Abstract
In this chapter, we explore and propose a systematisation of the complex geography of the mental. We first distinguish between sensations and perceptions (§1). We then move on to propositional attitudes and distinguish between beliefs, desires and intentions as “dispositions” and as “commitments” (§2). Finally (§3), we consider the complex case of emotions, whose nature still escapes philosophical consensus. After presenting and criticising several contemporary accounts, we put forward a borderline view of emotions.
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Notes
- 1.
In what follows, I will not dwell on those aspects of Burge’s overall proposal I am not entirely happy with, such as the notion of a priori knowledge he seems to subscribe to, with the result that we would know a priori certain natural norms regarding perception, or his account of smell and taste according to which these senses do not afford perceptions but merely sensations. For a presentation and a criticism of these aspects of his account, see Coliva 2012a.
- 2.
In this respect, Burge’s account of the content of perception is similar to Christopher Peacocke’s scenario content. Cf. Peacocke 1992, Chap. 3.
- 3.
Burge compellingly criticises Elisabeth Spelke’s claim that bodies are not represented as such in perception. Moreover, he convincingly argues that cohesion, solidity, boundedness and spatio-temporal continuity are properties, which can be represented as such in perception. According to Burge, the ability to discriminate three-dimensional figures from a background and to represent them as cohesive and bounded, together with the ability to track objects perceptually over time (although not necessarily in motion or behind occlusions), is “constitutively necessary to visually representing bodies as such” (2010, pp. 456, 458–459). By contrast, he thinks that perceptual attributions of solidity are not necessary to that end, even if they are sufficient for it. Notice, moreover, that, according to Burge, the ability to perceive bodies as such is not necessary for objective perceptual representation, although it is central to the development of our conceptual system.
- 4.
It is a further issue, which will not concern us here, whether those concepts are the constituents of the proposition itself, or whether the latter consists merely of objects, properties and relations and whether concepts are needed merely to entertain it in thought, or finally whether it is a set of possible worlds—that is, all and only those worlds in which it will rain tomorrow in a given place—or are indeed unstructured abstract entities, which can be entertained just in case one has the relevant concepts.
Similarly, it is a further issue, which we will not address in this volume, which conditions must be satisfied in order for a subject to possess the relevant concepts. For an overview and critical assessment of contemporary theories of concepts, see Coliva 2006.
- 5.
- 6.
This makes it disputable that they could have the relevant beliefs as well, if those depended on having the concepts necessary to grasp the propositions which constitute their contents. If one were in the grip of such preoccupations, then a-conceptual creatures could at least be granted with proto-beliefs, desires and intentions. See Dummett (1996, Chap. 12).
- 7.
There may also be mental states which are attributed from a third party to make sense of a subject’s behaviour, which are unconscious yet are not of a Freudian nature. The example discussed in (iii) would be a case in point if, instead of being self-ascribed, the mental state were ascribed by another person.
- 8.
We will discuss this possibility in the context of our treatment of self-deception.
- 9.
The example is presented and discussed in Wright 1998, pp. 15–16, borrowed from Tanney 1996. Analogous examples could easily be construed for the case of propositional attitudes. Giorgio Volpe has kindly pointed out to me that also Schopenhauer, in On Freedom of the Human Will, holds the view that a person’s character traits are known to her through reflection and inference on her past behaviour.
- 10.
- 11.
Bilgrami makes extensive use of the term; Robert Brandom too, although he is more interested in stressing the social dimension of commitments than the former (or indeed myself). Furthermore, it is not my contention, somehow built in to the very notion of a commitment, that one should have knowledge of all the logical consequences of one’s own beliefs and further propositional attitudes. As Bilgrami points out (2006, pp. 371–372, fn. 7, but see also pp. 376–377, fn. 20), the origin of the use of this term to refer to intentional states (or at least to a class of them) goes back to Isaac Levi.
- 12.
This is the main difference between the present account of commitments and Bilgrami’s. For, in his view, commitments are not dependent on a subject’s judgement.
- 13.
One may even hold that they are intrinsically normative and not merely—as it were, externally—constrained by normative principles. This is indeed the view that I favour and that will be put to use in the diagnosis of Moore’s paradox (see Appendix). There is no need to take a stance on it at this stage, though, for the less committal view would still do, in order to mark out propositional attitudes as commitments from propositional attitudes as dispositions.
- 14.
This is the constraint Bilgrami identifies as essential to commitments, from which, on his view, (b’) and (c’) follow. However, he gives a moral or evaluative twist that it is best to resist. For, in his view, would one be held not only rationally responsible for one’s commitments but also accountable at large. For instance, one might be reproached or resented for having certain commitments (Cf. Bilgrami 2006, p. 226). However, specified in the way Bilgrami characterises it, (d’) is not sufficient to mark out the contrast between commitments and dispositions, because one can criticise or be criticised, and accept to be criticised, also (for) one’s own dispositions, such as the disposition to smoke, or, to take a more loaded example, for wanting to get rid of other male opponents as a result of an unresolved Oedipus complex. But, surely, neither mental state is the result of a subject’s action, for which one can be held rationally responsible, although one may be considered “badly”—in Bilgrami’s extended sense of the term—for having it. It is then not by chance that, as a matter of fact, Bilgrami ends up endorsing the view that “we do have transparent self-knowledge of mental dispositions” (Bilgrami 2006, p. 287). I find this conclusion unpalatable, for, surely, when we do get knowledge of our unconscious mental states we obtain it through a process of self-interpretation or of analysis (that may or may not be guided by a therapist) relevantly similar to the ways in which we may come to attribute mental states to others. So, it seems to me that whatever knowledge we may eventually gain of our unconscious mental states, it is not “transparent” and is actually grounded in observation and inference.
- 15.
- 16.
Cf. Moran 2001, p. 116.
- 17.
“Credo quia absurdum” is usually attributed to Tertullian, even if he did not write it, and is often associated with fideistic positions.
- 18.
Moran 2001, p. 87.
- 19.
This distinction will become crucial in our analysis of Moore’s paradox (see Appendix).
- 20.
I may be reproached for having lied to him, of course, but this would be a moral judgement, which does not change the fact that I did not have any personal commitment in the first place.
- 21.
I have defended this view at length in Coliva 2015. The rejection of the idea that perceptual judgements are immediately justified by one’s perceptual experiences can be found in several other theorists, who, however, provide a different positive account of the structure of perceptual justification. Among them, see Wright 1985, 2004, and Davies 1998, 2004.
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Coliva, A. (2016). Varieties of Mental States. In: The Varieties of Self-Knowledge. Palgrave Innovations in Philosophy. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-32613-3_2
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