Abstract
This chapter builds on the discussion of the Lisbon Treaty to address institutional developments during the Eurozone crisis. It assesses how the crisis has been understood using the so-called new intergovernmentalism, which posits that EU decision-making since Maastricht has come to be dominated by deliberative consensus building, chiefly via the European Council. The chapter argues that while some authors have contended that the Commission emerged as an ‘unexpected winner’ from the crisis, when the wider trends in the EU’s architecture are put in context, the reforms undertaken since 2009 have resulted in the Commission ceding further ground to its institutional rivals.
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Brown, S.A. (2016). The Commission and the Crisis: Chief Loser or Unexpected Winner?. In: The European Commission and Europe's Democratic Process. Palgrave Pivot, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-50560-6_5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-50560-6_5
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Publisher Name: Palgrave Pivot, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-137-50559-0
Online ISBN: 978-1-137-50560-6
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