Abstract
When, why, and how do transnational actors (TNAs) gain access to international institutions?1 While a prominent trend in global governance in recent years is an increasing tendency for states and international institutions to involve TNAs as policy experts, service providers, and compliance watchdogs, the understanding of the factors that shape such participation is still weak.2 The purpose of this chapter is to lay the ground for systematic research on transnational access, by proposing three analytical approaches, informed by rational choice institutionalism, sociological institutionalism, and power-oriented institutionalism.3 For each approach, I explain the general theoretical logic and identify testable hypotheses, paying specific attention to expected patterns of variation across time, institutions, policy phases, and actors.4
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© 2010 Jonas Tallberg
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Tallberg, J. (2010). Transnational Access to International Institutions: Three Approaches. In: Jönsson, C., Tallberg, J. (eds) Transnational Actors in Global Governance. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230283220_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230283220_3
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