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The Super-Rich Game

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The Super-Rich
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Abstract

The new global financial system, which provides the framework for the operations of the new, mobile, super-rich elite, is now in place and appears to be increasingly stable and sustainable. It is driven by a powerful economic logic — the imperatives of free-market capitalism; and its ideology — international freedom and pluralism — underpins its support amongst opinion formers. It also has a growing constituency amongst the more bounded, less affluent — who, although not directly involved in the global economy are, like millions of Western pensioners, increasingly dependent upon its success.

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Notes and References

  1. Cited in Hans-Peter Martin and Harald Schumann, The Global Trap: Globalization and the Assault on Prosperity and Democracy (London and New York: 1997), p. 163.

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  2. US figures from Kennickell and Woodburn, op. cit. in note 5 previous chapter. British figures from John Hills, Income and Wealth (Joseph Rowntree Foundation, Feb. 1995), p. 94.

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  3. It is impossible to provide reasonably accurate hourly wage rates for some countries, particularly China, but a measure of the huge discrepancy between living standards can be seen in per capita GNP figures (GNP per capita in 1992 US dollars): China $470, USA $23,240, UK $17,790, Japan $28,190, Germany $23,030, France $22,260. In the US the average hourly earnings of production and non-supervisory workers on private non-farm payrolls was $11,82 per hour for 34.4 hours per week in 1996, World Bank Atlas (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1995).

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© 2000 Stephen Haseler

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Haseler, S. (2000). The Super-Rich Game. In: The Super-Rich. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230285965_2

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