Abstract
The author describes the theory behind intuitive and analytical decision making during investigations. Forms of reasoning are described (including their limitations) together with a brief overview of what the fields of neuropsychology and evolutionary psychology might be able to contribute to our understanding. We often make decisions based on a serial assessment of information and we choose the first available workable option that appears to satisfy our requirements. Decisions during major incidents often have to be made in quick time by exercising swift judgement by choosing between options (including not to act). Inevitably, complex situations have to be simplified in the human mind with the number of options considered at any one time severely limited and inferences rapidly drawn. Heuristics are often employed to facilitate this, which whilst often effective are also linked with a number of well-known cognitive biases.
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Notes
- 1.
An economic theory developed by Kahneman and Tversky in the late 1970s.
- 2.
A method of assessing the likelihood of each event and calculated an overall expected value.
- 3.
‘A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice’ first published in 1955 in the Quarterly Journal of Economics and subsequently in Simon’s book Models of Man: Social and Rational.
- 4.
See the concept of ‘satificing’.
- 5.
We use the words ‘innate’, ‘instinct’ and ‘intuition’ rather loosely and interchangeably in this chapter although it is acknowledged that differences between the concepts are often important. ‘Innate’ normally refers to the abilities that we inherit; ‘instinct’ is often taken as an innate automatic behaviour that is reflexive in nature whereas ‘intuition’ is a somewhat wider term referring to an unconscious ability to ‘know’ (which might result from learning, experience or innate traits).
- 6.
A term often employed in police critical incident training.
- 7.
Note that the form of ‘reasoning ’ used in the experiments and subsequent modelling involved participants searching using trial and error methods for 3-digit combinations of numbers (Donoso et al. 2014, p. 1481).
- 8.
And some other species.
- 9.
Adaptation also occurs by other means such as genetic mutation but we omit the details here.
- 10.
‘False positives’ and ‘false negatives’ are parallels of the Type 1 and Type 2 errors encountered in other examples of testing, for example presumptive testing for the presence of illegal drugs or explosives.
- 11.
Rather than, say, on the grounds of a direct threat to a hostage’s life or safety.
- 12.
In ancestral terms presumably this was important for the ability to hunt and to fight.
- 13.
That is, relating to duty and obligation.
- 14.
Technically, if A and B are events then Bayes’ Theorem states that the conditional probability of A given B (written as P(A|B)) is calculated using [P(B|A)P(A)]/P(B).
- 15.
Indeed, as Pinker (2003) observes, in terms of human understanding, in many circumstances calculating the probability of a specific occurrence of an event in time may not make much sense.
- 16.
However, they can also lead us seriously astray.
- 17.
Normally implicitly.
- 18.
In terms of experimentation, the ‘wrong’ decision is often choosing an option that contradicts a rational judgement of economic gain or the correct mathematical assessment of probability. Note however that a cognitive bias does not by necessity lead to a wrong judgement or decision.
- 19.
We notice much more when things happen than when they don’t. This can sometimes have serious implications in decision-making.
- 20.
The ‘self-fulfilling prophecy’, related to ‘tunnel vision’. One way to counter this is ask the question: ‘would the same facts fit an alternative explanation that points to the innocence, rather than guilt of the suspect?’
- 21.
‘I knew it all along! A bias well-known to readers of detective fiction. The problem is that the bias can lead to inaccurate estimations of the likelihood of events.
- 22.
The unwelcome bedfellow of the anchoring and adjustment heuristic.
- 23.
The guidance does not define what constitutes sound reasoning .
- 24.
Note that ‘abduction’ in this context is not related to the criminal act of the same name; an unfortunate coincidence in the context of policing.
- 25.
Technically this is an example of ‘selective abduction’, a method of induction which chooses the most likely explanation from a set of likely explanations (Magnani 2001).
- 26.
There are an infinite number of other possibilities, some of vanishingly small likelihoods, e.g., all the members of the public were hypnotised at the same time and autosuggestion used.
- 27.
In reality by necessity there have to be shortcuts to finding explanations as with n ‘dots’ of information there are 2n − (n + 1) possible combinations of two or more possible explanations to methodically search through (Schum and Starace 1994, pp. 491–492).
- 28.
Occam’s Razor, is a principle in philosophy that essentially advises that ‘of all the possible explanations on offer, accept the simplest’.
- 29.
Known as ‘modus ponens’.
- 30.
Also called ‘modus tollens’.
- 31.
Some of the most well-known examples of the ‘confirmation bias’ derive from experiments conducted in the 1960s by Peter Wason, including the ‘Wason Card Problem’.
- 32.
Technically known as the ‘premises’.
- 33.
Often described as the ‘reverse’ of deduction in the literature although this is somewhat misleading.
- 34.
Or even if.
- 35.
Such as burglary of domestic properties.
- 36.
Such as child homicide by stranger with a sexual motive.
- 37.
The subject of ongoing neurological research.
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Bryant, R. (2019). Innate Reasoning and Critical Incident Decision-Making. In: Roycroft, M., Roach, J. (eds) Decision Making in Police Enquiries and Critical Incidents. Palgrave Pivot, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95847-4_4
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