TISCO employed an indirect labour management system . “Foremen and others of that class, who held the power in their hands to give jobs, knew well enough how to make the best of the institution and to obtain financial benefits whenever new men were given jobs. It was, therefore, not unusual to find some of them dismissing existing hands and recruiting new hands for monetary consideration. These foremen were responsible for recommending the promotion of their subordinates which gave them further power to exploit the labourers.” Original Source: Proceedings of the Department of Industry (Labour), July 1921, L-941(2), NAI.

  81. 81.

    According to Gospel, indirect labour management systems were also employed at iron and steel manufacturers in the United States, Britain and Germany during the second half of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century, but were gradually replaced by new systems. “Slowly, however, different arrangements developed. Large firms, such as Carnegie and US Steel in the United States, Krupp in Germany , and Schneider in France , substituted their own foreman for internal contractors, began to recruit more systematically, trained workers internally on the job but usually not through apprenticeship systems, and developed employment hierarchies and some of the welfare arrangements… (notably housing, workmen’s compensation, sick pay, and pensions)” (Gospel 2009, p. 428).

  82. 82.

    In the case of colonial India , the influence of foremen over labour management was not exclusive. Basu, for instance, describes in his case study of jute mills at Calcutta that a foreman “had to tread on rather precarious ground, divided between workers’ grievances, managers’ demands, and the needs of allies such as burrababus [lit. “big bosses,” in this context influential figures both in the workplace and in town life]” (Basu 2004, p. 10). See also Chandavarkar (2007). Chapters 5 and 7 will show that such limited authority existed at TISCO during the 1920s and formed the basis for labour unrest during that decade.

  83. 83.

    The report clarifies the origins of 28,674 TISCO workers throughout the 1930s according to province: Assam 215, Bengal 3,473, Bihar 9,089, Bombay 524, the Central Provinces 3,974, Indian States (& Nepal) 1,579, Madras 1,999, Orissa 2,740, Punjab 1,948, United Provinces 2,694, North West Frontier Provinces 322, and outside India proper 117 (TISCO 1938).

  84. 84.

    While several case studies have described the social backgrounds of lower managerial staff of colonial India ’s manufacturing sectors, such as foremen at cotton mills and jute mills (Chakrabarty 1989; Chandavarkar 1994; Basu 2004), there are few studies clarifying their occupational and educational background . Datta (1990) is an exception, showing that some foremen were engineering graduates or diploma holders.

  85. 85.

    Detailed information on these 71 “old” (i.e., veteran, long-time) employees is provided in Nomura (2010, pp. 125–45).

  86. 86.

    According to Bear, Kharagpur was constructed between 1898 and 1900 as “an important intersection between Kolkata and the lines that travelled south to Orissa and west to Chattisgarh on the new Bengal Nagpur Railway ” (Bear 2007, p. 4). A large workshop for the overhaul of locomotives, freight cars, and passenger cars was constructed in the town in 1904, transforming Kharagpur into a major industrial town of east India. Kharagpur workshops became an important source of labour for TISCO throughout the first half of the 20th century, while Kharagpur workshops also supplied labour movement activists in the 1920s.

  87. 87.

    Datta also notes the significance of the railway industry as a source of skilled labour for TISCO, stating, “the Company had had no difficulty obtaining this force [of skilled labour during the early 1920s],” although he does not suggest that such experience was required for entering the fourth tier (Datta 1990, pp. 27–8). We agree with Datta’s view at least up until the mid-1910s, although we question the idea that such labour was readily available during the 1920s. To the contrary, a lack of skilled labour is clearly indicated by TISCO’s decision to establish a full-scale academy specializing in iron and steel industrial technology in 1921, in an attempt to fill the void. For more details on that school, see Chap. 5.

References

  • Amatori, F., & Colli, A. (2011). Business history: Complexities and comparisons. London: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bagchi, A. (1972). Private investment in India, 1900–1939. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Bagchi, A. (1997). The evolution of the state bank of India: The era of the presidency banks, 1876–1920. New Delhi: Sage Publications.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bahl, V. (1995). The making of the Indian working class: A case of the Tata Iron and Steel Company, 1880–1946. New Delhi: Sage Publications.

