Abstract
This last chapter first summarizes the book’s arguments and findings. It proceeds with a discussion on the implications of the results in three strands of research. First, by addressing the many faces of the EU regulatory space, it contributes to filling an important research gap in the field of EU regulatory governance. Second, it offers an analytical adaptation of the principal-agent framework to complex delegation involving multiple principals and threads of delegation. Third, it shows the relevance of integrating a refined functional approach in the study of institutional design and institutional change. The chapter ends with the identification of promising research venues in the field of EU regulatory governance.
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Mathieu, E. (2016). EU Regulatory Delegation and Institutional Design. In: Regulatory Delegation in the European Union. European Administrative Governance. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-57835-8_6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-57835-8_6
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Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-137-57834-1
Online ISBN: 978-1-137-57835-8
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