Abstract
A game of incomplete information is a game in which at least some of the players possess private information which may be relevant to the strategic interaction. The private information of a player may be about the payoff functions in the game, as well as about some exogenous, payoff-irrelevant events. The player may also form beliefs about other players’ beliefs about payoffs and exogenous events, about their beliefs about the beliefs of others, and so forth.
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Durlauf, S.N., Blume, L.E. (2010). Epistemic Game Theory: Incomplete Information. In: Durlauf, S.N., Blume, L.E. (eds) Game Theory. The New Palgrave Economics Collection. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230280847_11
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230280847_11
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