    Google Scholar 

  • Basu, S. (2004). Does class matter? Colonial capital and workers’ resistance in Bengal, 1890–1937. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bear, L. (2007). Lines of the nation: Indian railway workers, bureaucracy, and the intimate historical self. New York: Columbia University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Camp, J. M., & Francis, C. B. (1940). The making, shaping and treating of steel (5th ed.). Rewritten by C. B. Francis, Carnegie-Illinois Steel Corporation. Pittsburgh, Pa: Carnegie-Illinois Steel Corporation.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cassis, Y. (2009). Big business. In Geoffrey Jones & Jonathan Zeitlin (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of business history. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Chakrabarty, D. (1989). Rethinking working-class history: Bengal, 1890–1940. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Chandavarkar, R. (1994). The origins of industrial capitalism in India: Business strategies and the working classes in Bombay, 1900–1940. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Chandavarkar, R. (2007). The war on the shopfloor. In R. P. Behal & M. van der Linden (Eds.), India’s labouring poor: Historical studies, c.1600-c.2000. New Delhi: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Datta, S. B. (1990). Capital accumulation and workers’ struggle in Indian industrialization: The case of Tata Iron and Steel Company, 1910–1970. Calcutta: K.P. Bagchi.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dutta, M. (1977). Jamshedpur: The growth of the city and its regions. Calcutta: Asiatic Society.

    Google Scholar 

  • Elwin, V. (1958). The story of Tata steel. Bombay: Commercial Printing Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Fraser, L. (1919). Iron and steel in India: A chapter from the life of Jamshedji N. Tata. Bombay: Times Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ghosh, M. (1973). Our struggle: A short history of trade union movement in TISCO industry at Jamshedpur. Calcutta: Firma K. L. Mukhopadhyay.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gospel, H. (2009). The management of labor and human resources. In Geoffrey Jones & Jonathan Zeitlin (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of business history. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Government of India. (1918). Large industrial establishments in India. Calcutta: Superintendent Government Printing.

    Google Scholar 

  • Government of India. (1926). Report of the state railways workshops committee. Calcutta: Government of India, Central Publication Branch.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gupta, B. (2014). Discrimination or social networks? Industrial investment in colonial India. The Journal of Economic History, 74(1).

    Google Scholar 

  • Gupta, B. (2016). The rise of modern industry in colonial India. In L. Chaudhary, B. Gupta, T. Roy, & A. Swamy (Eds.), A new economic history of colonial India. London: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Harris, F. R. (1958). Jamsetji Nusserwanji Tata: A chronicle of his life. Bombay: Blackie.

    Google Scholar 

  • Johnson, W. (1966). The steel industry of India. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Lala, R. (1981). The creation of wealth: A Tata story. Bombay: IBH Publishing.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lala, R. (1984). The heartbeat of a trust: Fifty years of the Sir Dorabji Tata Trust. New Delhi: Tata McGraw-Hill.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lala, R. (1992). Beyond the last blue mountain: A biography of J.R.D. Tata. New Delhi: Penguin India.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lala, R. (1995). The joy of achievement: Conversations with J.R.D. Tata. New Delhi: Viking.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lala, R. (2004). For the love of India: The life and times of Jamsetji Tata. New Delhi: Viking.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lala, R. (2007). The romance of Tata Steel. New Delhi: Viking.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lamoreaux, N. R., Raff, D. M., & Temin, P. (2009). Economic theory and business history. In Geoffrey Jones & Jonathan Zeitlin (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of business history. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lokanathan, P. S. (1935). Industrial organization in India. London: George Allen & Unwin.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mahon, R. H. (1899). A report upon the manufacture of iron and steel in India. Simla: Government of Central Printing Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Markovits, C. (1985). Indian business and nationalist politics 1931–39: The indigenous capitalist class and the rise of the Congress Party. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Morris, M. D. (1965). The emergence of an industrial labor force in India: A study of the Bombay cotton mills, 1854–1947. Berkeley: University of California Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Morris, M. D. (1983). The growth of large-scale industry to 1947. In D. Kumar & M. Desai (Eds.), Cambridge economic history of India (Vol. 2). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Morris, M. D. (1987). Indian industry and business in the age of laizzes-faire. In D. Tripathi (Ed.), State and business in India. Manohar: New Delhi.

    Google Scholar 

  • Nomura, C. (2010). Development of labour management system of Industrial Enterprise in Colonial India: A case study of the Tata Iron and Steel Company. International Journal of South Asian Studies, 3.

    Google Scholar 

  • Nomura, C. (2014). The origin of the controlling power of managing agents over modern business corporations in Colonial India. The Indian Economic and Social History Review, 51(1).

    Google Scholar 

  • Place, Siddons, and Gough (Private) Ltd. Investor’s India yearbook. Bombay: Orient Longmans.

    Google Scholar 

  • Perin, C. P., & Weld, C. M. (1905). Perin and Weld report, stored at Tata Steel Archives.

    Google Scholar 

  • Radhakrishna, B. P. (1997). Pramatha Nath Bose (1855–1934). Current Science, 72(3).

    Google Scholar 

  • Samant, D. R., & Mulky, M. A. (1937). Organisation and finance of industries in India. Calcutta: Longmans, Green.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sen, S. K. (1975). The house of Tata, 1839–1939. Calcutta: Progressive Publishers.

