Abstract
For the two research groups studied, Chaps. 6, 7 and 8 have described how research efforts are divided among group members, how such division of labor creates relations of epistemic dependence and how such dependence relations are facilitated by trust. It was shown that it takes more than an individual effort to create scientific knowledge. Now, given that knowledge creation in much of today’s natural sciences is the result of collaborative effort, philosophers need to explore whether or not scientific knowledge amounts to genuinely collective knowledge. And in fact, during recent years, diverse accounts of collective knowledge have been debated controversially (see, e.g., Andersen, 2010; Cheon, 2014; de Ridder, 2014; Fagan, 2011; Gilbert, 2000; Rolin, 2010; Miller, 2015; Wray, 2001).
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Notes
- 1.
The concept of a belief-holding plural subject has been met with reservation by social epistemologists. Therefore, collective belief is rephrased as a form of “collective acceptance” of a proposition. It is argued that to speak of collective acceptance does not necessitate a plural subject capable of holding mental states (cf. Schmitt, 1994, p. 262; see also Wray 2001; Matthiesen 2006; Giere 2007; Hakli 2007).
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Wagenknecht, S. (2016). Collaboration and Collective Knowledge. In: A Social Epistemology of Research Groups. New Directions in the Philosophy of Science. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-52410-2_9
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