Skip to main content

Who Caused This Disaster?

  • Chapter
Anatomy of a Financial Crisis
  • 350 Accesses

Abstract

The first three chapters have been devoted to understanding how the financial crisis developed. It has been argued that the house price bubble and the credit bubble that supported it created massive amounts of wildly overvalued mortgage-related assets and derivatives. While many of these assets and derivates were spread throughout the international financial system, large quantities were concentrated in the hands of several important and highly leveraged financial institutions. When the house price bubble collapsed, these assets lost much of their value and several key firms were made insolvent. Because information about the extent of the losses and their location was and remains limited, there was a general loss of confidence in and between financial institutions. For those firms unable to disguise or weather their losses, debt-holder runs followed quickly, forcing bankruptcy or government rescue.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 39.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 54.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Notes

  1. R. Shiller (2005). Irrational Exuberance, second edition. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 18–20.

    Google Scholar 

  2. See C. Kindleberger and R. Aliber (2005), Manias Panics and Crashes, A History of Financial Crises, Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  3. K. Jones and T. Critchfield (2005), Consolidation in the U.S. Banking Industry: Is the “Long, Strange Trip” About to End? FDIC Banking Review, Volume 17, Number 4, 31–61.

    Google Scholar 

  4. See Frederick Mishkin (2006), How Big a Problem Is Too Big to Fail? Journal of Economic Literature, Volume 44, Number 4, December, 988–1004.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  5. G. Benston and G. Kaufman (1998). Deposit insurance reform in the FDIC Improvement Act: The experience to date. Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Economic Perspectives, Volume 22, Number 2, 2–20.

    Google Scholar 

  6. G. Stern and R. Feldman (2004). Too Big to Fail, The Hazards of Bank Bailouts, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 30–32.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Authors

Copyright information

© 2010 Marc Jarsulic

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Jarsulic, M. (2010). Who Caused This Disaster?. In: Anatomy of a Financial Crisis. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230106185_4

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics