Abstract
In ‘Internal and External Reasons’ Bernard Williams suggests that internalism about reasons is compatible with the idea that beliefs can motivate; that is, that internalism is compatible with cognitivism about motivation. However, contrary to Williams’ suggestion, I will argue that internalists about reasons are in fact committed to Humeanism about motivation; that is, that internalists about reasons cannot allow that beliefs can motivate in their own right. Since I believe that Humeanism about motivation is false, I think internalism about reasons implies something false, and that therefore internalism about reasons should be rejected. In this essay I shall say nothing about why I think Humeanism is false; rather, my aim will be to establish that internalism about reasons is compatible only with (or makes sense only on) a Humean theory of motivation. To do this, I will try to show that cognitive motivational internalism (CMI) is, at best, an unstable position.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Copyright information
© 2009 Kent Hurtig
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Hurtig, K. (2009). Why Internalists about Reasons should be Humeans about Motivation. In: Pigden, C.R. (eds) Hume on Motivation and Virtue. Philosophers in Depth. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230281158_9
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230281158_9
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-30186-7
Online ISBN: 978-0-230-28115-8
eBook Packages: Palgrave Religion & Philosophy CollectionPhilosophy and Religion (R0)