    Google Scholar 

  • Simmons, C. P. (1977). Vertical integration and the Indian steel industry: The colliery establishment of the Tata iron and steel company, 1907–56. Modern Asian Studies, 11(1).

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Spiegelman, R. G. (1960). Protection in India during the interwar period: With special reference to the steel industry. Ph.D. diss., Colombia University.

    Google Scholar 

  • Thacker’s Directories. (1919). Thacker’s Bombay directory, city and island: Together with a directory of the chief industries of Bombay. Calcutta: Thacker’s Directories Limited.

    Google Scholar 

  • TISCO. (1937). TISCO review, 5(4), stored at Tata Steel Archives.

    Google Scholar 

  • TISCO. (1938). Answers to the labour enquiry committee questionnaire, Bihar. Bombay: Tata Iron and Steel Company Ltd.

    Google Scholar 

  • TISCO. (1960). Staff training department break new ground. Supervisors’ News Letter, 5(5), stored at Tata Steel Archives.

    Google Scholar 

  • TISCO. Annual report of TISCO, stored at Tata Steel Archives.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wacha, D. (1914). The life and life work of J. N. Tata. Madras: Ganesh.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Chikayoshi Nomura .

Appendix: TISCO’s Sources of Domestic Labour During the Colonial Era

Appendix: TISCO’s Sources of Domestic Labour During the Colonial Era

Despite India’s relative inexperience in iron and steelmaking using western technology at the beginning of the 20th century, the shop floor workforce of supervisors and skilled and semi-skilled millhands, comprising the fourth and fifth tiers of TISCO’s corporate structure , were usually supplied from the domestic labour market from the company’s very start. The questions of where this workforce was recruited and what level of education and vocational background these workers had before being hired by TISCO will be addressed in this Appendix.

First, let us outline the geographical distribution of the domestic sources of TISCO ’s workforce, for which there is unfortunately minimal evidence for the formation period, but from the end of the 1930s on becomes clearer thanks to the 1938 TISCO publication Answer to the questionnaire of the Labour Enquiry Committee, Bihar.Footnote 81 According to this report, the geographical origins of the employees on the payroll as of 1 April 1938 were mainly from the three provinces in and around Jamshedpur of Bihar, Bengal and the Central Provinces , accounting for almost 60% of the workforce. The report also provides us with district-level information on the origins of workers employed during the past six years since 1932. The district that supplied most of TISCO’s labour was Singhbhum District in Bihar (2,596), where TISCO was located, followed by the port city of Surat in Bombay presidency (754), Raipur in the Central Provinces (669), Cuttack in Orissa (622) and Dacca , Bengal (578), which were located between 1630 km (Surat ) and 220 km (Dhaka) from Jamshedpur , indicating that TISCO had to seek far and wide for over half of its shop floor workforce. Although we have no information on the type or quality of the labour supplied from outside Singhbhum, we can only conclude that TISCO was looking in these remote places for people with specific steelworker experience and skills not available locally. Incidentally, such long distance recruitment and migration to TISCO was made possible by the advances in domestic market integration discussed in the previous chapter.

Turning to the vocational and educational backgrounds of the fourth and fifth tier workforce as a whole,Footnote 82 there is data provided by a feature entitled “Our Old Employee,” often appearing in the TISCO Review, a monthly magazine published mainly in English (and partly in Hindi) beginning in November 1932, which has been preserved in the Tata Steel Archives . The periodical was released to inform TISCO’s literate employees of general notices issued from the company’s Board and general managers and of current company news, such as the results of intramural sporting events, newlyweds, retiring employees, and the hiring of top managers, all for the purpose of creating a sense of loyalty to TISCO and unity among its employees. “Our Old Employee” was an feature tracing the professional and educational career of Indian shop floor workers before and after they were hired by the company. The feature covered a total of 71 employees, most of whom had been with the company since the early 1910s and some of whom had over the last 20 years or so been promoted to the post of foreman .Footnote 83 “Our Old Employee” enables us to identify three characteristic features of the occupation and educational background of TISCO’s clerical workers , the first of which is that most of them had previously worked for the Government or the railway companies, indicating the importance of such work experience in their job performance at TISCO. For example, among the 22 clerical workers appearing in the features, nine had worked for the Government (including one in the armed forces), seven had worked at a railway company , two had been hired by TISCO directly out of a college, while the remaining four had different work and educational backgrounds. Secondly, there seems to be no clear difference in the rates of promotion between those with railway company or government work experience and those directly recruited out of college. Moreover, those who did not have such occupation and educational backgrounds had less chance of promotion. Finally, less than half of the “old employees” had received any formal “school” education (five advancing to college level), which indicates that formal education was by no means a necessary condition for acquiring a clerical position at TISCO.

