Heath and the Atlanticists — Heath’s ‘Big Push’

Abstract

Towards the end of 1962 increasing Gaullist obstructionism and deteriorating home opinion created a ‘now or never attitude’ within the British government. The President of the Commission, but especially the Germans, were singled out as ‘key factors’ for an eventual success in Brussels. Personal pressure was first put on Hallstein who, with the help of the Americans, became more accommodating towards British accession. This in turn served as an important precedent for the idea of using similar tactics with the Germans and, in particular, with Adenauer. Schröder also played an important part in British calculations. This, it appears, must be attributed to a combination of factors: as German Foreign Minister he was crucial to a constructive solution in Brussels; as a rising star in German domestic politics he was important for a prospective post-Adenauer era; and in a combination of both he took centre stage for the British attempts to isolate Adenauer in German politics and force him to become more receptive to British ideas. Therefore, the meeting between the Lord Privy Seal and the German Foreign Minister at Chequers on 7 and 8 January 1963 thought of special importance, was actually held as part of a series of high powered bilateral consultation meetings to bring the negotiations to a successful conclusion.¹