“Our Old Employee’s” coverage of the skilled position of fitter reveals that first, nine among the total of eleven had worked at a railway company before joining TISCO, indicating such experience as a strong requirement for filling the position at TISCO. Secondly, four of the nine had worked at the Railway Workshop in Kharagpur , Bengal, one of the largest railway maintenance facilities in India.Footnote 84 Next, none of the eleven fitters, except one by the name of J. T. Rufas, were likely to have had learned English, although mostly receiving primary education in local languages or training as apprentices at their previous places of work. Finally, eight of the 11 were promoted to the post of foreman or equivalent despite having no higher education background or English skills.

Occupational experience at a railway company was not a requirement for a machine operator ’s position in an iron and steel production department. Among the nine Indian machine operators covered, only one had previously worked at a railway company , while three had worked at engineering companies, and of the remaining five, only one had experience at a production facility operated by a Western company, meaning that almost half had no workshop experience before joining TISCO. Notwithstanding, three among these four were promoted to such posts as shift foreman , assistant iron breaking foreman and head maistry during their stints at TISCO, although the others with railway or engineering experience were promoted more rapidly to lower managerial posts.

Regarding the 22 remaining “Our Old Employee” subjects, we notice two notable features, the first of which is that ten had previously worked at a railway company , indicating the overall significance of such experience for finding a job at TISCO. Secondly, of those ten, three had worked at the Kharagpur Railway Workshop , suggesting the importance of that city as a source of skilled labour .

Most notable among all the “Our Old Employees” is the professional career of a middle management staff member by the name of Makdum Sheikh , who a few months after joining TISCO in 1911 was promoted to the post of labour foreman and later became the general foreman of the Labour Department . As we will see in more detail in Chaps. 5 and 7, TISCO’s foremen played important roles as “jobbers” in recruiting, supervising and training shop floor workers from 1910s on into at least the 1930s. In this sense, Makdum, who supervised the foremen during that entire time was the key person responsible for controlling the two lowest tiers of the TISCO corporate structure , in keeping with his former career at an army sergeant.

The prevalence of prior experience working in the railway industry or Government agenciesFootnote 85 and the steady promotion of such veterans to the post of foreman or its equivalent at the fourth tier seems to mean that such experience imparted such skills as assembling, operating and repairing modern machinery and performing clerical tasks. These skilled workers also had previous connections with myriad other skilled workers and clerks, and brought many of them along to work in Jamshedpur , greatly assisting the TISCO management (Tata Sons ) in reducing the cost of recruiting and supervising such a huge industrial workforce.

As to how many fourth tier managers who played a significant role in TISCO’s indirect labour management system came out of the railway industry can be estimated based on a statistical examination of the number of railway employees. To begin with, the data show that the Indian railway industry was employing a total of 402,249 persons (387,566 Indian) in 1903 and 589,422 (571,506 Indian) in 1912, not all of which of course sufficiently qualified to work as lower level managers at an iron and steel company. To estimate those so qualified, there are the figures on the number of skilled workers employed at the five railway companies of Eastern Bengal, East Indian, Oudh and Rohilkhad, Great Indian Peninsula and North-Western, which all told accounted for 56.8% of the total expenditures (not total workforce) of the railway industry in 1921/22. A total 98,889 skilled workers were reported by those companies during the mid-1920s, and between 2,000 and 3,000 of them were acting in some kind of supervisory capacity in various iron and steel production -related workshops (GOI 1926). If we assume that these companies’ share of total expenditure in 1921/22 was equivalent to their share of the total workforce at that time, and the ratio of supervisors to total skilled workers was constant throughout the industry, then we can estimate that the total number of skilled workers employed in the railway industry as a whole was approximately 174,100, (23% of the total workforce), among whom approximately 4,500, or were in supervisor positions. On an assumption that the ratio was constant in 1903 and 1912, we estimate that there were 89,140 and 131,446 skilled workers, respectively, in the railway industry in those two years, indicating a huge pool for TISCO to choose from.

As previously mentioned, most of TISCO ’s indigenous labour force had no experience in iron and steel manufacturing, requiring experience workers to be hired from abroad as covenanted labour to fill both top management posts (such as general manager ) and line positions (such as blast furnace assistant). The need for foreign covenanted labour , however, does not lessen the contribution made by skilled indigenous labour supplied by the railway industry and Government agencies from the very start of operations. It was the above estimated rich pool of between 85 and 130,000 skilled railway workers that enabled TISCO to recruit the quality of labour necessary to man its fourth and fifth tiers.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2018 Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd.

About this chapter

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this chapter

Nomura, C. (2018). TISCO During the Decade of the 1900s: The Formation Period. In: The House of Tata Meets the Second Industrial Revolution. Studies in Economic History. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-8678-6_3

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics